An empirical investigation of post-completion error: A cognitive perspective. by Li, S.Y-W.
2 8 0 9 0 7 6 9 3 1
REFERENCE ONLY
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON THESIS
Degree 10 V\D Year ^  ^  ® ^  Name of Author / _  1 ,v l
)
A
COPYRIGHT
This is a thesis accepted for a Higher Degree of the University of London. It is an 
unpublished typescript and the copyright is held by the author. All persons consulting 
the thesis must read and abide by the Copyright Declaration below.
COPYRIGHT DECLARATION
I recognise that the copyright of the above-described thesis rests with the author and 
that no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the 
prior written consent of the author.
LOAN
Theses may not be lent to individuals, but the University Library may lend a copy to 
approved libraries within the United Kingdom, for consultation solely on the premises 
of those libraries. Application should be made to: The Theses Section, University of 
London Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.
REPRODUCTION
University of London theses may not be reproduced without explicit written 
permission from the University of London Library. Enquiries should be addressed to 
the Theses Section of the Library. Regulations concerning reproduction vary 
according to the date of acceptance of the thesis and are listed below as guidelines.
A. Before 1962. Permission granted only upon the prior written consent of the 
author. (The University Library will provide addresses where possible).
B. 1962 - 1974. In many cases the author has agreed to permit copying upon
completion of a Copyright Declaration.
C. 1975 - 1988. Most theses may be copied upon completion of a Copyright
Declaration.
D. 1989 onwards. Most theses may be copied.
This thesis comes within category D.
□
□
This copy has been deposited in the Library of _
This copy has been deposited in the University of London Library, Senate 
House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.
lOund By 
Blissett BookbinC 
020  8992  396E

An Empirical Investigation of Post-Completion Error 
A Cognitive Perspective
Simon Yau-Wai Li
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
of the 
University of London
Department of Psychology 
University College London
September 2006
1
UMI Number: U593061
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U593061
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
I, Simon Yau-Wai Li, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where 
information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in 
the thesis.
2
Abstract
Forgetting to retrieve your original after photocopying, forgetting to collect your card after a 
withdrawal from a cash machine, are examples of a specific type of omission error termed 
post-completion error (Byrne & Bovair, 1997). A post-completion error (PCE) is the 
omission of a “clean-up” step after the main goal of a task is fulfilled. The error phenomenon 
has the property of being infrequent but persistent; it does not occur very often and, yet, it 
continues to occur now and again.
This thesis is an empirical investigation of PCE to examine factors that provoke or mitigate 
the error. The investigation consists of two series of experiments. The first series of 
experiments is an extension of Byrne & Bovair’s finding of the effect of high working 
memory demand on the increased occurrences of PCE. A novel paradigm was designed and 
adopted in the experiments; it was found that PCE also occurs in problem-solving tasks, 
which impose a high demand on working memory load. Results from the experiments also 
suggest that the use of static visual cues may reduce the error rate.
The second series of experiments investigates the effect of interruption on PCE in a 
procedural task paradigm. Based on the activation-based goal memory model (Altmann & 
Trafton, 2002) predictions were made on the effect of interruption position and duration on 
the error. Results show that PCE is more likely to occur with interruption occurring just 
before the post-completion step. Interruption occurring earlier in the task has no effect on 
PCE rate; it was found to be the same as having no interruptions at all. Moreover, interruption 
as brief as 15 seconds was found to be disruptive enough to increase PCE rate. The same 
disruptive effect was also obtained for other non-PCEs.
The scarcity and disparate nature of the existing theoretical approaches to PCE motivated a 
meta-theoretical analysis of PCE. The analysis has resulted in the identification of the major 
criteria required for an adequate account of PCE. Although a complete cognitive model of 
PCE is beyond the scope of the current thesis, the meta-theoretical analysis offers new 
insights into the understanding of PCE and aids future theoretical development.
The current thesis constitutes a methodological advance in studying PCE. New factors that 
provoke or mitigate the occurrence of the error were identified through empirical 
investigations. New insights into the understanding of the error were also possible through a 
meta-theoretical analysis within a coherent theoretical structure.
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“To err is human” sums up very succinctly that making errors is an inherent characteristic 
of human behaviour. The study of human error is not only important for practical reasons 
in the safety critical domains but is also interesting from a psychological perspective. 
Researchers such as Rasmussen (1982) and Reason (1990) suggest that rather than 
viewing human error as “fault”, error can be viewed as an important part of behaviour 
that enables humans to learn and adapt to the environment.
To describe the particular kind of error that this thesis investigates, it is best to begin by 
giving some anecdotes from our everyday activity:
• Walking away from a photocopier with the copies in hand but leaving the original 
document behind.
• After withdrawing money from an automatic teller machine (ATM), walking 
away with the cash in hand but leaving the cash card behind.
• Having taken out dinner from an oven after 30 minutes of cooking time, forgetting 
to switch the oven off.
• Leaving change behind in a vending machine having bought the desired item.
The above anecdotes are all errors that share some common features:
• Each involves an action sequence that opens with satisfying some precondition 
(that the original be on the glass of the photocopier, that the card be inserted into 
the ATM, that the oven is switched on, that money is inserted into the vending 
machine).
• There is a subsequent action sequence that achieves the main goal of the 
interaction (that copies are obtained, that cash is acquired, that dinner is cooked, 
that change is collected).
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• There is a final ‘clean-up’ step to restore the state of the system (original 
retrieved, card retrieved, oven switched off, change collected).
This type of omission error that involves omitting a functionally isolated step has been 
documented back in the 1980s (Rasmussen, 1980; 1982; 1987) and in the Human- 
Computer Interaction (HCI) literature as an error due to closure of a task (Dix, Finlay, 
Abowd & Beale, 1998). Curzon and Blandford (2001) provide a useful concept, termed 
interaction invariant, to describe the error. An interaction invariant describes that some 
part of a system to be perturbed in order to achieve the desired goal; the perturbations 
need to be undone at the end of the interaction. For example, an original document has to 
be placed under the lid of a photocopier in order to make the photocopies required, and 
the original has to be retrieved to return the photocopier to its initial state.
The term “post-completion error” (PCE) was introduced by Byrne and Bovair (1997) to 
describe the error phenomenon. Byrne and Bovair (1997, p. 32) define PCE as errors 
associated with a task characteristic that “some action is required to be performed after 
the main goal of the task has been satisfied or completed.” While this definition captures 
the essence of the mentioned anecdotes, there are a number of examples that are similar 
to the description provided by Byrne and Bovair, but yet differ in a subtle way. Consider 
the following two examples:
• Setting a VCR with the appropriate times and channel but forgetting to press the 
“Record” button to set it to record.
• Setting an alarm clock with the desired time but forgetting to switch on the alarm.
Suppose the last step in each of the above example is carried out correctly (VCR set to 
“Record” and alarm switched on) the main goal is still not completed until the desired 
program is recorded or one is woken up at a particular time. However, they both involve 
omitting, arguably, a functionally isolated step at the end of an interaction. Using Curzon 
and Blandford’s concept of interaction invariant, the VCR and alarm clock examples can 
be viewed as a second class of PCEs that omit the opening perturbation, but finish with a 
confirmatory step.
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Defining a particular kind of error and classifying examples according to a precise error 
definition is usually open to slightly different interpretation. This is also part of the reason 
for the proposal of different terminologies such as “termination error” (Thimbleby, 1990) 
and “omitted secondary subgoal” (Young, 1994) describing the same error phenomenon 
as PCE describes. Nonetheless, the essence of the error in the number of examples 
mentioned above is that the final step of the task is secondary or peripheral to the main 
task goal, and needs to be carried out before moving on to the next task goal. The term 
PCE is used to refer to the error phenomenon in this thesis because the current work is 
largely motivated by the study carried out by Byrne and Bovair (1997).
In the above anecdotes a PCE might cause mere annoyance or inconvenience to our daily 
routine, however, in high-reliability and safety-critical systems, the consequences of 
human error can be severe. Rasmussen (1980) analysed 200 error incidents in nuclear 
power plants and identified that omission of functionally isolated steps, such as forgetting 
to set valves in the appropriate position, account for 34% of all incidents.
From a psychological point of view, it is important to understand the causes of error 
behaviour in terms of the underlying psychological mechanisms. Experimental studies of 
human error in the domain of cognitive psychology have investigated, for example, errors 
in statistical problem solving (Allwood, 1984), rule-based errors in arithmetic thinking 
(e.g. Payne & Squibb, 1990; Ben-Zeev, 1995) and slips in speech (Baars, 1992). 
However, there has been little experimental work investigating human error in the context 
of Human Computer Interaction (HCI), particularly on capturing error behaviours under 
controlled laboratory settings.
The scarce number of experimental studies of human error in HCI, as Senders and Moray 
(1991, p.2) suggest, is because “error is frequently considered only as a result or measure 
of some other variable, and not a phenomenon in its own right.” One of the challenges in 
human error research is to design a suitable methodological paradigm that allows the 
desired error behaviour to be generated to a level that is adequate for comparing various 
independent manipulations statistically. However, recent research has attracted attention 
to the empirical studies of human error and suggests two approaches to investigate human
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error experimentally. One approach is to collect a large database of errorful and error-free 
performance in interactive behaviour and then subject the obtained data to fine-grain 
analysis (e.g. Gray, 2000). The other approach is to design an artificial task environment 
to provoke a particular kind of error behaviour in a controlled experimental setting (e.g. 
Byrne & Bovair, 1997).
The current thesis adopts the approach of having a controlled experimental setting to 
study various factors that provoke or mitigate the occurrence of PCE. While naturalistic 
approaches to studying human error have ecological validity, it is very difficult to isolate 
the identified variable(s) and study because there are often many things going on at the 
same time when carrying out a study “in the wild” .
The first goal of the current thesis is to study PCE empirically in order to identify factors 
that provoke or mitigate the error. This goal is tackled by two series of empirical 
investigations: traditionally, research on PCE has been confined within the boundary of 
procedural tasks (e.g. Byrne & Bovair, 1997), however, informal observations from a 
number of anecdotes suggest that PCE may also occur in problem-solving situations (e.g. 
Poison, Lewis, Rieman, & Wharton, 1992). The first series of experiments (Chapter 3) is 
an investigation of PCE in problem-solving and the effects of a static visual cue on PCE.
Although interruption research generally finds that interruptions have disruptive effect on 
primary performance (e.g. Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; Hodgetts & Jones, 2005, 2006a and 
2006b), there is no existing study investigating the effect of interruption position and 
duration on PCE. The second series of experiments (Chapter 6) examine the effects of 
interruption on PCE.
The second goal of the current thesis is to examine critically the existing theoretical 
accounts of PCE (Chapter 4) in order to gain theoretical insights into the error 
phenomenon. This is carried out through a meta-theoretical analysis bringing the 
seemingly disparate and incommensurable theoretical accounts under a coherent structure 
for comparative analysis. Although the analysis is not able to specify a complete model of 
PCE, it suggests that any adequate theoretical accounts should address three criteria: (1) 
how the task in question is carried out, (2) how PCE arise from the task performance
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behaviour, and (3) how the infrequent but persistent nature of the error is manifested. 
This meta-theoretical analysis also suggests Altmann and Trafton’s (2002) activation- 
based goal memory model as a suitable theoretical basis to pursue the effect of 
interruption on PCE in a procedural task paradigm (Chapter 6).
The scope of the current thesis is described at the end of the next chapter, Chapter 2, 
which is a literature review of some of the major psychological research in human error in 
general, the empirical studies and theoretical accounts of PCE. Chapter 3 is the series of 
three experiments investigating PCE in problem-solving and the effect of static visual cue 
on PCE. Chapter 4 is the meta-theoretical analysis of extant PCE accounts. Chapter 5 is a 
literature review of existing research on interruption relevant to the current thesis. 
Chapter 6 is the series of four experiments examining the effects of interruption on PCE, 
and Chapter 7 is a concluding chapter summarising and discussing the implication of 
findings and contribution to knowledge of the current thesis.
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1 Introduction
Major accidents involving safety-critical systems such as nuclear power plants (e.g. Three 
Mile Island incident in 1979), the space shuttle (e.g. Challenger disaster in 1986) and 
mass transit transport (e.g. Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987) are typically judged to be 
related to human error (Reason, 1990). However, human error as a research topic has not 
had as long a history as it deserves. The study of human error did not receive serious 
attention in the context of human-computer interaction (HCI), human factors (HF) and 
psychology until the early 80’s. Moreover, traditionally, psychological research was 
primarily focused on error-free behaviour and not erroneous performance.
The first collective research effort on human error emerged in a conference held in 
Bellagio, Italy, sponsored by NATO in 1983. The conference involved participants from 
different academic disciplines: philosophy, psychology, mathematics and engineering. 
Discussions from the conference resulted in Senders and Moray’s (1991) book —  Human 
error: Cause, prediction and reduction. One of the main outcomes of the conference 
highlights an inherent difficulty in the study of human error, which is to arrive at an 
agreeable definition of the term “human error” across the different disciplines. However, 
Senders and Moray (1991) noted a generally accepted definition of human error among 
the different researchers and it usually contains the following attributes: 1) not intended 
by the actor; 2) not desired by a set of rules or an external observer; or 3) that led the task 
or system outside its acceptable limits (p. 25). These attributes include notions, such as, 
intention of an individual, the desirability of some performance outcome, and that the 
outcome is assessed against a task or system criterion. These definitional attributes are 
useful as a starting point in communicating what the term “human error” means in 
general.
The difficulty in arriving at a precise and universal definition of human error across 
different disciplines reflects the interdisciplinary approach to the research topic as a 
whole. The following sections serve as a brief review of the different perspectives or 
approaches in human error research, and the position adopted by the current thesis is then 
grounded in context.
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2 Different perspectives in human error research
The need for a multi-disciplinary approach to research of human error is not only because 
it draws on a wide body of knowledge, but also because when searching for a causal 
explanation of human error there is no objective rule indicating when is the “best” point 
to stop the search (Rasmussen, Pejtersen & Goodstein, 1994). As Rasmussen pointed out, 
it is always possible to trace back one step further along a causal chain of events that is 
related to an error, and it is entirely dependent on an analyst’s knowledge or approach to 
the investigation to decide the “cause” of the error after the fact. In general, there are two 
major perspectives in human error research and they can be described as the broad 
perspective and the narrow perspective. The different perspectives adopted not only affect 
how a researcher approaches a problem but also how the researcher explains an observed 
phenomenon. The following sections describe the two major perspectives in human error 
research and show which perspective the current thesis adopts.
2.1 A broad perspective
The nature of the broad perspective in human error research can be reflected by the 
definition of human error adopted by HF researchers such as Sanders and McCormick 
(1993): “Human error is an inappropriate or undesirable human decision or behaviour that 
reduces, or has the potential for reducing, effectiveness, safety, or system performance.” 
(p. 656). This broad perspective emphasises that investigations of human error should 
take into consideration the entire system and not only the operator who is likely to be 
perceived as directly related to the error under investigation. The term “system” in this 
context usually refers to not only the physical technology but also a wider range of 
components in a work system, such as equipment designers, maintenance staff, 
supervisors, and managers. This broad perspective of human error is usually adopted by 
accident/incident investigators, whose primary interest is to attribute the cause of an error 
through retrospective analysis, or by system designers whose interest is to identify 
potential changes to a work system that will improve overall performance.
The broad perspective of human error is directly compatible with Reason’s (1990) 
proposed distinction of latent error versus active error. Latent errors are similar to 
pathogens in the human body that may remain dormant for a long time before having any
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adverse effects on a system. Latent errors might be triggered or “activated” by a sequence 
of events or a combination of conditions, then weaken or break through a system’s 
defence line and lead to failures. This type of error is associated more with people in the 
“background” of a work system such as decision-makers, system designers, managers and 
so on. For example, the nuclear plant disaster at Chernobyl in 1986 was not only because 
of the technology itself but more to do with a poor management structure, attitude to 
safety and poor training given to the operators (Reason, 1990).
2.2 A narrow perspective
Reason’s notion of active error is very much representative of the narrow perspective of 
human error research. Active errors often result in immediate failure of a system and are 
usually concerned with immediate operators such as air traffic controllers, pilots, train 
drivers, nuclear plant operators etc. This is very similar to Hollnagel’s (1998) notion of 
“erroneous actions”, which also suggests that considerations apply only to the people who 
have direct involvement with the system interface. This narrow perspective of human 
error focuses its research agenda on the individual operator.
In general, the narrow perspective is mostly adopted by two branches of human error 
researchers defined by their different interests: evaluating human performance or 
understanding human performance. Human reliability engineers are primarily interested 
in human performance evaluation with the ultimate aim to develop predictive risk 
analysis of complex industrial installations. The risk analysis involved usually adopts 
some formal probabilistic frameworks. This approach is particularly important when 
human reliability is a crucial parameter, such as a monitoring role in a nuclear power 
plant since the operator is directly in a feedback control path in terms of the overall 
operation.
The other branch of human error research is characterised by psychologists who are 
interested in understanding human performance. This psychological approach views 
human error as “ ... an act which is counter-productive with respect to the person’s private 
or subjective intentions of goals.” (Rasmussen, Duncan & Leplat, 1987, p. 2). Moreover, 
human error is viewed as part of human behaviour and regarded as an essential part of 
skill development through trial-and-error in the environment (Rasmussen, 1982). In
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contrast to the reliability engineering approach, the psychological approach to human 
error not only focuses on observable behaviour but also on the underlying psychological 
mechanism(s) that give rise to the error behaviour.
In the context of HCI, tracing the cause of human error from a broad perspective can 
extend to the managerial level within an organisation, or even to the designer of the 
equipment or machine in question. However, the current thesis is concerned with 
understanding PCE from a cognitive perspective and a broad perspective investigation is 
not a suitable approach. A narrow perspective that focuses on investigating error 
behaviour arising from an individual (the operator) directly involved with a system 
interface is likely to be a more suitable approach in understanding PCE in terms of the 
cognitive causes. The current investigation adopts a psychological approach using 
laboratory-based experimentations, with the primary interest in identifying factors that 
provoke or mitigate PCE. The following sections review some of the major theoretical 
progress in human error research in terms of general psychological theories.
3 Classification of human error in various taxonomies
This section presents several dominant psychological theories of human error in general. 
The aim of this section is to exemplify the theoretical approaches adopted to understand 
human error behaviour, and also to set the error phenomenon under investigation, namely 
PCE, in the context of traditional human error classification.
Early theoretical effort in human error research has concentrated on devising 
classification systems to organise different errors that are observed or discussed into 
different categories. However, there is no single agreed taxonomy in human error 
research. Senders and Moray (1991) note that there are several ways in which an error 
can be classified; as a consequence, there are different levels of classification depending 
on which level the taxonomy adopts.
Senders and Moray (1991) summarise that there are three main levels of taxonomy: first, 
errors are classified in terms of their superficial manifestation. This is the simplest form 
of classification and is referred to as phenomenological taxonomies. Secondly, a 
taxonomy can have a lower level classification system in terms of the cognitive
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mechanism(s) involved. These taxonomies are usually grounded in psychological theories 
classifying errors according to mechanisms in human information processing. Thirdly, 
there are taxonomies that group errors according to biases or deep-rooted tendencies in 
decision-making process. For example, one typical psychological phenomenon in 
decision making is confirmation bias, which is a tendency to search for information that 
confirms ones hypothesis rather than disconfirming it (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972).
3.1 Phenomenological taxonomy
An example of a phenomenological taxonomy is a methodology proposed by Rouse and 
Rouse (1983) as a design and evaluation tool in relation to human performance in large- 
scale industrial installations such as aircrafts and power plants. Rouse and Rouse’s 
taxonomy classifies operator errors assuming the information processing of the operator 
follows cognitive stages such as: observation of system state, choice of hypothesis, 
testing of hypothesis, choice of goal, choice of procedure and execution of procedure. It is 
assumed that during normal operations the human operator is engaged in observing the 
system state, and choosing and executing procedures. However, when a system is 
operating outside the pre-specified normal state, the human operator is then engaged in 
problem-solving involving choosing and testing hypotheses. Errors that may occur are 
classified under these various cognitive phases under normal or abnormal system 
operation. Such a classification scheme may be used as a practical tool to account for 
failures that might occur in industrial settings. However, the taxonomy does not 
presuppose a particular psychological theory of human performance; as a consequence, it 
does not help to understand human errors in terms of their psychological causes.
3.2 Skill-based, rule-based and knowledge-based human performance 
taxonomy
Rasmussen (1982) offers a framework for event analysis in complex industrial 
installations. Event analysis is a decomposition of the event into the features characterised 
by the taxonomy in order to understand the mismatch between human and system 
performance. Rasmussen’s framework is a multifaceted description system, which 
describes human error in terms of cognitive domains as well as factors outside the human 
cognitive system such as situation-specific factors. Important to the current context is the 
cognitive components present in a framework of human performance. Rasmussen made a
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three level distinction in human performance: skill-based, rule-based and knowledge- 
based as the three categories one could use to classify human error.
Performance at the skill-based level involves dealing with highly familiar and routine 
tasks. Behaviour at this level is controlled by stored patterns or routines in the cognitive 
system that usually do not require direct conscious access by the skilled operator when 
performing the task. Performance at the skill-based level is primarily concerned with 
sensori-motor control and errors that occur at this level are very often attributed to faulty 
control of actions.
At the rule-based level, performance is concerned with fam iliar situations. The 
coordination of subroutines is carried out by stored rules in the cognitive system. In 
contrast to the automatic fashion of performance at the skill-based level, access to stored 
rules to find a solution often requires conscious mental effort at the rule-based level. 
Rule-based errors involve misrecognising the salient features of a situation and applying a 
wrong set of rules or misremembering a set of procedures.
In unfamiliar situations, one’s behaviour is governed by the use of resource-intensive 
analytical processes and stored knowledge. Performance in unfamiliar situations is at the 
knowledge-based level in which the operator is problem solving. Errors that happen at the 
knowledge-based level are usually the result of incomplete or incorrect knowledge. 
Rasmussen pointed out that performance at the knowledge-based level depends on details 
of the situation and the task context; therefore, error mechanisms at this level can only be 
inferred from detailed studies with, for example, verbal protocol analysis.
The three levels of performance together highlight the notion of familiarity of the 
operator with the environment and the task. Shortcuts might happen between certain 
performance levels and result in, for example, situation-specific stereotype fixation in 
which the confronted situation bypasses the labour-intensive knowledge-level processing 
and leads directly to the selection of ‘appropriate’ procedures.
In terms of describing PCE within Rasmussen’s framework of human performance, the 
error is best described at the rule-based level performance. The occurrence of the error is
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not due to incomplete or incorrect knowledge of the task, and is not because of mismatch 
of sensori-motor activity between the human and the artefact involved. Rasmussen (1987) 
commented that a common category of error at the rule-based level is the omission of an 
isolated act, which is not a logical part of the main task sequence. Such omission is 
attributed to lapses of memory because the nature of the isolated act is not an integral part 
of a larger memory structure.
3.3 Distinction between slips and mistakes
Reason (1990) approximates Rasmussen’s skill-rule-knowledge classification of human 
performance distinguishing between three error types: skill-based (SB) slips, rule-based 
(RB) mistakes and knowledge-based (KB) mistakes. Reason’s three-level framework of 
performance is slightly different to Rasmussen’s in that, like KB-level processing, 
processing at RB-level is also viewed as involved in problem-solving activity. Moreover, 
SB-level processing is usually involved in routine and non-problematic activities. Reason 
defined slips “as errors which result from some failure in the execution and/or storage 
stage o f an action sequence, regardless o f whether or not the plan which guided them was 
adequate to achieve its objective.” (p. 9). Mistakes are defined as “deficiencies or failures 
in the judgemental and/or inferential processes involved in the selection o f an objective 
or in the specification o f the means to achieve it, irrespective o f  whether or not the 
actions directed by this decision-scheme run according to plan.” (p. 9).
Reason explains how various types of errors may arise through transitions at the three 
different levels of performance. Processing is always sequential and starts at the SB level 
which is responsible for routine activities. At this point, attentional monitoring is the main 
mechanism for keeping track of one’s progress and, if the activity starts deviating from 
routine actions then RB-level processing will be called into play. The cognitive system 
will then search through the pre-established knowledge structures, schemata, for the 
closest matching rule in relation to the environment. If no approximate rules can be found 
then the effortful, computationally demanding processing at the KB level will be 
required. It is suggested that SB slips are distinguished between those caused by 
inattention and those by overattention. The application of bad rules or misapplication of 
good rules can lead to the occurrence of RB mistakes. Finally, KB mistakes usually arise 
because of ‘bounded rationality’ or inaccurate/incomplete representation of the problem
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space, which could lead to different types of error such as confirmation bias, over­
confidence and working memory limitations.
The various types of errors have also been proposed, by Reason, as results of two basic 
error forms: schema-matching and frequency-bias. Reason suggests that the two error 
forms are a basis for human errors, which arise from the same cognitive processes that are 
responsible for normal learning and performance of cognitive skills.
In light of Reason’s classification scheme, PCE can be viewed as a slip because it is not 
due to deficiency in knowledge or planning of an action sequence but more to do with a 
failure in the execution or storage of the action sequence. Although Reason categorised 
slips at the SB level whereas Rasmussen would categorise them at the RB level, these 
views are not conflicting because both views are describing the same notion, namely, 
human performance in routine, familiar situations. However, the use of different 
terminologies reflects something more fundamental in the ambiguity of classifying errors. 
As Gray (2004) comments “the knowledge-based, rule-based, and slip-based approach to 
errors is neither as neat and clean nor as theory-based as it may first appear. Whether an 
error is classified as skill-based, rule-based, or knowledge-based may depend more on the 
level of analysis than on its ontogeny.” (p. 3).
Norman is another proponent who makes a distinction between slips and mistakes. The 
distinction is succinctly summarised as “An error in the intention is called a mistake. An 
error in carrying out the intention is called a slip.” (Norman, 1983, p. 254). Norman 
(1981) proposed a model, the activation-trigger-schema system (ATS), to classify a 
variety of slips into different categories. The general principles of ATS state that there are 
schemas, which are memory units or an organised body of knowledge, and they are 
organised in a hierarchical structure. Schemas at the highest level are parent schema and 
schemas at lower levels are child schemas. There are activation levels associated with the 
schemas and interactions between schemas are possible through the activation 
mechanism. When the parent schemas are activated, this represents the formation of an 
intention, which is carried out by child schemas. Sources of activation can come from 
multiple sources such as the external world, internal processing (e.g. other associated 
memory structures) or familiar habits. More than one schema can be active at any one
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time and the selection of a schema is governed by a triggering condition. The triggering 
condition does not need to be an exact match for schema selection. Therefore, the 
selection of a schema is a trade-off between activation level and goodness-of-match of the 
triggering condition.
Norman suggests that ATS specifies three main sources contributing to action slips: fault 
in the formation of intention, fault in activation and fault in triggering. Faults occurring in 
the formation of intention can result in mode errors or description errors. Mode errors 
involve incorrectly classifying a situation leading to performing actions that are 
inappropriate for the actual situation. Description errors usually involve insufficient 
specification of the intention resulting in behaviour inappropriate for the current situation.
Faulty activation can have two forms of manifestations: unintentional activation or loss of 
activation. Unintentional activation of schemas not related to a desired action sequence 
can result in errors such as capture errors. Capture errors involve the control of an action 
sequence captured by a more practised, familiar sequence. A schema may lose activation 
due to decay or interference and the loss of activation can result in errors such as skipping 
a required step in an action sequence.
Slips occurring due to faulty triggering can also have two forms of manifestation: false 
triggering and failure to trigger. False triggering involves selecting an active schema at an 
inappropriate time leading to errors such as blends: performance of a combination of two 
action sequences. Failure to trigger is when an active schema does not get invoked and 
this can be because the schema has a very low initial activation level or the triggering 
condition is poorly specified.
By viewing PCE in light of Norman’s taxonomy, it is reasonable to describe the error as a 
slip in terms of omitting a step in an action sequence. However, the occurrence of PCE 
can be due to faulty activation resulting in a loss of activation or faulty triggering 
resulting in a failure to trigger the appropriate action, and it is not clear which is the best 
way to classify accordingly. This is not a problem specific to PCE because classifying 
human errors in general is not as clear-cut as one might think, as Norman (1981, p.7) 
commented “As is usual, these errors [referring to mode errors and description errors]
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most likely have several causes.” Therefore, there are often some ambiguities in 
classifying some errors into different categories. Nonetheless, the manifestation of PCE is 
more likely to resemble the characteristics of a slip that it is not because of insufficient or 
incorrect knowledge of a task but a momentary lapse in memory during the execution of 
the action sequence.
While classification using taxonomies is a good starting point, if not a necessary one, in 
organising a huge variety of data about a phenomenon, human error taxonomies suffer 
from several problems: first, as mentioned earlier, classification of an error is often not as 
clear-cut as one would hope for and there might be several categories that an error might 
fit. Secondly, related to the ambiguous nature of error classification, Byrne (2003) points 
out that in terms of explanations based on causal mechanisms, taxonomic frameworks 
have the problem of heterogeneity; that is, grouping unlike things together and like things 
apart. Two erroneous behaviours might be grouped under a same kind of error, but the 
underlying causal mechanisms responsible for the two surface behaviours might have 
completely different nature and vice versa. Thirdly, and most importantly, taxonomies are 
only useful for analysis of errors after the event; they cannot be used to predict the 
occurrence of errors. As Gray (2004, p. 3) points out, “Although some of these 
taxonomies rely on cognitive theory as the basis of their classifications, all lack the 
mechanisms to predict errors.” This is likely because the theories underlying the 
taxonomies are only specified in terms of some general principles of operation. As 
Norman (1981, p.4) points out “More detailed specification is, of course, required for the 
understanding of any specific action sequence, but at the moment there are not sufficient 
data to justify more details.”
Placing PCE in the context of taxonomies, which are tied with general theories of human 
error, helps distinguish the error from knowledge-based mistakes. The occurrence of PCE 
resembles more closely the characteristics of a slip: involving failure in the execution of 
an action sequence rather than the incorrect or incomplete specification of knowledge of 
the task. While general theories of human error fail to generate testable predictions of 
PCE, there have been some theoretical efforts specific to PCE and the following section 
introduces those existing theoretical approaches to the error phenomenon. This is then 
followed by a review of the empirical studies related to PCE.
31
Chapter 2 — Literature review o f human error research
4 Extant theoretical approaches to PCE
There are several theoretical approaches to account for the phenomenon of PCE: the 
supergoal kill-off approach, the Soar approach, the activation-based goal memory 
approach, and the working memory capacity approach. This section serves as an 
introduction to each of the PCE accounts, a more detailed analysis of the accounts is 
presented in Chapter 4.
4.1 Supergoal kill-off approach
Poison, Lewis, Rieman and Wharton (1992) developed a model of learning by 
exploration within the construction-integration (C-I) model (Kintsch, 1988). Poison et al. 
applied their model to explain the phenomenon of PCE, but instead of calling it PCE, they 
termed it supergoal kill-off.
The supergoal kill-off approach assumes that goals are organised in a hierarchical 
structure with the top-level goal representing the overall task goal, which can be 
decomposed into subgoals, and these subgoals can be further decomposed into the lowest- 
level goals representing executable actions. The model specifies that the hierarchy of goal 
is dynamic and when an action is executed the goal structure is revised. This highlights 
the important role of feedback from the environment as it helps the model to generate 
new goals when the goal structure is revised.
Goals and subgoals are linked together by activation links and activation flows through 
these links from the top-level goal to its subgoals and down to the corresponding action 
nodes. All subgoals receive activation from the top-level goal as long as it remains active. 
When a subgoal receives sufficient activation its corresponding action will then be 
executed. Each goal or subgoal has an associated “done-it” node attached to it by an 
inhibitory link. The “done-it” node gets activated once its associated goal is accomplished 
and, through the inhibitory link, the goal is deactivated and activation flows to and from 
this goal are cut off. The flow of activation is governed by the presence of “and-then” 
nodes, which act as activation gates between subgoals. An “and-then” node receives 
activation from the “done-it” node of a subgoal and spreads activation to the next 
subgoal. This “and-then” control pattern means subgoals are executed in an ordered
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sequence such that the second subgoal can only be carried out when the first subgoal is 
accomplished and the top-level goal is active. Poison et al. suggest that this type of goal 
execution in an ordered sequence is typical in procedural tasks such as operating an 
ATM.
The supergoal kill-off model specifies that when a subgoal is accomplished in the “and- 
then” control structure, the subgoal and the top-level goal are checked for their similarity. 
Similar goals can have their respective “done-it” nodes associatively connected, so the 
fulfilment of a goal can cause a similar goal to deactivate. The supergoal kill-off approach 
explains PCE in terms of similarity between the top-level goal and its subgoal, which 
causes premature deactivation of the top-level goal. In the example of the ATM case, the 
subgoal of collecting cash might be very similar to the top-level goal of withdrawing 
cash. When the subgoal is accomplished, this causes deactivation of the top-level goal 
and activation supply to the PC subgoal of collecting the card is terminated and its action 
not carried out.
However, the explanation offered by the supergoal kill-off approach is problematic in two 
ways: first, the approach does not specify how the notion of similarity should be 
operationlised, that is, it is difficult to determine what it means for two goals to be 
similar. Secondly, even if the level of similarity can be determined, the approach would 
then predict PCE to occur all the time when similarity occurs and no error at all when 
dissimilarity occurs.
4.2 Soar approach
Young (1994) proposed an account of PCE within the Soar cognitive architecture and 
suggested that the error phenomenon can be explained by the inherent property of how 
subgoals get initiated and terminated within the architecture.
In Soar, behaviour of a model emerges by applying operators to states in problem spaces, 
and the choice and application of operators are determined by knowledge in a long-term 
memory repository. When no more progress towards a goal can be made within a 
problem space, an impasse occurs and Soar then initiates a subgoal to acquire knowledge
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in other problem spaces. When the impasse is resolved, control is then resumed to the 
main goal but the subgoal and its associated structure then disappear. Young suggested 
that there is asymmetry between initiation and termination of a subgoal within Soar, 
which is important in explaining how a post-completion (PC) subgoal is omitted. The 
occurrence of an impasse allows Soar to initiate a subgoal to trigger activity, however, the 
termination of an impasse is a non-event such that a terminated subgoal simply disappears 
and cannot be used to trigger further activity.
In the case of withdrawing cash from an ATM, the Soar approach explains forgetting to 
take the card back at the end by applying the asymmetry property. The Soar approach 
suggests that an impasse occurs when using the ATM and a subgoal is set up to work 
through the necessary procedures to withdraw cash. The impasse is then resolved when 
the cash is withdrawn and the associated subgoal of collecting the card simply disappears 
and is not executed.
The Soar approach is different to the supergoal kill-off approach in that it does not rely on 
theoretical constructs such as activation but an inherent property within the architecture. 
However, the asymmetry is only a starting point of the explanation to PCE because it 
does not account for how the task is ever performed without committing the error. Young 
further suggested that remembering of the PC subgoal might be achieved by learning 
appropriate cues, such as self-reminding or reliance of external cues. Moreover, the usage 
of these cues or strategies are necessarily fragile such that they could be disrupted easily 
by, for example, distracting conditions. Although details of the compensatory strategies to 
overcome the error and disruptive conditions are not specified further, this multi-level 
structure of explanation is an important insight which can be used to address the problem 
of having a deterministic model generating error behaviour either all the time or no error 
at all.
4.3 Activation-based goal memory approach
The activation-based goal memory (AGM) model (Altmann & Trafton, 1999; 2002) was 
developed to address some of the fundamental limitations of traditional approaches to 
goal memory. The traditional view of goal memory in cognitive architectures assumes a
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stack-like structure (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998; Newell, 1990). A goal-stack memory 
exhibits error-free behaviour in goal selection such that a goal order is perfectly 
preserved. In contrast, the AGM model treats goals as ordinary memory elements in that 
they are subject to various constraints such as decay, noisy retrieval that is vulnerable to 
interference, and cognitive costs in active maintenance.
The AGM model is implemented in the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson & 
Lebiere, 1998), with its goal stack “switched o ff’, to model the goal selection process of 
the Tower of Hanoi task, which is a task often used in problems-solving research (e.g. 
Simon, 1975). There are three main components in the AGM model: the interference 
level, the strengthening process and the priming process. The interference level is a 
gateway determining the most active goal in memory. Goals in the AGM model undergo 
a gradual decay process that is time-based. This means that decaying goals can act as 
distractors to the retrieval of a target goal forming a mental clutter. The interference level 
is effectively the mean activation level of the most active distractor. In order for a goal to 
direct behaviour, its activation level must be above the interference level.
The strengthening process specifies how a new goal gains activation to overcome 
interference imposed by old goals. During the process of strengthening, a goal is 
effectively being encoded in memory, in other words, attention is being focused on it. The 
strengthening process determines how long should be spent in encoding a goal because 
spending too little time means the goal does not get enough activation, however, 
strengthening for too long increases the interference level and affects retrieval of 
subsequent goals. Once a goal is strengthened above the interference level and starts 
directing behaviour, it begins to decay.
An old goal has to overcome retroactive interference in order to be retrieved successfully 
and this is specified by the priming process. An old goal can receive a boost in its 
activation level from its context, and this context manifests as external cues in the 
environment or internal mental cues. For a cue to be effective, association between the 
cue and the target goal must be learned in the first place. The priming process highlights 
that the process of goal selection, which can be driven by environmental cues or mental
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cues. The AGM model suggests that procedural skills can be viewed as a chain of 
associative steps; the execution of each step associatively primes the next step.
Altmann and Trafton describe the occurrence of PCE within the AGM model. The AGM 
model suggests that when a subgoal is suspended it undergoes decay, and this implies that 
PCE should occur by default. This is because the PC subgoal is the last subgoal in a task 
and should have decayed the most. However, Altmann and Trafton suggested that the fact 
PCE is often avoided is because of the priming process; it is postulated that associative 
cueing occurs between the PC subgoal and its preceding subgoal. The execution of the 
penultimate subgoal serves as a cue to prime the PC subgoal in procedural tasks. 
However, this PCE approach is problematic in its assumption that the PC subgoal should 
have decayed the most. By the same logic, given a long enough task, subgoals that are in 
proximity to the PC subgoals should also have decayed and be omitted. Moreover, the 
account ultimately provides a description of how PCE is avoided rather than how the 
error is made.
4.4 Working memory capacity approach
Byrne and Bovair (1997) proposed a working memory capacity account of PCE 
predicting that PCE is more likely to occur under high working memory demand. The 
account is developed in the CAPS cognitive architecture (Just & Carpenter, 1992), which 
has an explicit mechanism of working memory capacity.
In the CAPS model of PCE, active goals are held in working memory and in order to 
remain active a goal has to have an activation value above a certain threshold. Like the 
supergoal kill-off approach in C-I, activation is propagated from the top-level goal to its 
subgoal and the activation propagation process is in place as long as the top-level goal 
remains active in working memory. When the cognitive system is operating above its 
working memory capacity, activation levels for both maintenance and propagation get 
scaled back.
Satisfied goals decay in the CAPS model, and the decay process is dependent on working 
memory load rather than time as in the AGM model. Satisfied goals only get displaced
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from working memory when there are other items to absorb their activation. In explaining 
the occurrence of PCE, the CAPS model postulates the following: when the cognitive 
system is operating within its working memory capacity, the main goal remains active in 
working memory even after being accomplished and there is no cut-back in maintaining 
and propagating activation to the PC subgoal. Therefore, the PC subgoal becomes active 
and gets executed. However, when the working memory load exceeds the cognitive 
system’s capacity, the satisfied main goal gets displaced from working memory and also 
the amount of activation propagated to the PC subgoal is cut back. As a consequence, the 
PC subgoal fails to receive enough boosts in activation before it is displaced from 
working memory.
The working memory capacity account is problematic in two ways: first, as Byrne and 
Bovair pointed out, since satisfied goals in the CAPS model can still be carried out it is 
necessary to impose a minimum amount of working memory load in order to get the 
satisfied subgoals displaced from working memory. This is to ensure subgoals are carried 
out in the correct sequence without repeated execution of a previously accomplished goal. 
However, correct behaviour usually occurs without the constraint of a fixed minimal 
working memory load. Secondly, although the working memory capacity specifies the 
condition under which a PCE is more likely to occur, the model generates deterministic 
error behaviour, that is it makes the error all the time under high working memory load 
and no errors at all when working memory load is low. This will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4.
Apart from the working memory capacity approach, the existing theoretical approaches to 
PCE are all verbal descriptions of the error phenomenon. The explanation offered by 
Byrne and Bovair is the most comprehensive in that a computational model is developed 
to capture one of the main empirically tested aspects of PCE, namely, working memory 
load. The theoretical progress of PCE is still in its infancy and this is mainly because 
there are only a limited number of empirical studies looking specifically at PCE. This is 
also partially related to the lack of experimental investigation of human error in general. 
The following sections provide an overview of the main empirical approaches in studying 
human error, and review the experimental studies of PCE.
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5 Empirical studies of human error
The topic of human error is broad and spans many different disciplines. However, the 
study of human error is shallow and the main reason, pointed out by Gray (2004, p. 1), is 
that although many researchers collect error data, there is no established research 
tradition to experimentally manipulate and study error as a phenomenon.” One of the 
difficulties in studying errors systematically in experimental settings is because error 
behaviour is rare, as Gray (2004, p. 4) further comments that “This rarity may have 
encouraged the naturalistic approach in which researchers and their confederates carry 
around notebooks with the goal of noting and recording the occasional error.” While 
naturalistic approaches are useful in documenting the frequency of error occurrences, 
reports of errors after the fact usually do not capture the essential context in which the 
error occurred. Gray (2004, p. 4) contends that “ ... they [naturalistic approaches! have 
not been particularly productive in understanding the cognitive mechanisms that 
determine the nature, detection, and correction of errors in interactive behaviour.”
5.1 Two empirical approaches to human error
The experimental study of human error can be divided into two main approaches: the first 
approach involves collecting a large database of error behaviour as well as error-free 
behaviour and subject them to fine-detailed analysis. This approach has been adopted in 
investigation of errors in arithmetic thinking (e.g. Payne & Squibb, 1990; Ben-Zeev, 
1995) as well as speech errors (e.g. Baars, 1992). A recent study carried out by Gray 
(2000) has adopted this fine-detailed approach to examine various errors in the interactive 
behaviour of VCR programming. In Gray’s study, the measurement unit of interactive 
behaviour is number of keypresses made on a simulated VCR. Although only 4% of the 
total keypresses collected from the participants were identified as errors, had these 
incorrect behaviours not been corrected they would have led to a failure in recording the 
desired TV programs successfully. Gray was able to describe and explain the obtained 
errors under a cognitive framework, which will be described in more detail later in the 
chapter.
The second empirical approach of studying human error is to elicit a particular error in a 
controlled laboratory environment. This approach is difficult for two reasons: first,
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participants arriving at an experimental session are likely to be more conscious about 
their performance than usual, and self-monitoring mechanisms can be the main obstacle 
to obtaining the desired error behaviour. Secondly, as Sellen and Norman (1992, p. 335), 
comment, “Another difficulty inherent in laboratory-induced errors is the low frequency 
of errors in artificial tasks. It is often impossible to obtain a large enough sample of errors 
in a reasonable time to conduct statistical tests. This is especially true when one is 
looking for a particular kind of error.”
Despite the difficulties of this experimental approach, there are a number of studies that 
successfully elicit particular kinds of error in laboratory settings. For example, capture 
error in the visual domain has been successfully generated and examined under controlled 
conditions (Larson & Perry, 1999). Visual capture error is the erroneous behaviour driven 
by external context rather than by one’s internally generated goal. Larson and Perry 
studied susceptibility to visual capture in relation to individual differences in everyday 
error proneness and working memory capacity using the antisaccade paradigm, which 
measures ones ability to inhibit reflexive responses to visual stimuli in terms of eye 
movements. It was found that error-prone participants were more susceptible to visual 
attention capture than less error-prone participants, suggesting that error-prone 
individuals find it harder to suppress distraction from external stimuli that dominate 
internal goals. Moreover, working memory capacity was found to be uncorrelated with 
visual capture susceptibility. However, Larson and Perry pointed out that the sample in 
their study had generally high working memory scores and this might have contributed to 
the non-significant finding.
Instances of mode error have also been studied in controlled experimental conditions. 
Monk (1986) analysed mode error from a user-centred perspective and examined the 
effect of keying-contingent sound on the error occurrences. A computer-based game 
paradigm, with two possible modes of operation, was designed to elicit mode errors. Two 
conditions of sound feedback upon key-presses were tested: a control condition that 
consisted of a single pitch level tone across the two operation modes in the computer 
game; and an experimental condition, which had two different pitch tones (high and 
medium) for the two different modes of operation. Results from the study suggested that 
despite the low overall frequency of mode error generated, participants in the
39
Chapter 2 — Literature review o f human error research
experimental condition made about 1/3 of the mode errors obtained in the control 
condition. The effectiveness of differential keying-contingent sounds to mitigate mode 
errors was attributed to an increased general awareness of which mode one is in, and 
thereby reducing the cognitive burden in remembering which mode is currently active.
Another kind of error known as the unselected window (USW) error has also been 
successfully generated and studied using an artificial task (Lee, 1992). USW error occurs 
in multi-window environment in computer use and the error is an omission to select a 
desired window before interacting with it; so input gets sent into a “wrong” window 
instead. USW error is an action slip and is also classified as very similar to, or simply a 
specific case of, omitted secondary subgoal (Young, 1994). In Lee’s study, two variants 
of USW errors were generated: one variant occurred within the same computer terminal 
during switching between different windows; the other variant occurred between different 
computer terminals when the participant completed an external task and returned to a 
multi-window environment at the initial terminal.
Lee designed an artificial task involving multi-window usage to elicit USW error and 
examined the effect of time course and dynamic visual feedback on the error. The 
computer-based task required participants to buy or sell shares according to some simple 
decision rules. The effect of visual feedback was tested by two conditions: dynamic 
condition with a fizzy border appearing around the should-be-selected window after 25 
seconds of inactivity, and the static condition, which had a black border around the 
desired window. An interruption task was also implemented in a separate computer 
terminal requiring participants to copy down a 14-digit random number every 90 seconds. 
The participants in the study were required to perform trials with the interrupting task and 
without the interrupting task in order to simulate the two variants of USW. In order to 
assess the effect of time course, the participants were tested for three one-hour sessions 
spread over three days within a week. The results showed that there was initial decrease 
in USW error after the first day of testing; however, the error persisted throughout the 
second and third day though no differences in the error occurrence were found between 
these two days. There was also no reliable difference between the interrupted and non­
interrupted condition in terms of USW error. Moreover, dynamic visual feedback was
40
Chapter 2 — Literature review o f human error research
found to be effective in reducing the number of USW error whereas static feedback had 
no effect on error reduction.
Lee explained the effectiveness of dynamic visual feedback in terms of its attention- 
capturing property and that it increased participants’ general awareness of window 
selection. Lee (1993) extended the study to examine the effect of a longer time course on 
USW error. The study involved the use of static visual feedback only and increased the 
time course to four one-hour testing sessions on different days spreading over a week. It 
was found that USW error decreased after the first day of testing and remained at the 
same low rate throughout the second and third day; however, the error occurrence 
increased significantly in the last day of testing. Lee accounted for the finding by 
postulating that there was considerable cognitive cost in remembering to select a window 
since static visual feedback did not help in mitigating USW error. As a result, participants 
rely on error correction rather than error prevention strategy to avoid the cognitive 
overhead as there were no dire consequences associated with error commission in the 
study.
Although there are a limited number of studies of laboratory-induced error in interactive 
behaviour, the studies mentioned above are the few examples that suggest it is possible to 
generate slip-like errors in a laboratory setting with the appropriate choices of task 
paradigm. Recently, PCE has also attracted attention, and has been artificially generated 
and studied empirically. The following section reviews those studies that are directly 
relevant to PCE.
6 Empirical studies of PCE
In studying the nature, detection and correction of error behaviour in a rule-based 
procedural task, namely, VCR programming, Gray (2000) adopted the approach of 
collecting a large database of error-free and error behaviour and analysed them in fine- 
grain detail. Using a simulated VCR, Gray collected data from 9 participants who were 
asked to program the VCR and their actions were recorded as action protocols. In the 
analysis, Gray adopted a cognitive framework guided by three least-effort cognitive 
principles to describe and explain the correct and incorrect interactive behaviour. The 
three cognitive principles were 1) least-effort in operating the device such as minimising
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cost in terms of perceptual-motor level; 2) least-effort in mapping existing prior 
knowledge to device knowledge such that participants would assume the VCR works in a 
way according to their existing understanding; and 3) a least-effort strategy of display- 
based difference-reduction, this is a strategy to reduce the distance between one’s current 
state and the target goal state by offloading associated cognitive burden to the device’s 
display. For example, in setting the VCR clock to a desired time the display-based 
difference-reduction strategy allows one to use the display information to hill-climb to the 
desired value without having to keep track of the number of key-presses one needed to 
carry out in order to reach the target.
The main idea behind the three least-effort principles is the notion that cognitive effort is 
minimised whenever possible. Gray then implemented these three cognitive principles in 
a computational model using the ACT-R cognitive architecture and used the model to 
trace through each individual participant’s action protocol. Gray used the model-tracing 
technique to identify matches and mismatches between the model and the human 
behaviour, mismatches were identified as errors and subjected to further analysis to 
examine if they were “true” errors or limits of the model.
It was found that the model accounts for the vast majority of correct behaviour, and the 
display-based difference-reduction strategy accounts well for most of the detection and 
correction of error behaviour. Certain limitations of the model were also revealed; for 
example, the model had perfect memory of programme information, and was never 
distracted by other items on the VCR display. Gray was able to categorise the mismatches 
obtained from model-tracing into two kinds of error: push error and pop error. A push 
error is an error in adopting a goal or subgoal; for example, Gray accounts for display- 
induced mode errors suggesting that these errors arise because a certain goal needs to be 
done; however, information on the device’s display is not sufficient to indicate one’s 
place in the current mode. A pop error is an error in terminating a goal or subgoal and it 
can be further divided into premature pop, in which one stops before completing a goal, 
or postponed pop, in which one continues executing a goal even though the goal is 
completed.
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Although Gray’s study is not a specific investigation into PCE, the study documented the 
occurrences of the error phenomenon. To successfully program the simulated VCR, 
participants were required to set various parameters such as date, channel and time to the 
desired values and then the last step was to set the VCR to record. Gray (2000, p. 244) 
noted that “ ... device-specific goals are the hardest for participants to remember to 
accomplish. In this study, many of the trials that were not successful failed because of the 
post-completion error of forgetting to set the VCR to PROG REC.” A total of 26 errors, 
which had prevented the VCR from successful recording, were identified and there were 
6 PCEs (23%). Gray’s analysis suggests PCE is a premature pop error: the early 
termination of a goal leads to omission of the PC subgoal. The display-based difference- 
reduction perspective suggests that the difference between the current goal state and 
target goal state is minimal when the various parameters (date, time, channel) on the VCR 
are set, and this lures one to terminate the task prematurely, as a result, forgetting to set 
the VCR to record. However, this explanation of PCE is problematic because it does not 
explain how the PC action is remembered and gets executed most of the time. However, 
Gray’s investigation is not focused solely on PCE and he also admitted that the model 
does not account for factors such as working memory load, which is found to have an 
effect on PCE (Byrne & Bovair, 1997).
The first experimental paradigm, using the approach of generating a particular error under 
controlled conditions, to study PCE was carried out by Byrne and Bovair (1997). Byrne 
and Bovair carried out two experiments and examined, specifically, the effect of working 
memory load on PCE. In the first experiment, the main aim was to set up an artificial task 
that is sufficiently complex to generate systematic occurrences of PCE. A complex 
fictional computer-based game, called the Phaser task, was designed. The objective of the 
Phaser task is to destroy enemy ships and operation of the Phaser involves following a 
pre-defined set of procedures with various subgoals. To fire the Phaser, a component 
called “Tracker” needs to switched on and when the enemy ship is destroyed the 
“Tracker” needs to be switched off. Forgetting to switch off the ‘Tracker” is classified as 
a PCE. A similar task but simpler with fewer subgoals was also designed to compare task 
performance. Participants were trained and tested on both tasks. It was found that the 
simpler task was unable to produce many PCEs, however, the complex Phaser task was 
able to generate a high level of PCEs. A systematicity threshold of error occurrence was
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calculated as a ratio of obtained number of errors to the number of opportunities for that 
error to occur. The PCE rate obtained in the experiment had a 9.3% (13 out of 140 
opportunities) systematicity score which is higher than the 5% threshold needed to 
classify an error occurrence as systematic. Byrne and Bovair suggest that the Phaser task 
is sufficiently complex to elicit PCE for further investigation.
In the second experiment, the effect of working memory manipulation was tested. In 
addition to the Phaser task, a similarly complex task, Transporter task, with the same 
number of subgoals and task structure was also included in the experiment to establish 
that the occurrence of PCE is not specific to the Phaser task. The Transporter task differs 
from the Phaser task in terms of visual appearance and has a shorter tracking subtask. In a 
condition where working memory is taxed, participants were required to carry out a 
concurrent letter recall task. The recall task involved continuous broadcasting of 
randomly generated letters every 3 seconds and participants were required to recall the 
last three heard letters at a random time between 9 to 45 seconds. Participants in the no 
working memory demand condition were not required to perform the letter recall task. 
Working memory capacity of each participant was also measured, from which 
participants were divided into two groups: low and high capacity. It was found that the 
overall systematicity of PCE reached a level of 48% (294 out of 610) across tasks. There 
was a general increase in overall errors with the Phaser and Transporter tasks when low- 
capacity participants performed the tasks with high working memory load. It was 
observed that PCE was rarely made by high-capacity participants with no working 
memory load but low-capacity participants with high working memory load produced 
reliably more PCE. Moreover, there were more PCEs made in the Transporter task than 
the Phaser task. Byrne and Bovair explained the difference in terms of the different 
tracking times in the two tasks; it was suggested that the relatively longer tracking time in 
the Phaser task might have acted as a buffer period freeing up working memory capacity, 
and, as a consequence, leading to fewer PCEs than the Transporter task, which has a 
shorter tracking time. Byrne and Bovair concluded and proposed a working memory 
capacity account to explain the effect, suggesting that under high working load the PC 
subgoal is more likely to be displaced from working memory and left forgotten when the 
main task goal is accomplished.
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The effect of working memory load on PCE has also been replicated by a different study 
using a computer-based game paradigm (Mortenson, 2003). A robbery game was set in a 
context where participants were required to collect items from different houses; the items 
had to be remembered and recalled once a robbery was completed. A device was required 
to be switched on to search for the items and the PC step required the device to be 
switched off after the recall of the item collection. The effect of working memory load 
was manipulated by the different number of items to be collected and recalled; 
participants were required to collect 1, 3, 5 or 7 items. Consistent with results from Byrne 
and Bovair (1997), it was found that more PCEs were committed with higher working 
memory demand (5 or 7 items) than with lower working memory demand (1 or 3 items).
Factors related to mitigating PCE occurrences have also been investigated. Chung and 
Byrne (2004) examined the effect of visual cues on PCE, specifically, performance from 
a dynamic just-in-time cue (occurring just-before the PC step) and a static asynchronous 
cue (occurring earlier in the task) was compared. The same Phaser task (in Byrne & 
Bovair, 1997) was used alongside a simpler task with fewer subgoals. There were three 
visual cue conditions: first, a dynamic condition involving blinking arrows pointing to the 
PC step button and the arrows appearing just-before the PC step needed to be executed; 
secondly, a static condition where the PC step is highlighted and a message indicating the 
“Tracker” mode is on and this cue appeared when the “Tracker” is switched on; thirdly, a 
control condition with no visual cues regarding the PC step. Participants in the 
experiment were also required to perform the concurrent letter recall task to increase 
working memory load. It was found that the dynamic just-in-time cue was effective in 
completely eliminating PCE, however, the static asynchronous cue had no reliable effect 
on PCE compared to the control condition. The simpler task generated a low PCE rate 
overall but the dynamic cue was still able to eliminate all PCE. Chung and Byrne 
explained their finding in terms of the AGM model (Altmann & Trafton, 1999) 
suggesting that the just-in-time property of a visual cue is important in determining its 
effectiveness in mitigating PCE. An asynchronous cue occurring earlier in a task adds 
memory load to the participants while performing intervening subgoals, and the effect of 
the cue is likely to be masked by the other subgoals. It was also suggested that the 
dynamic nature of a visual cue helped in capturing participants’ attention in 
acknowledging the presence of the cue.
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The effects of motivational factors on PCE was also examined (Byrne & Davis, in press). 
Using the same Phaser task paradigm as Byrne and Bovair (1997), Byrne and Davis 
carried out two experiments to investigate the effect of practice and various motivational 
factors on PCE. In the first experiment, participants were required to go through three 
separate testing sessions with the Phaser task. In the experiment, a non-postcompletion 
(non-PC) version of the Phaser was also included, in which the PC step of switching off 
the “Tracker” had to be carried out in order to receive feedback about goal completion. 
All participants were also required to perform the concurrent letter recall task to impose a 
working memory load. The result suggested that significantly more PCEs were obtained 
in the PC version of the task than the non-PC version in the first testing session. 
Occurrence of PCE in the PC task declined significantly throughout the second and third 
testing, whereas the PCE rate in the non-PC task remained low throughout all testing 
sessions. Byrne and Bovair suggest that while more testing sessions might need to be 
included to test the effect of prolonged practice on PCE, this initial finding indicates 
practice can help mitigate the error.
In the second experiment, Byrne and Davis used the same experimental paradigm to 
examine the effect of various motivational strategies in mitigating the error. The 
motivational strategies include, praising good performance, reporting of poor 
performance and re-training. A task redesign condition was also tested in which the 
Phaser task was switched from the PC version to the non-PC version when the 
intervention was applied. Task performances in the various intervention conditions were 
compared to a baseline condition in which no intervention was applied. The various 
interventions were introduced in the middle of the second testing sessions. Task 
performance was compared between the first and the third testing sessions. It was found 
that occurrences of PCE decreased in all intervention conditions and across testing 
sessions, and that all interventions were equally effective in alleviating the error. 
Moreover, the rate of error reduction in the intervention conditions did not differ from the 
baseline condition. Byrne and Bovair concluded that motivational factors that were tested 
were not more effective in combating PCE than practice alone. Although the 
interventions did not differentiate statistically in error reduction, the redesign condition 
obtained a complete elimination of PCE. Results from this study suggest that PCE has a
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persistent nature in occurrence and the complete elimination of the error might be best 
achieved by avoiding a task structure with a PC subgoal.
Reason (2002) carried out a survey of errors made in photocopying and analysed the PC 
step (collecting the original) in terms of its task structure characteristics. In the survey, 95 
undergraduates and academic staff were given questionnaires about various possible 
errors that could be made in photocopying. Each item on the questionnaire had a 7-point 
scale (0 = never, 6 = nearly all the time) and the participants were asked to rate each item 
accordingly. It was found that the PCE, leaving the last page of the original, had the 
highest score among all other omission errors (e.g. fail to copy all pages) with a mean of 
2.18 and a standard deviation of 1.56. The result suggests that the PCE does not always 
occur but it has a persistent occurrence. Reason then analysed the photocopying task and 
identified a number of characteristics that make the PC step particularly vulnerable to 
omission:
1) The output of the last copy page acts as a false completion signal and can be a 
miscue in cueing one to terminate the task before all necessary steps are 
carried out.
2) The strength of the false completion signal is particularly powerful at the end 
of the task because ones attention starts to shift to a subsequent task leading to 
“premature exits”.
3) The PC step is functionally isolated in relation to the entire task.
4) There is no cue visible in reminding one about collecting the original since the 
original is obscured from view by the photocopier’s lid.
However, the survey data in Reason’s study might suffer from biases, for instance people 
might tend to remember forgetting to collect the original more than other omission errors. 
A naturalistic approach is prone to biases imposed by factors such as unreliable memory 
recall of incidents. Alternatively, a longitudinal diary study might provide a more reliable 
source of data. However, the survey data suggests that forgetting to collect the original is 
infrequent but is persistent in occurrence. Furthermore, through the analytic approach in 
terms of task characteristics, Reason offered some useful insights into the elements that 
make the PC step vulnerable to omission.
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7 Summary
In sum, from early taxonomic approaches to human error, PCE can be characterised as a 
type of omission error with slip-like properties; its occurrence is not due to deficiency at 
the knowledge level but at the task execution level. From early theoretical analysis to 
more recent empirical studies, PCE has been established as an interesting error 
phenomenon from a task-related or cognitive perspective. Moreover, PCE occurs in a 
range of different procedural tasks and can be provoked in a controlled laboratory setting. 
Although there are only a limited number of empirical studies on PCE, they suggest that 
the error is sensitive to working memory demand and is persistent in its occurrence —  i.e. 
cannot easily be eliminated through practice alone or by the use of various motivational 
strategies such as being asked not to make the error. However, PCE is attenuated by 
dynamic presentation of visual feedback.
Recent research has shown that PCE can be induced and studied under controlled 
experimental environments, and this is also the approach taken by the current thesis in 
order to extend our understanding of PCE. The review of the literature on PCE suggests 
that the number of empirical studies of the error is small, and theoretical understanding of 
the error phenomenon is still in its infancy. Research on PCE has, traditionally, been 
motivated by its origin in practised procedural tasks, in which task execution involves 
carrying out a set of pre-defined and learned procedures. Anecdotes of PCE occurring in 
procedural tasks range from office equipment, such as forgetting to collect your original 
after photocopying, to personal machinery, such as forgetting to put the petrol cap back 
on after filling up petrol in your car, to public-access machines, such as forgetting to take 
your cash card after withdrawing money from an automatic teller machine (ATM).
The scope of the current thesis is to adopt a narrow perspective to the study of human 
error by focusing on error behaviour arising from an operator who has direct interaction 
with the artefact in question. More specifically, the current investigation adopts a 
psychological approach using laboratory-based experimentations. This involves designing 
artificial task environments to induce and study PCE in order to identify factors that 
provoke or mitigate the error phenomenon. The goal of this thesis is to understand PCE
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from a cognitive perspective; therefore, theoretical motivations and explanations are 
drawn from cognitive psychology.
The traditional view and empirical investigations of PCE were placed in the context of 
routine procedural tasks, and this is well justified since a lot of everyday examples or 
anecdotes of the error, as described earlier, involve carrying out procedural tasks. In order 
to extend our knowledge of PCE beyond its occurrence in procedural tasks, the next 
chapter investigates whether the prevalence of PCE extends to another type of task, 
namely problem-solving. Moreover, the effect of static visual cues on PCE is also 
examined to investigate whether the error can be mitigated.
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Overview
This chapter gives the first set of empirical studies in this thesis investigating PCE using a 
novel methodological paradigm, namely, problem-solving. The question of whether the 
prevalence of PCE extends beyond procedural tasks to problem-solving is motivated by a 
documented error in programming practice known as the semicolon problem (Poison et 
al., 1992). The semicolon problem is the omission of a semicolon at the end of a coding 
statement, which some programming languages require. This error is essentially a PCE 
because inserting a semicolon at the end of a coding statement is peripheral to the main 
goal of constructing the piece of code in the first place. This kind of PCE resembles the 
second class of PCEs, mentioned in Chapter 1, which does not have an opening 
perturbation to the interaction but finishes with a confirmatory step. The interesting 
aspect about this observed PCE is that it occurs in a problem-solving domain in which the 
programmer is engaged in an active process of problem-solving rather than carrying out a 
set of learned procedures.
PCE occurring in a similar situation is also captured by the author’s anecdotal experience 
of committing a PCE when doing arithmetic problems in primary school. The anecdote is 
as follows: you are carrying out some arithmetic calculations for some mathematics 
homework, which requires a fair level of cognitive effort. After some time working on a 
problem you arrive at an answer, which you believe is a correct one, then you write the 
answer down and move on to the next question. However, you forget to write down the 
unit (it could be litres, metres, miles etc.) that is required so you only get half the marks 
for the problem! Although an anecdote only has descriptive values, it captures some of 
the important characteristics of PCE: firstly, an omission of a subsidiary step (including 
the unit) after fulfilment of the main task goal (solving the arithmetic problem). Secondly, 
a considerable demand is placed on working memory during the process of solving the 
arithmetic problem.
Byrne and Bovair’s (1997) general findings suggest that PCE is associated with situations 
that place a high demand on working memory. The series of experiments in the current 
chapter investigates the occurrence of PCE in problem-solving situations, which place 
considerable demands on working memory by having participants solving problems “in
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the head”. For the purpose of the current context, a problem-solving task is taken to mean 
that a participant has to “figure out” the solution to a problem during task execution. In 
other words, the procedures of the problem task are not learned, and the problem-solver 
has no pre-existing knowledge of the solution before task execution. This notion of 
problem-solving stands in contrast to the notion of a procedural task in which task 
execution involves following a learned set of procedures.
The aim of the Experiment 3a was to set up an experimental paradigm employing logic 
problem tasks to investigate whether PCE can occur in problem-solving situations. 
Although the paradigm managed to generate a high level of PCE, two methodological 
shortcomings that possibly confound the results were identified. First, the issue of 
whether the participants had the correct knowledge of the PC step. Second, the problem 
of whether the participants had the correct knowledge of how to execute the PC step.
Experiment 3b involved correcting the methodological shortcomings from Experiment 3a 
redesigning the training phase of the experiment to ensure participants had acknowledged 
the presence of a PC step, and that they knew how to execute the action associated with 
the PC step. The refined methodology was successful in removing the identified 
problems, generating a reduced level of PCEs. The experiment also investigated the effect 
of a static visual cue on PCE, and the results suggest that the simple static cue present on 
the interface was able to mitigate the error. An unexpected finding was obtained 
suggesting error reduction by the static cue manipulation was more pronounced in one of 
the three problem tasks than in the other two. Experiment 3c was a follow-up experiment 
to further pursue this unexpected finding.
The series of experiments in this chapter is not an investigation of problem-solving 
behaviour per se , but rather the current experiments used problem-solving tasks as a 
vehicle to extend knowledge of PCE beyond our previous understanding of the 
phenomenon.
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Experiment 3a: a preliminary study
1 Introduction
To the author’s knowledge, to date, there is no empirical work that has examined the 
occurrence of PCE in problem-solving task, therefore, the current study is the first 
attempt to examine the error phenomenon occurring beyond a procedural task paradigm. 
The foremost objective of the current experiment was to set up an appropriate 
methodological paradigm to generate PCE in a laboratory setting. Further investigation 
into the nature of PCE is possible when the error can be reliably obtained. This in itself is 
a challenge to experimental studies of human error in general, as Byrne and Bovair (1997, 
p.42) comment that, “For a variety o f reasons, probably the most critical o f which is self­
monitoring on the part o f the participants, laboratory studies in which such errors are 
produced are few  and far between. ”
The current experiment is not a direct replication of Byrne and Bovair’s (1997) finding of 
PCE occurrences associated with high working memory demands, but rather examines 
the generality of the working memory effect in another task paradigm, namely, problem­
solving. The notion of a high working memory demand is implemented in the current 
experiment by requiring participants to solve a set of puzzles “in the head” without the 
aid of any external medium, such as writing down partial solutions on paper.
The hypothesis of the current experiment is that if PCE can be reliably generated in this 
problem-solving paradigm, it is expected that the obtained PCE rate to exceed an error 
rate of 5%, which is a criterion recommended to determine the systematic occurrence of 
an error (Byrne & Bovair, 1997). The following section describes the problem-solving 
paradigm in detail.
2 Method
2.1 Tasks
The tasks adopted in this study are variants of the well-known river-crossing problems 
(Ernst & Newell, 1969) used in human problem-solving, reasoning and artificial
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intelligence research. Three puzzles were used in the current study: the Father & Son 
problem (FS), the Dog, Hen & Corn problem1 (DHC) and a simplified version of the 
standard Missionaries & Cannibals problem (sMC2) (see Appendix A (vi-viii) for details 
of the problems and Appendix A (ix) for their solutions). The FS task and the sMC task 
are used as distractor tasks so make the participants believe the experiment is about 
solving puzzles but, in fact, the real purpose of the experiment is to have participants 
make PCE during problem-solving. The DHC problem contains a PC step, which 
includes the following sentence:
“ Whoever finishes using the seat always returns it to the market side, where Mr. Edison 
lives, so that it is easy for him to take it in each evening.”
A PCE is operationalised, in the current context, as the omission of sending the transport 
vehicle back after finishing solving the problem. Goal completion of the puzzles is self- 
determined; the participants have to decide if they have reached the solution before 
carrying out the PC step. No feedback about the solutions of the problems was given until 
the end of the experiment.
2.2 Solving logic problems “in the head” using a text-based interface
To ensure that the task used was mentally demanding, participants were not allowed to 
write down any of the intermediate steps of the solution. The idea here is to have 
participants solve the puzzles “in the head”, so they can only enter the solution steps via 
the computer interface developed. The interface constrains participants to work out each 
solution step before they type in the answer, and each answer entered is hidden away. 
Looking back at previous step(s) requires explicit actions at the interface.
Participants were instructed to click on the S t a r t  button to initiate a trial. For each step 
of a puzzle, participants had to type in their answers into the two text boxes and click the
1 The use o f the DHC problem, and the PC problems in Experiment 3b and 3c, was inspired by a 
puzzle documented in Curzon (2003).
2 The sMC problem adopted in the current study is a simplified version o f the original 
Missionaries & Cannibals problem, hence, the subscript “s”. Instead o f having three missionaries 
and three cannibals, the current version has only two m issionaries and two cannibals. This 
sim plified version o f the problem task has a very straightforward four-step solution. This 
simplified version was used to keep the experimental session relatively short for the participants.
54
C hap te r  3  — PQ$t-compl(;tion ?rror in prob lem -so lv in g : E xper imen t 3q
E n t e r  button (F igure 3 .1). O bject(s) to be m oved  across the river (e .g . Fred, cat, canoe) 
w ere typed into the longer text box on the left and the sid es  o f  the river (e .g . hom e or 
market) w ere typed into the shorter text b ox  on the right. C lick in g  the E n t e r  button  
clears the text in the text b oxes for the next s tep ’s entry. W hen participants think they 
have reached the solution  o f  a problem  they term inate the trial w ith  the F i n i s h  button.
© 0 0  Please en t e r  your  answers
f  Start )  View History [ 1 step
Move L I 1 to the \ I side of the river
Figure 3.1: A screen shot of the m a in  w in d o w  for entering solution steps o f a puzzle.
C lick in g  on the V i e w  H i s t o r y  drop-dow n m enu sh o w s participants a record o f  the 
previous steps they have m ade. T hey cou ld  ch o o se  1 s t e p  w h ich  o n ly  sh ow ed  the 
previous step m ade, 2 s t e p s ,  or A l l  s t e p s .  Participants cou ld  a ccess  any o f  these  
three fu n ction s at any tim e during the experim ent but they  w ere told  on ly  to use the 
function  w hen it w as absolutely  necessary. Figure 3 .2  is a screen  shot o f  A l l  s t e p s  in 
the p rocess o f  so lv in g  the sM C  problem . P articpan ts’ a c tio n s w ere lo g g ed  by the 
com puter.
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© o © H IS TO R Y  -  A ll
"1. Move C annibal, Boat to the Right side of the river
"2. Move Boat to the Left side of the river" u
"3. Move C annibal, Boat to the Right side of the river
"4. Move Boat to the Left side of the river
w
i.
’▼o « ►
^  Close )
Figure 3.2: A screen shot of the A l l  s t e p s  function being accessed at a particular point in time 
when solving the Missionary & Cannibal problem .
2.3 Design
T his study is a on e-factor w ith in-subject design , w ith the three problem s (i.e . FS, D H C  
and sM C ) as the factor. Each problem  counts as a trial; th erefore, each  participant 
received  three trials. A ll participants w ere presented with all three problem s in the order 
of: FS, D H C  then sM C.
T he FS and the sM C  problem s act as shadow  tasks in order to fram e the experim ent to  
avoid  participants over attending to any o f  the p u zz les . T h is  is  im portant b ecau se  
p articip an ts’ ab ility  to se lf-m o n ito r  is, by and large, the m ost detrim ental factor in 
reducing errorful behaviour in an experim ental setting.
2.4 Materials
M aterials in c lud ed  an instruction m anual o f  how  to enter so lu tio n s v ia  the interface  
(A p p en d ix  A (i) );  a training problem  sh eet d escr ib in g  a p rob lem  for a training trial 
(A ppendix A (ii)); a recall sheet for writing dow n the objects and sides o f  the river that the 
participant rem em bered from  the training problem  (A ppendix  A (iii)); an instruction sheet
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with the steps of how to perform the training problem printed on it (Appendix A(iv)); a 
reminder sheet to remind the participants of what they are required to do in the testing 
phase (Appendix A(v)); and the three problem tasks: FS, DHC and sMC (Appendix A(vi 
to viii); for their respective solutions see Appendix A(ix)).
The interface used in the experiment was implemented in Macintosh Common Lisp 5.0 
(MCL) and was run on an iMac computer.
2.5 Participants
36 students from UCL took part in the study. There were 21 male and 15 female. Their 
mean age was 27 ranging from 21 to 40.
2.6 Procedure
Firstly, the experimenter briefed the participant that he/she was required to solve a series 
of problems. The main objective of the investigation was not mentioned to the 
participants until after the experiment. The participant was then asked to read the 
instruction manual (Appendix A(i)) regarding the use of the computer interface and was 
allowed to ask questions about it.
Each participant was then given a training phase. The training problem sheet (Appendix 
A(ii)) was given to the participant and was taken away when read. The participant was 
then asked to recall the objects involved in the problem and the sides of the river by 
writing them down on the recall sheet (Appendix A(iii)). This is to familiarise the 
participant with having to remember the objects and sides of the river from the problem 
as part of the experimental procedure. An answer sheet (Appendix A(iv)), containing the 
order in which the objects should be entered, was then given to the participant. The 
participant was required to enter the various steps as printed on the answer sheet. This is 
to familiarise the participant with the use of the interface.
After the training phase, the participant was given a reminder sheet (Appendix A(v)) to 
read. This emphasised what were classified as “objects” in the problems to be followed, 
and that each problem has specific rules to follow in order to solve it correctly. The 
participant was then presented with the main trials in which they had to solve a total of
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three problems. Each trial had the exact same procedures as the training trial, i.e. firstly 
reading the problem on paper; secondly, recall of the objects and the sides of the river by 
writing them down on the recall sheet; and thirdly, to solve the problem.
The experimenter was in the same room as the participant throughout the experimental 
session. The experimenter was not allowed to answer any questions specific to the 
solutions of the problems, but was allowed to clarify the rules of the problems if asked by 
the participant. At the end of the experiment, the participant was debriefed and asked if 
he/she remembered the PC step in the DHC problem. This served as qualitative feedback 
in addition to the behavioural data logged by the computer.
2.7 Measure
The measure of primary interest is the number of PCEs committed in the DHC problem.
3 Results
Data from 9 participants were excluded from the analysis because 6 of them did not 
follow the instructions properly, and the remaining 3 terminated the experiment without 
completing the entire session. This resulted in 27 valid data points for analysis.
3.1 Are the observed PCEs systematic in occurrence?
A total of 21 PCEs were obtained in the DHC problem. In analysing the frequency of an 
error occurrence, researchers such as Payne & Squibb (1990) and Byrne & Bovair (1997) 
adopted a measure of systematicity, which is defined as the ratio of the observed error to 
the total opportunities for that error to occur. A 5% level threshold has been 
recommended to consider an error rate systematic (Byrne & Bovair, 1997). In the current 
study, each participant had one opportunity to make a PCE giving a total of 27 
opportunities. Therefore, the observed PCE rate has a systematicity of about 78% (21/27), 
which is well above the recommended threshold level.
3.2 Issues related to the obtained PCEs
There are a number of notable findings related to the PCEs obtained that were not initially 
formulated as part of the main objective of the study. Firstly, in the DHC problem, there
58
Chapter 3 — Post-completion error in problem-solvins: Experiment 3a
were two occasions in which the PC step was carried out by sending “Mrs. Jones”, 
instead of the transport vessel — “seat”, back to the other side of the river. The two 
participants who executed the move reported that they did not know how to send the 
transport vessel back, therefore, sent the carrier instead. These two responses were not 
classified as PCEs as the PC step was executed. The nature of these responses has a 
methodological implications for the experiment, as discussed in more detail in the next 
section.
Secondly, the participants were asked to recall objects involved in the problem on the 
recall sheet before solving it. Table 3.1 shows the number of participants who wrote 
down the transport vessel as one of the recalled objects, and the number of participants 
who typed in the transport vessel in the problem solutions.
Transport vessel on Transport vessel in
recall sheet problem solution
FS 4 0
DHC 3 2
sMC 4 17
Table 3.1; Number o f participants who recalled the transport vessel or included it in the problem
solution.
There were only a few participants who wrote down the transport vessel on the recall 
sheet for each of the problems. There were substantially more participants who had typed 
in the transport vessel in the sMC solution; however, this was not observed for the FS and 
DHC problem. This suggests that there might be some difference in the sMC problem 
relating to the higher number of participants referencing the transport vessel in its 
problem solution but not in the other two problems.
Again these two findings have methodological implications for the current paradigm, as 
discussed in more detail in the next section.
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4 Discussion
A high PCE rate fulfilled one of the main objectives set out by this pilot study —  using a 
novel task to generate the robust error phenomenon. Previous studies investigated the 
error phenomenon within the boundary of highly familiar or proceduralised tasks, but the 
current study extends that boundary to problem-solving tasks, which are not necessarily 
familiar to the participants.
Although a high PCE rate of 78% was obtained, a number of findings suggest that the 
high occurrence of the error might be confounded by a number of factors. Firstly, in the 
DHC problem, two of the participants reported that they did not know how to send the 
transport vehicle back at the end of the solution; therefore, the carrier was sent back 
instead to fulfil the PC step. Although this response was only observed from two 
participants, it suggests an important methodological implication for the current paradigm 
— the need to ensure participants have the correct knowledge of how to execute the PC 
step.
A further finding relating to the knowledge of the PC step execution is the failure to 
include the transport vessel in the intermediate steps of the DHC problem solution. 25 out 
of the 27 participants did not type in the transport vessel in the problem solution, even 
though it was explicitly stated in the instructions that everything that gets moved across a 
river (“a canoe” was provided as an example) is classified as an object and should be 
included in the solution. Moreover, only three participants recognised the transport vessel 
as an object when asked to write down on the recall sheet. On this basis, the cause of the 
high PCE rate is unclear: whether participants had the correct knowledge of how to 
execute the PC step but genuinely forgot about the required step; or they simply did not 
know one could move the transport vessel across the river on its own and, therefore, did 
not perform the required action.
However, the same finding was not observed in the sMC problem. There were a relatively 
higher number of participants (17 out of 27) who included the transport vessel in the 
solution steps. A closer examination of the sMC problem suggests that this is most likely 
due to a peculiarity that is not present in the FS and DHC problem. In the sMC problem,
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there are steps in which the transport vessel has to be sent back on its own without any 
passenger on it in order to proceed further in the solution. This feature in the problem 
most likely had prompted the participants about the permissible action of sending the 
transport vessel alone.
The second methodological concern is related to whether participants had encoded the PC 
step as a required step to the problem solution. Participants were asked about their 
recollection of the PC step in the DHC problem at the end of the experiment. 8 out of 27 
participants responded that they were aware of the PC step but had concentrated on the 
main goal and forgotten about it. This anecdotal evidence plus some of the behavioural 
data (6 participants who did not commit the PCE) suggests that 14 out of 27 participants 
had, more or less, acknowledged the PC step as an integral step to the solution. However, 
this is mostly anecdotal evidence, and the data also suggests that the rest of the 
participants were not aware of the PC step as part of the solution.
Finally, the following is not a methodological issue but an issue concerned with the 
problem-solving nature of the currently adopted task. One might argue against the 
definitional issue over the error and, consequently, the suitability of the task for 
investigating the phenomenon. This is because in the current problem-solving situation, 
not every participant was able to solve the problem correctly. The traditional view of PCE 
(e.g. Byrne & Bovair, 1997) is an error, which “people have the knowledge required to 
perform the task correctly, but still fa il on occasion .” (p. 32). The direction of 
investigation taken by this view led one to look at the error in well-practiced routine 
activities. However, the very essence of PCE resides in a particular task characteristic, in 
which a step needs to be carried out a fter  completing the main goal. Since goal 
completion in the DHC task is self-determined, the importance lies in the fact that the 
participants think they have completed the goal more than the “correctness” of their 
solutions. Once the participants have decided the main goal has been fulfilled, the 
remaining step in the task, by definition, is a PC or “clean-up” step.
Nevertheless, the methodological concerns mentioned earlier suggest that it is important 
to ensure participants have correct knowledge of the PC step and also the knowledge of
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how to execute the step. The following are a number of possible refinements to rectify the 
identified methodological shortcomings.
Firstly, the training trial may be modified to include an example problem resembling 
closely the current sMC problem. The important point is to show the participants that the 
transport vessel can be moved on its own, to ensure their having the knowledge of how to 
execute the permissible action. Secondly, in order to ensure participants have 
acknowledged the PC step as a required step, a questionnaire could be given to 
participants before solving a problem. Questions such as “Is it true or false that the hen 
can not be left alone with the corn?”, “Is it true or false that the seat is to be returned to 
the market side of the river after use?”, etc. would provide a way to check that the 
participants have encoded the PC step as part of the solution. Furthermore, in order to 
produce a high enough error rate for subsequent studies, each participant could be given 
more than one PC problem. Variations of the current PC problem could be used to 
provide more error opportunities for each participant.
Finally, a manipulation that could be tested in the subsequent experiment is the 
effectiveness of a simple cue on PCE. This idea comes from one of the observations from 
the current study: in the DHC problem, the transport vessel (“seat”) could be regarded as 
a cue related to the PC step (returning the “seat” to the market side) of the task. The 
responses given by the participants who did not include the word “seat” might be related 
to the high PCE rate obtained. As discussed earlier, although the failure to include the 
transport vessel in the solution may have been problematic to the validity of the obtained 
high error rate, the error rate might also be related to the absence of relevant visual cues. 
Manipulating the presence of the transport vessel during the problem-solving process 
allows one to investigate whether PCE could be mitigated by the presence of a cue 
relating to the PC step. Nevertheless, before the manipulation of visual cues can be 
investigated, the identified methodological shortcomings should be rectified to ensure the 
validity of the error rate obtained. This is the motivation for the next experiment.
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Experiment 3b: refined methodology and the effect of 
static visual cue
1 Introduction
There are two aims in this experiment, the first aim is to eliminate the identified 
confounding factors by refining the experimental methodology. The major refinements 
made in this experiment include the following: firstly, an instructional phase with a real 
problem-solving example (rather than an abstract problem as used in the previous 
experiment) was used. The example not only illustrated how to use the interface for 
entering answers but how the transport vessel may be moved on its own when necessary. 
Secondly, in the training phase, a problem with a PC step was used (the structure of the 
problem closely resembles the sMC problem from the previous experiment). A 
questionnaire was also used to assess whether participants were aware of the required PC 
step. Finally, the testing phase involves three PC problems and three non-PC problems 
acting as shadow problems. It is expected that the overall rate of PCEs would decrease in 
this current experiment as a result of implementing the methodological refinements. The 
refined methodology is described in more detail in the “Method” section. It is 
hypothesised that there will be a decrease of the overall PCE rate but the error rate will 
still be above the 5% systematicity criterion.
The second aim of the current experiment is to investigate the effect of static visual cues 
on PCE. In a recent study, Chung and Byrne (2004) examined the effect of visual cues on 
reducing PC errors. The main PC task used in their experiment was the procedural task 
(i.e. Phaser task) used by Byrne and Bovair (1997). The experiment tested two types of 
reminders; a mode indicator relying on static contextual information and a dynamic cue 
occurring just before the PC step. It was found that the visual cue with dynamic 
movement (flashing arrows in this case) was effective in guarding against the error, but 
the static indicator was not; this is consistent with Lee’s (1992) findings. Furthermore, it 
was found that, to be effective, a cue should be meaningful in relation to the PC action, 
and occur just before the PC step. However, there are examples of situations where the 
artefact in use might not necessarily be able to track one’s state in a task; for example,
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when programming a VCR, there is no way the VCR could tell when the user has finished 
the programming task. In such situations, the implementation of a just-in-time cue will 
not be possible and other means of cueing should be adopted.
No existing theoretical accounts support predictions about the effect of static visual cues 
on PCE in problem-solving tasks; therefore, the nature of this investigation is exploratory. 
The second hypothesis of the current experiment is that the static visual cues should be 
effective in mitigating PCE in the current problem-solving tasks, because of the 
simplicity of the interfaces used in the current experiment. The basis of this hypothesis is 
that there are fewer visual distractions in simpler interfaces and this would make a static 
visual cue relatively more salient than in more complex interfaces, such as the one of the 
Phaser task. The manipulation of static visual cues in the current study involves using two 
different interfaces to solve the problem tasks. These two interfaces are described in 
detail in the following section.
2 Solving logic problems “in the head”
Logic problems such as the Missionaries & Cannibals problem, and similar river-crossing 
problems, were used in this study to provoke the occurrence of PCEs. The idea of using 
logic problems, as opposed to using routine procedural tasks like Byrne & Bovair’s 
(1997), is thought to be a novel experimental paradigm in investigating PCEs. 
Furthermore, solving these logic problems is mentally demanding in terms of working 
memory resources when one is not allowed to write down the intermediate steps of the 
solution. Therefore, based on Byrne & Boviar’s finding that increasing working memory 
demands increases the chances of making PCEs, it was thought that solving logic 
problems “in the head” would be an effective way of producing PCEs without using a 
concurrent secondary task.
2.1 Two interfaces— text-based and menu-based
In order that the participants to solve the problems “in the head”, two interfaces were 
designed for the two experimental conditions: the Text (Txt) condition and the Pop-up 
(Popl) condition. Common to both interfaces is that each step of the solution entered is 
hidden away: looking back at previous step(s) requires explicit actions on the interface.
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In the Txt condition, participants have to type in their answers into the two text boxes and 
click the Enter button (Figure 3.3). Object(s) to be moved across the river (e.g. Mrs. 
Jones and Hen) are typed into the longer text box on the left and the sides of the river 
(e.g. Home or Market) are typed into the shorter text box on the right. Clicking the 
Enter button clears the text in the text boxes for the next step’s entry. If a mistake is 
made the participant can press the Reset button and start from the beginning. When the 
participant thinks he/she had reached the solution of a problem they can terminate the 
trial with the Finish button.
© 0 0  Please enter your answers
( Reset x View History r l  step NNj
( Reminder ;
Move  _J  to the I 1 side of the river
(  Finish! N f Enter 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 3x3; A screenshot of the Txt interface-
Clicking on the V iew  H i s to r y  drop-down menu shows a record of the previous steps 
they have made. They can choose 1 s t e p  which only shows the previous step made, 2 
s t e p s ,  or A l l  s t e p s .  The participant can access any of these three functions at any 
time during the experiment but they were told only to use the function when it was 
absolutely necessary. Figure 3.4 is a screen shot of A l l  s t e p s  in the process of solving 
the DHC problem.
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HISTORY -  All
"1. M ove Mrs. J o n e s  H en  to th e  H o m e  s id e  o f th e  river"
" 2 . M ove Mrs. J o n e s  to th e  m ark et s id e  o f th e  river"
”3. M ove Mrs. J o n e s  C orn to th e  h o m e  s id e  o f  th e  river"
"4. M ove Mrs. J o n e s  H en  to th e  m ark et s id e  o f  th e  r iver
“5. M ove Mrs. J o n e s  S h e p  to th e  h o m e  s id e  o f  th e  r iver
"6. M ove Mrs. J o n e s  to th e  m ark et s id e  o f  th e  r iv er
" 7 . M ove Mrs. J o n e s  H en  to th e  h o m e  s id e  o f  th e  r iver
0 . .        .............
f  C lo se
________________________________________________________
Figure 3.4: A screenshot of the Historv-All window.
Clicking on the Reminder button brings up information of the sides of the river and the 
names of the characters involved in the story (Figure 3.5); the participant could use this 
function when he/she forgot any of the information but was instructed to keep the usage 
to a minimum.
OOP
Corn 
Hen 
Hom e 
Market 
Mrs. Jones 
Shep
feClosg*#
Figure 3.5: A screenshot of the Reminder window
2.1.1 Control of the visual cue for the post-completion step
In condition Popl, participants entered their answers into the text boxes by selecting the 
appropriate item(s) from two pop-up menus (Figure 3.6).
66
Chapter 3  — Post-com pletion error in problem-solving: Experiment 3b
6 0 6 Please enter your answers
(  Reset )
Move
List 1
(  Finish! )
List 2
to the
View History 1 step I \
side of the river
(  Enter }
Figure 3.6: A screenshot of the Popl interface.
The pop-up menu on the left contains a list of object(s) to be moved across the river, 
including the transport vessel (i.e. “seat” in the DHC problem) used in the story (Figure 
3.7).
Shep
Seat
Mrs. Jones
Hen
Corn
6  0 0 Please enter your answers
(  Reset )
Move
' List 2 T )
View History f 1 step
I side of the river
(  Enter )
1 to the □
(  Finish! )
Figure 3.7: A screenshot of the object pop-up menu in the Popl interface.
The pop-up menu on the right contains the sides of the river (Figure 3.8). The main 
difference, in terms of the information available to the participants during the problem­
solving process, between the Popl and the Txt interface is the presence of the transport 
vehicle from the problem story. The transport vehicle itself is thought to be a visual cue 
reminding one of the post-completion step of sending it back to the other side of the river 
at the end. The R e m in d e r  window in the Txt interface contains all of the information, 
but the transport vehicle, provided in the pop-up menus in the Popl interface. This is to
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ensure there are no transport vehicles, which might act as a source of visual reminder, in 
the Txt interface.
0 0 © Please enter your answers
( Reset ) Market View History 1 step f *)
Home _ 1
List 1 ....^ m
Move to the □  side of the river
( Finish! ) (  Enter )
A
Figure 3,8; A.screenshot .of the river-side pop-up menu in the Popl interface.
It is also worth mentioning that the control of visual cueing of the PC step between the 
two conditions is done through explicit instructions in the instruction and training phase. 
More details are outlined in the following section but the basic idea is that the transport 
vehicle does not need to be specified when it has passenger(s) in it, it only needs to be 
specified when it is moved on its own with no passenger(s). For example, if one wants to 
move “Mrs. Jones”, “Hen” and “seat” across the river, only “Mrs. Jones” and “Hen” need 
to be entered into the long text box; however, when the “seat” needs to be sent back on its 
own after everything crosses the river, then “seat” needs to be entered into the long text 
box.
3 Method
3.1 Tasks
As in Experiment 3a, variants of river-crossing problems (Ernst & Newell, 1969) were 
used in this experiment. Six problems were used: the Father & Son problem (FS), the 
Three Guests problem (3G), the Lion, Monkey & Banana problem (LMB), the Dog, Hen 
& Corn problem (DHC), the Torch problem (Trch) and the Itchy & Scratchy problem 
(IS). The latter three problems were modified to contain post-completion steps which 
required one to send the transport vehicle back to the other side of the river as the very 
last step of the solution. Each problem is adapted into the form of a story so that the post­
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completion step is coherent with the story (see Appendicees A(vi & vii) and B(iii to vi) 
for details and Appendices A(ix) and B(viii to xi) solutions for each of the problems).
3.1.1 Post-completion step in DHC. Trch and IS
All three problems that one might make a post-completion error in contain a sentence 
indicating the presence of a post-completion step. Table 3.2 shows the post-completion- 
step sentence in each of the three problems:
Problem task PC step sentence
Whoever finishes using the seat always returns it to the market side, 
DHC where Mr. Edison lives, so that it is easy for him to take it in each
evening.
Trch When they reach the other side of the river, they have to send the boat
back to the forest so that no one will notice it has been used
They realise that they have to send the crate back to the initial side 
IS when they reach the other side so no one would suspect that it had
been used
Table 3.2: The sentences used in indicating a post-completion step in the DHC. Trch and IS tasks.
3.2 Design
A between-subject design was used in this study. The between-subject manipulation was 
the Txt or the Popl interface used in solving the problems. All participants did all six 
problems using either one of the interfaces. The post-completion problems were placed in 
positions 2, 4 and 6 in the sequence of problem presentation, and the sequence was 
counterbalanced using a 3x3 Latin Square. Positions 1, 3 and 5 in the problem 
presentation sequence were filled with non-post-completion problems and were 
counterbalanced again using a 3x3 Latin Square.
3.3 Materials
Materials included a Power Point presentation, which described the instructions involved 
in using the interface; a training problem sheet (Appendix B(i)) with an example problem 
task printed on it; a check list (Appendix B(ii)) which contains 14 statements relating to
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the training problem; and the six problem tasks printed on paper (Appendices A(vi & vii) 
and B(iii to vi)).
The two interfaces used in the conditions Txt and Popl were implemented in MCL 5.0 
and they were run on an iMac computer. The Power Point presentation for the instruction 
phase was also run on the same computer.
3.4 Participants
64 participants participated in the current study; the majority of which were UCL 
students. There were 31 males and 33 females, age ranging from 18 to 50 with a mean of 
25.6. Each participant was paid £3 for participating in the experiment; moreover, as an 
incentive to encourage performance an extra 50p was paid for every correctly solved 
problem. Therefore, each participant could get paid a maximum of £6.
3.5 Procedure
All participants went through the following procedures:
3.5.1 Instruction phase
First, in the instruction phase each participant was presented with a set of instructions (in 
Microsoft PowerPoint format) about solving a simple river-crossing example problem via 
the specially designed interface. The sets of instructions were identical in the Txt and the 
Popl condition except for the details about the computer interface involved for entering 
answers. The solution of the example problem was walked through during the instruction 
presentation; the first step of the solution was an explicit action of moving the transport 
vehicle to one side of the river. The purpose of this very first step was to ensure the 
participant knew one could enter the transport vehicle alone into the left text box on the 
interface. Furthermore, the instruction also stated that the transport vehicle only needed to 
be specified when it is moved on its own with no passenger(s) in it. This is to eliminate 
entering the transport vehicle into every step of a solution to avoid confounding the 
absence of post-completion reminders in the Txt condition.
The participants were also told that for every problem solved successfully they would 
receive a payment of 50p. The monetary incentive was designed to encourage participants
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to fully engage with the problems and complete them as best as they could. If participants 
were not spending any effort in thinking of the solutions, they could just give the wrong 
answers very quickly.
3.5.2 Training trial
Second, after the instruction phase, participants were asked to perform a training trial 
which consisted of reading a simple river-crossing problem (which was printed on paper, 
see Appendix B(i) for the problem story), then it was taken away from the participant so 
that he/she had to memorise the rules, names of the object(s) to be moved and the sides of 
the river from the problem. To ensure the participants knew of the presence of a post­
completion step in the problem, a reminder (“Please also send the boat back to the 
coffee shop when finish taking everything across”) was placed at the end of the story 
in addition to the post-completion sentence (“the boat is always sent back to the 
coffee shop side of the river, as a convenience to the staff for the next order ”).
Before the participants started entering their answers into the interface, they were asked 
to complete a check list (Appendix B(ii)) indicating whether they had acknowledged the 
post-completion step as a required step to the solution. The check list consisted of 14 
statements (6 true, 8 false) which the participants had to identify as true or false. The true 
statements were also required to be rated as how important (Not at all, Moderate or Very) 
they would be in solving the problem. The statement “The boat is always sent back to the 
coffee shop side of the river after use” was used to assess the acknowledgement of the 
post-completion step.
Feedback on any errors made (including PCE) was given to the participants at the end of 
the training trial so that they knew if they had completed the trial successfully. It is 
worthwhile to mention that the solution to the training problem (Appendix B(vii)) 
involved the action of explicitly sending the transport vehicle to the other side of the river 
in intervening steps. The rationale is to further make sure participants know the 
permissible action of sending the transport vehicle alone to one side of the river.
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3.5.3 Test trials
Third, following the training trial, participants were asked to perform the test trials which 
consisted of a series of six logic problems (Appendices A(vi & vii) and B(iii to vi)). As in 
the training trial, participants were asked to read a story and enter their answers into the 
interface on a computer. A check list was not required in the test trials phase to eliminate 
the possibility of reminding them about the post-completion steps in the three post­
completion problems. Participants were also instructed to hand the problem story, which 
was printed on paper, back to the experimenter as soon as they finished reading it. The 
participants were then asked to start solving the problem by entering the answers into the 
interface on a computer.
Participants were told that there would be no time pressure in solving the problems; 
however, they were told that the session would last for about an hour and that the 
experimenter would indicate if they should move on to the next problem when they could 
not work out the solution to a problem. When the participant indicated that they could not 
arrive at the solution or they had spent too long on a particular problem, the experimenter 
would ask him/her to give a second best answer (which would depend on the context of 
the problem). The rationale was to have participants finishing the problem regardless of 
the correctness of the solution and see if they would still commit post-completion errors 
in the three problems.
No feedback to the solutions was given during the test trials and this was to minimise the 
effect of explicitly reminding participants about the post-completion steps in the three 
post-completion problems. Feedback to the solutions was given at the end of the 
experiment. During an experimental session, the experimenter was present in the same 
room as the participant. The experimenter was not allowed to answer questions regarding 
the solutions to the problems but was allowed to clarify questions about the rules of the 
problems. At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed about the objective of 
the experiment. Each session lasted approximately an hour.
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3.6 Measures
The measure of primary interest is the number of PCEs. Measures of secondary interest 
such as completion times of the problem tasks, usage of the History and Reminder 
functions were also collected.
4 Results
Data from five participants were excluded because they withdrew from the experiment 
session after the first trial. A total of 59 participants were included in the data analysis; 29 
in the Txt condition and 30 in the Popl condition.
The following analyses were carried out on data concentrating on the three post­
completion problem tasks. Since each participant had three possible opportunities of 
making at least one PCE, the entire data set should have yielded a total of 177 data points; 
87 in Txt condition and 90 in Popl condition.
12 data points were excluded from the analyses resulting in a total of 163. Five of the 
excluded data points were missing data: trials not completed by the participants because 
they could not give the second most approximate solution when prompted to do so. Seven 
of the data points were either indeterminate as PCEs: participants reported that he/she was 
unclear about the PC step before finishing the trial; or contained solutions that did not 
follow the instructions of the problem: for example, sending the vehicle on its own at 
intermediate steps, mention of items that should not be mentioned, sending more items 
than the vehicle can hold, etc.
The 12 excluded data points came from different participants, but other data points from 
these individuals were intact. Missing or excluded data yielded a total of 23 and 24 valid 
cases from conditions Txt and Popl respectively for data analysis.
4.1 Responses from checklist in the training trial
Almost all participants (43 out of 47) rated the PC step in the checklist as “very 
important”. Three participants gave an “important” response and one participant did not 
give the item any rating. The responses from the checklist suggest that the PC step, as
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indicated by the PC sentence and the reminder sentence, was acknowledged as part of the 
integral solution in the training trial.
4.2 PCE rates in Txt and Popl
Table 3.3 summarises the number of PCEs in the two experimental conditions.
Txt Popl
No. of PCEs 33 16
No. of PCE opportunities 69 72
Error rate (%) 47% 22%
Table 3.3: Summary of number o f PCEs obtained in the two experimental conditions.
Overall, more than half of the participants (29 out of 47) committed at least one PCE. 
Collapsed across problem tasks and conditions, a total of 49 PCEs were generated out of 
141 opportunities (each participant had three PCE opportunities). Therefore, the overall 
PCE rate (no. of errors divided by no. of opportunities for that error) is about 35%. This 
result supports the first hypothesis of the current experiment that the occurrence of PCE 
in these problem-solving tasks is systematic because the obtained error rate exceeds the 
5% systematicity level.
4.3 Difference in PCE occurrences between Txt and Popl condition
A score was calculated for each participant based on the number of PCEs committed, 
with one PCE counting as a score of 1; so each participant could have a minimum score 
of 0 and a maximum of 3. Table 3.4 shows the respective mean, median and interquartile 
range of the PCE scores.
Txt Popl
Mean 1.43 0.67
Median 2.00 0.50
Interquartile range 0.00 -  2.00 0.0 0 - 1.00
Table 3.4: The means, medians and interquartile ranges for the two conditions.
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A Mann-Whitney U test was used to examine if there was a significant difference in the 
scores between the Txt condition and the Popl condition. The difference was found to be 
significant, U = 164 (Nj = 23, N2 = 24), p  = .012, suggesting that there were reliably 
fewer PCEs in condition Popl than condition Txt. This difference supports the second 
hypothesis that PCE can be mitigated through the use of a static visual cue.
4.4 PCE occurrences in each individual problem task
While the above results suggest a significant overall effect of error reduction across the 
three PC problems, the effectiveness of the Popl interface is expected to be present in 
each individual PC problem tasks. The following analysis was used to examine whether 
the error reduction effect is general to all problem tasks or only specific to certain 
problem tasks.
Table 3.5 shows the respective number of PCEs for all three PC problem tasks (DHC, 
Trch and IS) in both conditions.
Txt Popl
DHC Trch IS DHC Trch IS
No. of PCE 10 9 14 5 6 5
No. of PCE opportunities 23 23 23 24 24 24
Error rate (%) 43.5% 39.1% 60.9% 20.8% 25% 20.8%
Table 3.5: No. of PCEs in each individual problem task in condition Txt and Popl.
In each PC problem task, each participant either made the error or not. Therefore, Chi- 
Square comparisons were made for each problem task separately to assess any significant 
differences in the number of PCEs between Txt and Popl conditions. Post hoc 
comparisons using Bonferroni correction obtained a significant difference in PCE in the 
IS task, x2 = 7.817 (1, N = 47), p  = .005. In descriptive terms, the PCE rate in condition 
Txt was about three times the PCE rate in condition Popl. However, no significant 
difference was found in the DHC, x2 = 2.77 (1, N = 47), n.s., and Trch problem task x2 = 
1.08 (1, N = 47), n.s..
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4.5 Difference in number of PCEs between the three problem tasks
The next logical question to ask is whether the significant error reduction effect in the IS 
problem task is due to a higher PCE rate inherent to the problem itself. PCE rates are 
compared across the three problem tasks within condition Txt and condition Popl. 
Cochran Q test was used to assess differences between more than two within-subject 
dichotomous variables. Although Table 3.5 shows that, in condition Txt, there was a 
higher number of PCE occurrences in IS followed by DHC then Trch, Cochran Q test 
yielded no significant difference between the three problems in terms of the number of 
PCEs, Q = 3.231 (df = 2), n.s.. Differences in the number of PCEs between the three 
problem tasks in condition Popl was also found to be not significant, Q = .167 (df = 2), 
n.s..
5 Discussion
The current experiment obtained an overall PCE rate of 35% across the two experimental 
conditions and this supports the first hypothesis that PCE can occur systematically in a 
problem-solving paradigm. In Experiment 3a, which used the same paradigm as the 
current experiment but with only one PC problem task (DHC), the obtained PCE rate was 
80%. The high rate of PCE was thought to be associated with a couple of methodological 
shortcomings. In the current experiment, the obtained PCE rate in the DHC task was 
43.5% in the Txt condition alone. The still relatively high error rate, but decreased from 
the previous experiment, is an anticipated and positive finding. The decrease in the error 
rate is taken to indicate that the current experiment (the Txt condition specifically) has 
successfully “debugged” the shortcomings of the previous experiment; through the 
refined instructions and training trials to ensure participants had knowledge of the PC step 
present in the problem and had knowledge of how to execute the PC step. This is evident 
in the responses given by all, but one, participant rating the PC step as either “very 
important” or “important” to the overall solution of the problem.
The overall PCE rate was found to be significantly different between the Txt and the 
Popl condition; there were fewer PCEs in the Popl condition than the Txt condition. The 
current result suggests that, regardless of the different problem tasks, PCEs were less
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likely to occur when the Popl interface, containing a visual cue related to the PC step, 
was used to solve the PC problem tasks. Finer data examination at the individual problem 
task level revealed significant error reduction between the two interface conditions in the 
IS problem task; the magnitude of the difference in PCE occurrences suggests that the 
error is about three times as likely to occur in Txt as in Popl. Although the same error 
reduction pattern was not found to be statistically significant in DHC or Trch, the trend of 
the data is consistent with the overall finding that fewer PCEs occurred in Popl condition. 
The overall finding suggests that the use of a simple static visual cue could mitigate PCE 
occurrences, and the error reduction effect was relatively more substantial in one of 
problem tasks -  IS. This finding provides support to the second hypothesis of the current 
study that PCE can be mitigated through the use of static visual cues.
The differential error reduction effect between different problem tasks was not an 
anticipated outcome. One possible reason for this could be the problem tasks themselves. 
This speculation is made on the basis that the three problem tasks are not isomorphic. 
Since Byrne & Bovair’s (1997) findings suggest that high working memory load is a 
major determinant on the occurrences of PCE, it is not unreasonable to speculate that the 
different problems used in the current study might impose different working memory 
demands on participants and, consequently, result in different reduction rate of PCE 
occurrences between the two different interfaces used. To pursue this speculation, the 
next section is a qualitative analysis of the three problem tasks.
5.1 Analysis on the three PC problems (DHC, Trch & IS)
Problem-solving research work has been carried out to determine how difficult a problem 
is by quantifying its imposed working memory load; for example, Kotovsky & 
Kushmerick (1991) compared participants’ performances on isomorphic versions of the 
Tower of Hanoi problem and developed a computational model to explain the differences 
in working memory load imposed by the isomorphs. However, it is difficult to quantify 
the level of difficulties in the problems used in the current study and this is, largely, 
because the three problems used are not isomorphic, i.e. they differ in terms of features in 
their problem space structures. As a result, in any subsequent comparisons between the 
three problems it is impractical to pinpoint exactly which dimensions one problem is 
more difficult than others. However, by adopting some of the dimensions in which
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problems are analysed in the problem-solving domain, the objective of the following 
analysis is to outline some of the main qualitative differences between the DHC, Trch and 
IS problem task in order to examine if the differences in PCE reduction rate are related to 
inherent characteristics of the problems.
The first dimension to look at is performance level in terms of the number of correct 
solutions for each problem task across the two experimental conditions. This dimension 
might provide a rough indication of the relative difficulty of the problems; the more 
participants able to solve the problem, the less difficult it is. Looking at the data on a 
descriptive level, the DHC problem was solved correctly by 70% (33 out of 47) of the 
participants, the Trch problem was solved correctly by 15% (7 out of 47) of the 
participants, and the IS problem was solved correctly by 23% (11 out of 47) of the 
participants. The differences in the number of correct solutions arrived at in each problem 
suggest that DHC might be the least difficult in the problem set; however, it is not clear 
which problem is more difficult among Trch and IS based on this performance level 
dimension alone.
Other measures such as completion times and usage of the History and Reminder 
functions have been taken for each problem. Table 3.6 shows the mean completion times 
for the three problem tasks in both conditions. The general trend suggests that IS took the 
longest time to complete followed by Trch and then DHC. The difference in mean 
completion times between condition Txt and Popl is not more than 60 seconds for any 
problem. IS appears to have taken the longest time to complete. However, this measure 
alone is not informative enough to differentiate how difficult or demanding in terms of 
working memory the problem tasks are. The completion times may well be a by-product 
of the number of steps required to solve the problem, the more steps a complete solution 
requires the more time may be required to complete it.
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Txt Popl
DHC 197s (101) 241s (172)
Trch 341s(275) 325s(219)
IS 616s(283) 564s(248)
Table 3.6: Mean completion time and standard deviation (in bracket) for each PC problem task in
the two experimental conditions.
Table 3.7 summarises the means and standard deviations of the number of History 
function usage (to recall previous steps carried out).
Txt Popl
DHC 0.65 (0.98) 0.83 (1.74)
Trch 0.74(1.49) 0.96 (0.95)
IS 2.5 (2.7) 2.71 (2.26)
Table 3.7: Mean and standard deviation (in bracket) o f History functions usage for each PC
problem task in the two conditions.
Differences in mean usage between the two conditions for each problem task are not 
more than 0.3. IS had the most usage followed by Trch then DHC in the History 
functions. This measure might indicate a relationship with demands on working memory; 
the higher the working memory demands the more the usage required. However, it is not 
clear how the minimal difference in the functions usage between DHC and Trch might 
agree with the rather substantial difference between the two problems in terms of correct 
solutions achieved.
The usage of the Reminder function might be related to the number of entities involved in 
a problem task; the more entities, the more the usage required. Such a relation might, 
arguably, add extra demands on working memory. The Reminder function is only present 
in the Txt condition and was used most often in the Trch problem (M = 2.35, SD = 2.14) 
followed by the DHC problem (M = 1.57, SD = 1.8), and followed by the IS problem (M
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= 1.4, SD = 1.4). However, the pattern of data on reminder usage is not consistent with 
the pattern of the performance level: the Trch problem had the fewest correct solutions, 
followed by the IS problem and then the DHC problem.
By drawing out the problem space graph for each individual problem (see Appendix C) 
one can then start describing the differences among the problems in terms of other 
dimensions. The diagrammatic representations of these problem space graphs are adapted 
from Jeffries, Poison, Razran & Atwood’s (1977) problem space graph for the 
Missionaries-Cannibals problem (p. 414). Following some of the dimensions discussed as 
being important in determining the difficulty of a problem in problem-solving research 
(e.g. Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985), the following dimensions have been chosen to 
assess the relative difficulty in the current problem set: a) minimum solution path: the 
least number of moves involved in arriving at the solution, b) number of “moving away 
from goal” steps: the number of moves that result in a state which apparently removes 
one further away from the goal state, c) number of branches: the number of branches in 
the problem space that leads to an illegal state, and d) number of entities involved to test 
the legality of a move. Table 3.8 summarises the three problems in terms of these four 
dimensions.
Problem task 
DHC Trch IS
Minimum solution path 9 7 13
No. of “moving away from the goal” step 1 0 1
No. of branches 7 N/A 18
No. of entities involved to test the legality of a move 4 4 6
Table 3.8: The three problems (DHC. IS and Trch) and their corresponding characteristics in
terms o f four chosen dimensions.
First of all, let us consider the comparison between DHC and IS. These two problems are 
similar in that they both include a “moving away from the goal” step in their solution
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paths; it is this step that most participants had problems with (Thomas, 1974 & Greeno, 
1974). Furthermore, the river-crossing paradigms in DHC and IS are similar in that each 
state is reversible to its previous state. The differences between the two problems are that 
DHC has a shorter minimum solution path, fewer branches and fewer entities to consider 
when testing the legality of a move. Differences in these dimensions might make the 
DHC problem less difficult than the IS problem, accounting for why more participants 
managed to solve it correctly.
However, the same logical comparison does not apply to Trch as it has the shortest 
minimum solution path, no “moving away from goal” step and the same number of 
entities as DHC, but it has the smallest number of participants solving it correctly. A 
closer look at the problem space of Trch suggests that it has a couple of inherently 
different characteristics to the other two problems.
Firstly, the river-crossing paradigm in Trch is different to the others in that each state is 
not reversible to its previous state because of the time component in the problem; every 
move made in the problem adds extra time to the solution path. Secondly, the type of 
branches in Trch is different in that a branch from the start state leading to an illegal state 
is not immediately apparent, i.e. they are like “traps”. Once one makes an incorrect move 
from the start state, the illegal state does not appear until a few moves later, whereas an 
illegal state is immediately apparent usually after making one single move in DHC or IS. 
Therefore, it is impractical to quantify the number of branches in the Trch problem task, 
which is indicated as N/A in table 3.8.
The presence of “traps” in the Trch problem might impose a relatively larger exploratory 
space on participants compared to the other two problems and this might explain the 
lower performance level in the Trch problem even though it has, for example, a shorter 
minimum solution path than DHC. The relatively low performance levels in Trch and IS 
might suggest that they are, more or less, of equal difficulty but for different reasons. 
Although IS does not have the “traps” property of Trch, the difficulty of the problem 
might be because of its longer minimum solution path and more entities involved in 
testing the legality of a move than the Trch problem.
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The performance level data together with the analysis outlined above suggest that, among 
the problem set used in the current experiment, the DHC problem is the least difficult and 
the Trch and the IS problem are, more or less, equally difficult. Although demands on 
working memory imposed by the problems might be different and might correlate with 
level of difficulty, only qualitative comparisons are possible and informative since the 
three problems adopted are not isomorphic.
With respect to the relatively more substantial error reduction found in IS: if the effect of 
error reduction was related to the difficulty of the problems, then one should expect to see 
Trch and IS having the same pattern of results and the DHC problem having a reversed 
result pattern. However, this hypothetical pattern of results was not supported by the data 
and this rules out the speculation that the differential error reduction rate in the three 
problems being related to the differences in difficulty or the qualitative characteristics 
inherent in the problems themselves.
5.2 Pop-up menus in the Popl condition
A second speculation on the differential error reduction is made on the basis that the pop­
up menus used for each of the three problem tasks exhibit some differences at a physical 
level. Figure 3.9 are the screen shots of the three pop-up menus used in Popl condition 
for DHC, Trch and IS.
Shop
►Seat
Mrs. Jones
Hen
Corn
✓ List 1
David
Charles
Boat
Ben
Adam
V  List 1
Scratchy
Itchy
Crate
✓  Li s t  1
Figure 3.9: Pop-up menus used in Popl condition for DHC (left). Trch (middle) and IS (right).
Arrows indicating the PC cues.
One common characteristic of the DHC and Trch menus is that there were five items in 
each of the menu lists, whereas there were only three items in the IS menu list. In 
addition, the PC cue is embedded within the list in the DHC and Trch cases, but appears
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at the bottom (right next to the initially highlighted item) in the IS case. When using these 
lists, participants’ visual attention on the PC cue (i.e. Seat or Boat) might have been 
distracted by other items in the list for DHC and Trch, making the cue less conspicuous 
and, consequently, less effective as a reminder to the PC step when compared to the IS 
list.
The following experiment is designed to examine whether the differential error reduction 
among the three problem tasks is related to the differences in the cue position of the 
menus.
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Experiment 3c: a follow-up study 
1 Introduction
This experiment is a follow-up from Experiment 3b to examine the effect of cue position 
in pop-up menus on PCE occurrences. More specifically, by controlling for the relative 
position of the PC cue in the pop-up menus, this experiment is set out to examine if the 
differential error reduction observed in the previous experiment still persists.
1.1 Modification of the pop-up menus
A modification was made to each of the three pop-up menus used in Experiment 3b. 
Figure 3.10 shows the screen shots of the modified pop-up menus for the three problem 
tasks.
5H«p
Mrs. Jones 
Hen 
Corn 
Seat
David ~
Charies
Ben
Adam
Boat
Scratchy
Itchy
Figure 3.10: Modified pop-up menus for DHC (left). Trch (middle) and IS (right). Arrows
indicating the PC cues.
The lack of reduction of PCEs in the DHC and Trch problem task was attributed to the 
PC cues being embedded within other items in their respective pop-up menus making 
them inconspicuous. Whereas, the PC cue for IS was placed at the bottom of the list in 
Experiment 3b. Therefore, with the modified menus, the PC cues (Seat and Boat) were 
placed at the bottom of the lists for DHC and Trch. To select an item from the pop-up 
menus involves one moving the cursor (the blue strips in Figure 3.10) upwards from the 
bottom of the list. By placing the PC cue at the bottom, just like the configuration in the 
IS menu from the previous experiment, the cue becomes the first item in the list and is not 
embedded within other items. The PC cue in the modified IS menu was placed at the top
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of the list. This modification serves as an extra test to assess if the occurrence of PCE in 
the IS problem is affected by a difference in menu position.
If the obtained differential error reduction effect was due to the relative position of the PC 
cue in the menus then, with all else being equal, the following predictions are made with 
respect to the modified pop-up menus:
1) Reliable reduction in PCE occurrences should be observed in the DHC and Trch 
problem task
2) Reliable reduction in PCE occurrences should still be observed in the IS problem 
task because despite its modified PC cue position, being at the top of the list, it is 
not embedded within the other items in the menu.
These modifications made to the pop-up menus serve as an experimental condition 
(Pop2) and data collected with this condition is compared to the data collected from the 
previous experiment.
2 Method
2.1 Tasks
The same six problem tasks from Experiment 3b were used.
2.2 Design
A single condition, where participants solve the problem tasks using the modified pop-up 
menus (Pop2 condition), was run in this experiment. The same counter balancing of 
testing trials was used as in Experiment 3b.
2.3 Materials
The same computer equipment and paper materials were used as in Experiment 3b.
2.4 Participants
24 participants took part in the current study. They were all UCL undergraduate or 
postgraduate students. There were 12 males and 12 females, ages ranged from 18 to 30
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with a mean of 22.3. Each participant was paid £3 for participating in the experiment; 
moreover, as an incentive to encourage performance, an extra 50p was paid for every 
correctly solved problem. Therefore, each participant could get paid a maximum of £6.
2.5 Procedure
The same instructions, training and testing trials were adopted as in Experiment 3b.
2.6 Measures
The same measures of interest were obtained as in Experiment 3b.
3 Results
Analysis was carried out with the data obtained in the previous experiment (conditions 
Txt and Popl) and 24 valid cases from condition Pop2 in the current experiment.
3.1 Responses from checklist
Almost all participants (22 out of 24) in the Pop2 condition rated the PC step as “very 
important” in the checklist. The remaining two rated it as “important”. Consistent with 
responses from Txt and Popl in the previous experiment, the PC step was acknowledged 
as part of the integral solution in the training trial.
3.2 PCE rates in Txt and Pop2
Table 3.9 summarises the number of PCEs and their respective error rates in the two 
experimental conditions. Almost half of the participants (11 out of 24) in the Pop2 
condition committed at least one PCE. Collapsed across problem tasks and conditions 
(Txt and Pop2), a total of 53 PCEs was generated out of 141 opportunities for the error; 
yielded an overall PCE rate of 38% between Txt and Pop2.
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Txt Pop2
No. of PCEs 33 20
No. of PCE opportunities 69 72
PCE rate 47% 28%
Table 3.9: Summary of number of PCEs obtained in the two experimental conditions.
3.3 Difference in PCE occurrences between conditions
A PCE score was computed for each participant in the Pop2 condition. Table 3.10 below 
shows the respective mean, median and interquartile range of the PCE scores.
Txt Popl Pop2
Mean 1.43 0.67 0.83
Median 2.00 0.50 0.00
Interquartile range 0.00 -  2.00 0.00- 1.00 0.00 -  2.00
Table 3.10: The means, medians and interquartile ranges for the three conditions.
The difference in PCE scores between Txt and Pop2 was found to be marginally 
significant, U = 190.5 (Nt = 23, N2 = 24), p  = .055. No reliable difference was detected 
between Popl and Pop2, U = 272 (N, = 24, N2 = 24), n.s..
3.4 PCE occurrences in each individual problem task
3.4.1 Comparison between Txt and Pop2
Table 3.11 shows the number of PCEs for all three PC problem tasks (DHC, Trch and IS) 
in Txt and Pop2.
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Txt Pop2
DHC Trch IS DHC Trch IS
No. of PCE 10 9 14 7 6 7
No. of PCE opportunities 23 23 23 24 24 24
Error rate (%) 43.5% 39.1 60.9% 29.2% 25% 29.2%
Table 3.11: Individual problem task’s PCE rate in Txt and Pop2.
Planned comparisons using Chi-Square comparisons showed a significant difference 
between Txt and Pop2 conditions only in the IS problem, %2 = 4.78, (1, N = 47), p  = .029. 
Descriptively, the difference in PCE rate for the IS problem task was about twice between 
conditions Txt and Pop2. No significant difference was found in the DHC problem, %2 =
1.04 (1, N = 47), n.s., or the Trch problem, %2 = 1.08 (1, N = 47), n.s.. The results show a 
consistent pattern of error reduction with the previous experiment.
3.5 Difference in number of PCEs between the three problem tasks in 
Pop2
As in the previous experiment, the difference in the number of PCEs are compared across 
the three problem tasks within condition Pop2. This is to assess if any one of the problem 
tasks produce a reliably higher PCE rate. Cochran Q test was used to assess the difference 
in number of PCEs between the three problems. The difference was found to be not 
significant, Q = .20 (df = 2), n.s.. The result is consistent with the pattern found in Txt 
and Popl in the previous experiment, suggesting that given a particular interface used, the 
three problems did not differ in terms of the number of PCEs obtained.
4 Discussion
Across the two experimental conditions, Txt and Pop2, the current experiment generated 
an overall PCE rate of 38% which is comparable to the 35% obtained in the previous 
experiment. The same pattern of results as the previous experiment was replicated: there 
was an overall difference in the error rate, albeit marginal, between the two conditions, 
and the difference was relatively more substantial in IS than the other problem tasks. 
Although no statistically significant error reduction was detected in the DHC and Trch
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problems, the trend of the data is consistent as in the previous experiment that fewer 
PCEs occurred in Pop2.
The findings suggest that moving the PC cue to the bottom of the pop-up menus did not 
have the anticipated error reduction effect in the DHC and Trch problems. However, as 
predicted, moving the cue to the top of the menu list in the IS problem did not affect its 
error reduction effect. The results also suggest no difference in PCE occurrences between 
the two pop-up menus, namely Popl and Pop2. Therefore, the overall findings suggest 
that the differential PCE reduction effect observed in the previous experiment cannot be 
due to the relative positions of the PC cue in the menu lists.
This leaves one final speculation, which is the different number of items in the three pop­
up menus. The menus in DHC and Trch both have five items but the IS menu only has 
three. Since the factor of menu size was not controlled for, the speculation implies that 
the differential PCE reduction between the problem tasks might be related to the 
differences in the menu size. A possible explanation for the more substantial error 
reduction in IS could be that the PC cue is made more salient as compared to the PC cues 
in the relatively larger menus in the other problems. The presence of fewer items in the 
smaller menu might provide less distraction in relation to the PC cue. As a result, the 
more salient the static PC cue, the better it is as a reminder of the PC step. This 
speculation, nevertheless, requires further experimentation before any firm conclusion 
can be drawn.
However, one would argue that there might be a potential relationship between PCE 
occurrences and correctness of the solutions. Across the three experimental conditions, 
more than half of the participants (48 out of 71) had at least one of the three PC problem 
tasks solved correctly. Table 3.12 shows that there appears to be no substantive difference 
in terms of the number of PC problem tasks solved correctly between the three 
conditions.
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Txt Popl Pop2
DHC 15 18 14
No. correct solution Trch 5 2 3
IS 5 6 4
Total 25 26 21
Total no. of PC problem tasks 69 72 72
% Correct 36% 36% 29%
Table 3.12: The no, o f PC problem tasks solved correctly in the two experimental conditions.
The completion of a problem task in the current experiments is self-determined by the 
participants. The participants were explicitly instructed to complete the problem even if 
they could not arrive at the correct solution. This methodological design is one of 
practical concern since the problems adopted were not particularly easy when one had to 
rely solely on one’s working memory to solve them. Furthermore, the essence of PCE 
resides in the fact that one thinks the task has been completed. Table 3.13 shows the 
proportion of participants in each condition solving the PC problems correctly or not and 
whether a PCE was made.
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Txt
DHC Trch IS
PCE No PCE PCE No PCE PCE No PCE
Correct 9 6 2 3 4 1
solution (39%) (26%) (9%) (13%) (17%) (4%)
Incorrect 1 7 7 11 10 8
solution (4%) (30%) (30%) (48%) (43%) (35%)
Popl
DHC Trch IS
PCE No PCE PCE No PCE PCE No PCE
Correct
solution
3
(13%)
15
(62%)
1
(4%)
3
(13%)
1
(4%)
5
(21%)
Incorrect
solution
2
(8%)
4
(17%)
5
(21%)
15
(62%)
4
(17%)
14
(58%)
Pop2
DHC Trch IS
PCE No PCE PCE No PCE PCE No PCE
Correct
solution
3
(13%)
11
(46%)
0
(0%)
3
(13%)
3
(13%)
1
(4%)
Incorrect
solution
4
(17%)
6
(25%)
6
(25%)
15
(62%)
6
(25%)
14
(58%)
Table 3.13; Distribution o f number o f participants solving the PC problems correctly or 
incorrectly with PCE or no PCE in all three conditions.
While this hypothesis is not one that was originally to be tested in the current study, the 
relationship between PCE occurrences and correct solutions was explored in each 
condition for each PC problem task. Fisher’s Exact tests were used for each problem task 
in each condition to assess association between the number of correct solutions and the 
number of PCEs within each problem task. Table 3.14 summarises the p values for all the 
comparisons.
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Txt Popl Pop2
DHC p  = .074 p  = .568 p  = .393
Trch p=  1.000 p  = .446 p  = .546
IS p  = .611 p  = 1.000 p =  1.00
Table 3.14: p  values o f Fisher’s Exact tests for assessing associations between PCEs and correct 
solutions for each problem task in three conditions.
There were no significant associations between the number of correct solutions and the 
number of PCEs observed in any of the problem tasks in all three conditions.
4.1 Limited effectiveness of static visual cues in mitigating PCEs
Using the same game-like procedural task paradigm as Byrne & Bovair (1997), Chung & 
Byrne (2004) found that effective visual cues in combating PCEs have a couple of 
properties: first, a dynamic presentation (such as blinking movements) provides an 
attention-capturing element. Secondly, there is a just-before temporal occurrence at the 
PC step as opposed to it occurring earlier in the task. The temporal characteristic of a cue 
is explained in terms of the activation-based goal memory (AGM) model (Altmann & 
Trafton, 2002) suggesting that cues occurring at the beginning of a task tend to be 
forgotten by the cognitive system when the time comes to execute the PC step. This is 
because the cue is “masked” by other goals or steps in the task and the activation of the 
cue would have undergone considerable decay by the time it needs to be recalled. 
Consequently, the cue would not have enough activation to be retrieved. It was also found 
that using a static cue which occurred early in the task, but not just-before the PC step, 
did not have an effect in reducing the error.
In contrast to Chung & Byrne’s findings, the cues used in the current experiments were 
static because they have the same appearance as any other items in the menus. In other 
words, they did not appear any more dynamic relative to the other items. Moreover, these 
static cues did not have the just-in-time characteristic, i.e. they did not occur just-before 
the PC step. Nevertheless, data from the current experiment suggest that visual cues 
which lack the dynamic and just-before temporal properties do have an effect in reducing 
PCEs. However, the errors still persist and did not decline to 0% occurrence, whereas the 
use of dynamic and just-before cueing achieved a complete elimination of the error in
92
Chapter 3 — Post-completion error in problem-solving: Experiment 3c
Chung & Byrne’s study. This supports the notion that static cues without the just-before 
temporal property are less effective than dynamic cues with the temporal characteristics 
in combating PCEs.
Contrary to Chung and Byrne’s findings, the current findings suggest that a static visual 
cue might still have an effect, though limited, in mitigating PCEs. There are a number of 
differences between the current experiments and Chung & Byrne’s, and it is possible that 
some of these differences might contribute to the opposite findings. One prominent 
difference is the interface of the task environment used. The task in Chung & Byrne’s 
study involves an interface which is visually more dynamic and complex: there are 
various controls such as buttons, check boxes, indicators and sliders. Interaction with the 
task environment involves navigating around different parts of the interface. On the other 
hand, the interface of the pop-up menus is relatively simple, consisting of a couple of 
menus and text boxes. Interaction with the interface requires only selecting items from 
the menus. Although the adopted static cues lack the just-in-time characteristic, the 
relatively static information and simplistic interaction might make the simple static cues 
salient and, consequently, able to prime the PC step. In contrast, in Chung & Byrne’s 
study, only the dynamic cue was effective because the relatively high complexity of their 
task environment made the static cue not salient enough to prime the PC step.
The current findings show that a simple static visual cue could reduce PC errors, and the 
context of the task environment was an important determinant of the effectiveness of the 
cue.
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Overall chapter discussion
Having participants solving mentally demanding problems “in-the-head” imposes high 
working demands throughout the problem-solving process. The occurrences of PCEs in 
the current experiments support Byrne & Bovair’s (1997) and Mortenson’s (2003) 
general finding that the error rate is sensitive to working memory demands. In the current 
study, across the three experimental conditions, more than half of the participants (40 out 
of 71) made at least one PC error. Furthermore, the PCE rate generated in the Txt 
condition (48%; 33 errors out of 69 opportunities) is comparable to the 50% error rate 
obtained in Byrne & Bovair’s Experiment 2 with a high working memory load condition. 
This demonstrates that PCEs can be generated reliably under laboratory conditions using 
a novel experimental paradigm based on problem-solving tasks. The high error rate also 
confirms the cognitive robustness of the error phenomenon: that it occurs not only in 
routine procedural tasks but also in problem-solving situations.
The problem-solving tasks used in this study had a number of characteristics that made 
them particularly effective in provoking PCEs that contrast with the routine 
proceduralised tasks used by previous studies. First of all, participants were required to 
solve the problems “in the head”, without the use of any form of external representation, 
which placed a high demand on working memory for keeping track of the problem state. 
The use of the problem-solving tasks in generating the error is functionally similar to the 
use of a concurrent secondary task to tax working memory (Byrne & Bovair, 1997), 
except that the working memory demand is an integral part of the primary problem­
solving task, removing the need for an artificial secondary task.
Secondly, Altmann and Trafton (2002) suggest that under normal circumstances, such as 
in the absence of high working memory load, the relatively low PCE rate in routine 
procedural tasks (e.g. using an ATM) is due to rote associative learning —  in which the 
temporal order of the steps in a procedural task helps to cue the next step in the sequence. 
The relatively low occurrence of PCE is explained in terms of the successful cueing from 
the preceding step to the PC step. The problem-solving tasks adopted in the current study 
are not routine procedural tasks, so the extent of procedural cueing from one step to the
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next is minimal. As a consequence, the generation of the error did not require extensive 
training on the participants’ part. Although the participants had training to ensure they 
had knowledge of the PC step and action, they were not trained in doing the problems per
se.
The effect of the simple static cue was found to be limited in its effectiveness in that it did 
not completely eliminate the error across the problem tasks. In relation to Chung & 
Byrne’s (2004) findings, interpretation of the result from the current experiments also 
suggests that the static visual cues may have a mitigating effect on PCEs depending on 
the complexity of the task environment. In practice, providing a just-in-time and dynamic 
cue might not be possible if a system cannot tell where the PC step lies in a particular 
task. In the current study, completion of the main goal could not be detected by the 
system, whereas Chung & Byrne’s interface could use a just-in-time cue because the 
system could detect when the main goal had been achieved. The implication is that when 
it is not possible to provide a cue with the just-in-time and dynamic features, the use of 
static cues to combat PCE is better than not using any at all.
There are a number of issues that need to be addressed in this study. Firstly, the 
manipulation between the two different experimental conditions — text boxes and pop-up 
menus — is not just a difference in the presence of the PC cues but also in their 
interaction style. This difference in two factors rather than one might be a shortcoming of 
the experimental manipulation. However, a practical constraint of the manipulation is that 
a menu-based interaction allows one to select and input an item (in this case, the PC cue) 
only if the item is actually present in the menu list.
One suggestion for a future experiment is to consider using a text-based interaction style 
for two conditions —  a cue condition and a no-cue condition. In the cue condition, all 
entities involved in a problem task including the PC cue are to be on screen. In the no-cue 
condition, only the problem task entities are to be on screen and not the PC cue. This 
manipulation should control for the difference in PC cue presence while having the same 
interaction style across conditions. With this modification, it is expected that the same 
pattern of results to be obtained as the current experiments, namely less PCE occurrences 
in the cue condition where the PC cue is present on screen.
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Secondly, the completion of a problem task in the current experiments is self-determined 
by the participants. The participants were explicitly instructed to complete the problem 
even if they could not arrive at the correct solution. This methodological design is one of 
practical concern since the problems adopted were not particularly easy when one had to 
rely solely on one’s working memory to solve them. Furthermore, it is argued that the 
essence of PCE resides in the fact that one thinks the task has been completed. There 
might be a potential relationship between PCE occurrences and correctness of the 
solutions. While this hypothesis was not tested in the current study, exploration of the 
data shows there were no statistically significant associations between the number of 
correct solutions and the number of PCEs in each of the problem tasks across the three 
conditions.
Finally, one might criticise the approach of analysing the inherent differences among the 
individual problem tasks as being imprecise in claiming their differential working 
memory demands. While one could use tools such as Cognitive Complexity Theory 
(Kieras & Poison, 1985) or building computational cognitive models (e.g. Kotovsky & 
Kushmerick, 1991) to obtain quantitative estimates of the working memory demands 
imposed by the different problems, these methods require assumptions about what 
methods participants use in the problem-solving process. These assumptions cannot be 
made within the scope of the current study because verbal protocols were not collected. 
While verbal protocols might be useful in studying problem-solving behaviour, however, 
this series of experiments used problem-solving tasks as a vehicle to study PCE rather 
than an investigation into the cognitive processes involved in problem-solving as such.
The current experiments are only the beginning of studying PCEs using a novel problem­
solving paradigm. Future research can be directed to adapt and refine the current 
methodology to address the identified limitations, and some equivocal issues such as the 
effect of menu size on static visual cues and the relationship between PCEs and 
correctness of solutions in problem-solving.
The following section is a discussion of the general findings in relation to the existing 
theoretical approaches to PCE.
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Theoretical discussion
The main findings from the series of experiments suggest that PCEs occur not only in 
routine procedural tasks but also in problem-solving tasks. Moreover, simple static cues 
were found to have a mitigating effect on the error although complete elimination of the 
error was not achieved. In this section, these two findings are discussed in terms of the 
extant PCE approaches in order to examine if these approaches are able to provide some 
theoretical understanding to the findings.
The AGM approach (Altmann & Trafton, 2002) provides a description of how PCE is 
avoided rather than how it actually occurs. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the AGM 
model proposes that in routine procedural tasks the avoidance of the error is achieved 
through associative cueing between task steps. The well-practiced procedures in a routine 
task act as cues for subsequent procedures, therefore the execution of a PC step is 
associatively primed by its preceding task step provided it is carried out. However, 
participants in the problem-solving tasks were not carrying out routine procedures; they 
did not receive extensive practice in solving the problems. Therefore, associative cueing 
between task steps in the problem-solving tasks should be minimal if it exists at all. In 
AGM terms, the susceptibility of PCE in the problem-solving tasks could be attributed to 
the lack of associative cueing between task steps.
Chung & Byrne (2004) explain their finding of dynamic just-in-time cueing to eliminate 
PCE in terms of the AGM approach; the just-in-time characteristic of a cue is particularly 
important since cues appearing early in a task are likely to be masked by subsequent task 
goals. As a consequence, those cues will not be retrieved in time to prime the execution 
of the PC step. Current findings that static cues, which lack the just-in-time element, 
could also reduce PCE might appear contradictory at first glance. However, despite the 
fact that static cues in the Pop conditions did not occur just before the PC step, they 
appear whenever the menu was clicked for inputting an item. The cue in the problem­
solving tasks then did not appear only at the beginning of the task but throughout the 
problem-solving process. In terms of the AGM approach, the intermittent appearance of 
the static cues was able to overcome masking by intermediate task goals and associatively
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prime the execution of the PC step, though complete elimination of the error was not 
successful.
The successful generation of PCE using problem-solving tasks supports the general 
finding that high demands on working memory increase the likelihood of PCE 
occurrences (Byrne & Bovair, 1997, and Mortenson, 2003). In the current study, 
participants were required to carry out the problem-solving process without any external 
aids in the environment, placing considerable demands on the participants’ working 
memory. Byrne & Bovair’s CAPS account postulates that as long as the main goal of a 
task remains active in working memory, activation gets propagated to its subgoals. When 
the condition of a subgoal is matched and it accumulates, from the main goal, a high 
enough level of activation, then that subgoal is retrieved and its actions executed. 
However, completed goals or subgoals decay and get displaced from working memory. 
Furthermore, the amount of activation that gets distributed to the subgoals varies as a 
function of working memory load: the higher the load, the less the activation distributed. 
When the main goal of a task is fulfilled and the system is operating over its working 
memory capacity, then the main goal will not remain active long enough to propagate 
enough activation to the PC subgoal. Consequently, the PC subgoal will not get retrieved 
when its activation level is not high enough to be above threshold. The CAPS account 
seems able to make sense of the problem-solving situation: the various memory demands, 
such as having to remember one’s state in the problem space and keeping track of the 
names and number of entities involved, adds to the system’s working memory load. 
When the main goal of completing the problem is fulfilled, it decays and is removed from 
working memory without propagating enough activation to the subgoal of sending the 
vehicle back to the other side of the river. However, the CAPS account does not address 
the influence cues in the external environment have on goal-directed behaviour, which 
was not the account’s original intention. Therefore, it is difficult to articulate the effect 
static cues have in mitigating PCE in CAPS terms.
The Soar account of PCE is based on a particular property of the cognitive architecture; 
the asymmetry between the initiation and termination of a subgoal. The initiation of a 
subgoal occurs when Soar encounters an impasse in a problem space, and the set up of the 
subgoal leads to other actions which when completed allows resumption to the original
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main goal. However, the subgoal disappears together with its associated structures, such 
as a sub-subgoal, once it is completed and terminated. This asymmetry property between 
goal initiation and termination in Soar does not seem antagonistic to problem-solving 
situations. Once the main goal of the problem is reached (e.g. all entities get across the 
river safely) and terminated, its associated subgoal of “sending the vehicle back” is lost 
and never carried out.
However, PCE does not happen every time and, indeed, participants in the current study 
did not make the error in every trial. The Soar account further postulates compensatory 
mechanisms against the error tendency, such as internal cueing through rehearsal 
strategies reminding one to carry out the PC step, or external cueing from the 
environment. Furthermore, the compensatory mechanisms are fragile enough that they 
stop working when influenced by adverse factors, such as high working memory demand. 
In Soar terms, the compensatory mechanisms might be depleted by the high working 
memory demand in the current problem-solving task, resulting in successful generation of 
the error. The mitigating effect on PCE of using static visual cues is consistent with the 
Soar account’s notion of having external cueing as one of the compensatory strategies 
against the error occurrence.
The supergoal kill-off account bases its theoretical constructs in the construction- 
integration (C-I) model (Kintsch, 1988). This C-I based account was initially developed 
to explain behaviour in exploratory learning. Instead of assuming a complete 
specification of correct task knowledge as in most routine cognitive skills, it is assumed 
that one’s goal hierarchy is incomplete and fragmented. In carrying out a task, the goal 
structure has a dynamic nature and generation of new subgoals is driven by feedback 
from the external environment. As far as this assumption of the account goes, it seems 
applicable to the problem-solving situations because participants would not have had the 
correct knowledge in solving the problems. However, the difference is that the generation 
of subgoals during the problem-solving process is most likely to be driven from internal 
feedback since the participants did not receive any information of the problem states in 
the task environment; rather the information is in one’s working memory. The presence 
of the static cues in the Pop conditions can be interpreted as information in the external
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environment which aided the generation of the PC subgoal because it is semantically 
related to the PC step: the vehicle name relating to the PC step of sending it back.
In explaining PCE, the supergoal kill-off account postulates that as long as the main goal 
in the hierarchy remains active it supplies activation to its subgoals. When a subgoal is 
completed its supply of activation is terminated. When two goals are similar, the 
termination of one might also lead to the termination of the other because they are 
associatively linked together. The occurrence of PCE is attributed to the high similarity 
between the completion step in a task and the main task goal; once the completion step is 
executed, the main task goal also gets deactivated and cuts off the supply of activation to 
the PC subgoal. Consequently, the PC subgoal never gets executed. Although this 
descriptive explanation might be stretched to describe the occurrence of PCE in the 
problem-solving tasks, it does not address the effect of working memory demand imposed 
by the problem-solving process. Therefore, despite the fact that the supergoal kill-off 
account appears compatible at first glance with the problem-solving situations and the use 
of static cues against the error, it does not offer any description to make sense of the 
effect of working memory demands on PCE occurrences.
In summary, Byrne and Bovair’s CAPS account is able to provide a description of the 
notion of high working memory demand imposed by the problem-solving situation, 
however, the account is less able to explain the effect of static cues on PCE. This is not 
surprising given that the original intent of the account was to investigate the effect of 
working memory on PCE and did not take into account factors from the external 
environment. The approach offered by the AGM model and the Soar account describe the 
occurrence of PCE not in terms of working memory demands, but in terms of inherent 
characteristics of procedural tasks or property of the cognitive architecture respectively. 
The AGM model explains PCE arising in routine procedural tasks and might not be 
entirely suitable when applied to problem-solving tasks. However, the description of PCE 
offered by the AGM model might be stretched to explain how the error occurs in 
problem-solving tasks due to the lack of associative cueing in non-procedural tasks. The 
Soar account describes the occurrence of PCE in terms of its architectural property —
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asymmetry between subgoal initiation and termination —  but it is not clear how the 
notion of working memory demand might be explained.
The AGM and Soar approaches are able to take into account the effect of static cues since 
both approaches incorporate the role of the external environment on PCE. Among the two 
approaches, Soar might be a more suitable candidate for applying to problem-solving 
situations because the architecture was initially developed to explain problem-solving 
behaviour. Finally, the supergoal kill-off account takes account of the notion of feedback 
from the external environment and seems able to describe the mitigating effect of static 
cues on PCE: the cue generates the PC subgoal through a semantic-action relationship. 
However, the notion of subgoal similarity, which gives rise to PCE, does not seem 
compatible with the effect of high working memory demands in problem-solving 
situations.
The current theoretical discussion has assessed how well the extant theoretical accounts 
accommodate the findings so far. However, the current series of experiments are not able 
to distinguish between the different theoretical perspectives. One of the difficulties is that 
because existing approaches describe PCE using different theoretical constructs, this 
makes it hard to compare and contrast the different accounts. This is hardly surprising 
because research on PCE is still in its infancy, although observation and documentation 
of the error phenomenon can be dated back more than 20 years ago (e.g. Rasmussen, 
1982). It is important to examine the existing theoretical accounts closely in order to gain 
further insights into the nature of the error phenomenon. The insights might then be able 
to guide further empirical investigation into PCE.
The next chapter is a critical analysis of the four existing approaches to PCE: the 
supergoal kill-off account, the Soar account, the CAPS model and the AGM model. The 
objective of this meta-theoretical analysis is to find a common reference point so that the 
seemingly incommensurable approaches can be compared and contrasted with each other.
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1 Introduction
The empirical studies carried out in the previous chapter extended our knowledge of PCE, 
that it does not only occur in procedural tasks but also in problem-solving tasks. 
However, existing theoretical approaches to PCE are scarce and most of the approaches 
(except the CAPS account) only offer verbal descriptions of the error phenomenon. In 
order to further pursue PCE empirically, it is necessary to revisit the existing theoretical 
approaches in more detail to gain further insights into the error phenomenon.
This chapter is a meta-theoretical analysis of PCE. There are several existing theoretical 
accounts of the error phenomenon, however, they remain rather distant from each other, 
in that they differ from the each other in terms of their theoretical constructs. For 
example, although their theoretical positions are similarly grounded in goal management, 
Poison et al.’s (1992) and Byrne & Bovair’s (1997) approaches all have an explicit notion 
of the activation construct, whereas Young’s (1994) Soar account does not rely on such 
construct. Furthermore, there does not seem to be a consensus among researchers as to 
what key aspects a model or explanation of PCE should possess. This lack of theoretical 
consensus can be seen in the different explanations proposed by researchers grounding 
them in different choices of cognitive architectures such as Soar, ACT-R and CAPS. 
Although the choice of a particular cognitive architecture is sometimes dependent on the 
functional behaviour in question, it is, nevertheless, difficult to envisage a coherent 
theoretical picture of the error phenomenon.
The purpose of the current meta-theoretical analysis is to construct a simple analytical 
framework, through which to compare and contrast the various existing PCE accounts. 
However, this is not to claim that the framework should develop into a unified model of 
PCE: it is constructed and used as a conceptual tool to analyse and evaluate the different 
proposed theories in a systematic manner. Therefore, as such, the current analysis is best 
viewed as an attempt to outline what important characteristics an adequate explanation of 
PCE might need to possess. Moreover, it is also one of the objectives of the current 
analytical exercise to be able to further empirical investigation through a critical 
examination of the existing theoretical accounts of PCE.
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2 Basis of the analytical framework
The proposed analytical framework consists of a set of criteria and it is argued that a 
model, or an explanatory description of PCE, should address each of the criteria. The 
basis of the framework is derived from various theoretical difficulties faced by the 
different PCE accounts.
Firstly, one of the difficulties in developing a mechanistic model of PCE is to have the 
model produce the error rate that is in accord to what the human subjects produced. 
Consider even under error-prone conditions, such as having a high working memory 
demand, subjects in Byrne & Bovair’s (1997) Experiment 2 did not make the error on 
every single trial. As Young (1994) noted “ ...it’s a general problem for any deterministic 
model ... when attempting to account for certain kinds of errors. If a deterministic model 
makes the error at all, then it will make the error every time. Conversely, if it can do the 
task right, then it will never make the error.” (p. 10). Young further commented that in 
order to address this all-or-nothing error behaviour in any explanations one should be 
aware that, “ ... errors are typically explained not by a model which actually produces 
them, but by a model which does the task correctly but about which a secondary 
argument is made that it is liable or susceptible, in some way, to the error.” (p. 10)
The second difficulty, which is related to the first, is addressing the infrequent but 
persistent nature of the error phenomenon. As described in Chapter 2, Reason (2002) 
carried out a questionnaire survey asking 95 undergraduates and academic staff to 
indicate how often they committed various kinds of omission errors when using a 
photocopier in a naturalistic setting. The participants’ responses were based on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 0 = never to 6 = nearly all the time. It was found that the PCE, leaving 
the last page of the original, had the highest score among all other omission errors with a 
mean of 2.18 and a standard deviation of 1.56. Although the PCE was found to be the 
most prevalent kind of omission error, its frequency score, at least from Reason’s study, 
supports the notion that it does not occur very frequently. It is not unreasonable to 
suppose that the occurrence of the error in most everyday PC tasks is rather infrequent, 
since most people are able to carry out PC tasks without making the error most of the 
time, such as remembering to get change from a ticket machine, retrieving the original
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after photocopying and collecting one’s cash card after a withdrawal on an ATM. 
However, despite its infrequent occurrence, PCE has a persistent nature in that it happens 
every now and again. Data from empirical studies, as described in Chapter 2, also lend 
support to its persistent characteristic that prolonged practice and motivating participants 
not to make PCE did not achieve complete elimination of the error (Byrne & Davis, in 
press), PCE was reduced to 0% occurrence only when the task structure was altered such 
that the PC step has to be carried out before goal completion.
Based on the two inter-related problems posed by theorising about PCE, a set of four 
criteria proposed by the framework can be formulated as follows:
How the task in question is carried out correctly.
How the error occurs.
How the error is avoided most o f the time, i.e., being infrequent.
How the error is sometimes made, i.e., being persistent.
The first criterion: “how the task in question is carried out correctly” is concerned with 
how a given explanation of PCE deals with the foundational level of the error behaviour; 
in other words, a description of how the PC task is executed correctly. The second 
critierion: “how the error occurs” is to do with explaining how the error may arise from 
the basic foundational level of task performance. The third and fourth criteria: “how the 
error is avoided most of the time” and “how the error is sometimes made” are concerned 
with how the infrequent but persistent nature of PCE is explained, and implied in these 
criteria is also how the issue of an all-or-nothing error rate is addressed.
The four criteria form a set of questions to be asked of each of the extant PCE accounts to 
examine how each of the criteria is addressed. The nature of this meta-theoretical analysis 
is qualitative, therefore, there is no strict chronological order in which the criteria should 
be assessed. In some cases it might be meaningful to assess more than one criterion at the 
same time.
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3 Analysis and evaluation of extant PCE accounts
In the following section, an overview of each of the PCE accounts is presented again, in 
more detail, and then each of the four criteria from the framework above are used to 
assess the ways in which each of the theoretical accounts fulfils them (or not).
3.1 Supergoal kill-off account
In suggesting a theory-based evaluation technique for user interface design, Poison, 
Lewis, Rieman & Wharton (1992) proposed a cognitive model of learning through 
exploration. At a high level, their model is similar to Norman’s theory of action (1988) 
which describes a cycle of stages in order to carry out some actions in the world and 
evaluate the effect of the action. Poison et al.’s model extends further and specifies the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying the control of the different stages in the action cycle. 
Poison et al.’s model is based on the construction-integration (C-I) model (Kintsch, 
1988), which was initially developed to model text comprehension tasks but has been 
used in areas of HCI as well (e.g. Kitajima & Poison, 1992).
Poison et al.’s C-I based model specifies that the initial goal structure of a user’s task can 
be organised in a hierarchical form similar to ones derived from a GOMS analysis (Card, 
Moran & Newell, 1983). The goal hierarchy may consist of a top-level goal representing 
the main task goal, lower-level goals represent the decomposition of the task, and the 
bottom-level goals represent the executive actions necessary to accomplish the 
corresponding goals.
Goals and subgoals in the goal hierarchy are represented by propositions and they are 
connected to each other through a network of associative links which are also represented 
as propositions. Activations flow from the top-level goal to its subgoals through the 
associative links and the execution of an action is the result of receiving high enough 
activation from its associative subgoal. Goals or subgoals become deactivated once they 
are accomplished and the supply of activation to the subgoals gets terminated when the 
top-level goal is deactivated, in other words, the subgoals will remain active as long as 
the top-level goal is active.
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Various nodes associating with each task goal exist in the goal structure; such as a “done- 
it” node which signals the completion status of a goal or subgoal, and an “and-then” node 
connecting between subgoals specifying the order in which the subgoals are to be 
executed.
How is the task carried out correctly?
Poison et al.’s model was initially developed to account for behaviour in exploratory 
learning. Instead of assuming users have a complete specification of the necessary 
procedures and correct knowledge of the task as in routine cognitive skill, it is assumed 
that the user’s initial goal hierarchy is incomplete and fragmented. Poison et al. suggest 
that the goal structure has a dynamic nature and is constantly being revised when an 
action is executed; the generation of new subgoals is driven by feedback from the task 
environment.
In relation to executing task steps in a procedural task, Poison et al. suggest an “and-then” 
goal structure in which there are “and-then” nodes interconnecting the various task goals, 
and these interconnections make up the specific sequence of how the task steps in a 
procedural task are to be carried out. The “and-then” nodes govern the flow of activations 
between subgoals; for example, if a first subgoal is connected to a second goal through an 
“and-then” node, then activation may flow from the “and-then” node to the second 
subgoal only when the first subgoal is accomplished. Each task goal has an associated 
“done-it” node, and when the task goal is completed it is deactivated through an 
inhibitory link from its corresponding “done-it” node.
Although the assumption made about the user’s task knowledge is somewhat in contrast 
to the assumption of correct and complete task knowledge in routine cognitive skills, such 
as using an ATM, Poison et al. made the assumption because of a different aspect of skill, 
namely, exploratory learning rather than execution of routine procedural tasks. The 
assumption does not pose much of a problem in the way they postulate how a procedural 
task is carried out. In essence, so far, in describing how a procedural task is executed 
correctly, Poison et al.’s model highlights the important role of feedback from the task
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environment and the control structure between subgoals through a coordinated dispersion 
of activations.
How the error occurs?
The occurrence of a PCE within the model is founded upon the notion of similarity 
between the main task goal and the penultimate subgoal, which is usually the subgoal 
preceding the PC subgoal. For goals that are similar they may be associatively linked to 
each other through their respective “done-it” nodes; for example, in a photocopying task, 
the main goal —  make copies —  may be argued as being similar to the penultimate 
subgoal —  get copies —  and their “done-it” nodes, then, associatively link together. 
When a subgoal is fulfilled and deactivated by its “done-it” node, activation may spread 
to the “done-it” node of a similar task goal through the associative link deactivating it.
So, in the case of a PC task, such as the photocopying task, the completion of the subgoal 
of getting copies may cause deactivation of the main goal —  make copies —  because of 
their inherent similarity. Once the main goal is deactivated all of its subgoals lose 
activations and deactivate, because all subgoals remain active by receiving activation 
from the overall main goal only when it is active. As a result, this premature deactivation 
of the main goal causes deactivation of the PC subgoal of collecting the original, and the 
PC step is not executed result in a PCE.
The main problem with the supergoal kill-off account in explaining the occurrence of the 
error is, as Byrne & Bovair (1997) point out, that the notion of similarity is not 
operationalised to determine how similar the penultimate subgoal and the main goal must 
be in order for the error to occur.
How is the error avoided most o f the time, i.e., being infrequent? How is the error 
sometimes made, i.e., being persistent?
The persistent nature of PCE is implied in Poison et al.’s model in that a task with a 
penultimate subgoal that is similar to its overall goal (the PC goal) will be terminated 
prematurely every time and never get executed. However, this poses a problem for the
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account in addressing the infrequent nature of the error: PCE will occur every time if the 
penultimate subgoal is similar to the main goal but will never occur in a task where the 
penultimate subgoal is dissimilar to the overall goal. Therefore, this explanation suffers 
from the all-or-nothing error behaviour which is common to many deterministic models.
3.2 Soar account
Young (1994) used an analytical modelling approach called Programmable User Models 
(Young, Green & Simon, 1989) to analyse the unselected window error which is similar 
to a PCE. The Programmable User Models technique is based on the Soar (Laird, Newell 
& Rosenbloom, 1987) cognitive architecture, and the main idea is to identify the 
knowledge that a user needs in order to perform the task at hand. Once the knowledge 
required is made explicit, it can be implemented as rules and run as a predictive model in 
Soar.
The necessary procedures for carrying out a procedural task are essentially a collection of 
rules in Soar. These rules are statements, which take the form of IF-THEN conditions, 
just like many production systems. The rules are organised at different levels representing 
a hierarchical structure of the main goal, subgoals, sub-subgoals etc., in a task 
decomposition.
How is the task carried out correctly? How the error occurs?
The way a procedural task is executed in Soar is by treating the task as a problem space, 
and the model proceeds by applying operators to states in the problem space. When the 
progress through the problem space is blocked then the model is faced with an impasse. 
When Soar encounters an impasse it generates a subgoal which when accomplished 
would enable the model to resume progression in the initial problem space. Once the 
model resumes to processing of the main goal, the subgoal simply disappears. Young 
argued that the occurrence of PCE is largely due to this asymmetry between the 
generation and the termination of a subgoal. The encounter of an impasse causes the 
generation of a subgoal which initiates some events, however, the termination of a 
subgoal makes the subgoal itself disappear, and this does not initiate further activities.
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A Soar explanation of the photocopying task may have a rule at the main goal level, such 
as, IF in photocopying room AND have copies in hand THEN go to the scheduled 
meeting. However, if one is in the photocopying room but with no copies in hand then an 
impasse occurs and a subgoal of using the photocopier to make copies is then set up. 
When the subgoal is fulfilled, that is, copies are in hand then control is resumed to the 
main goal which is to go to the scheduled meeting. Since the subgoal and its associated 
structures disappear when it is accomplished, the sub-subgoal of collecting the original is 
lost and is never executed. This subgoal-lost account also implies, implicitly, the 
importance of the notion of moving on to the next subsequent goal, and indeed, when a 
PCE occurs in the real world there is usually another main goal to follow. This point may 
seem rather obvious and trivial; however, it is not addressed properly in most PCE 
accounts.
Implicit in the way that the Soar account explains how a procedure is executed is also the 
assumption of a complete specification of the correct knowledge necessary. But the 
account does not specify, in detail, how the correct order of execution in a procedural task 
is coordinated. Nevertheless, the explanation of PCE occurrence is based on an inherent 
property of the architecture. So how does the task ever get executed correctly given the 
model is faced with the problem of only producing the error behaviour?
How is the error avoided most o f the time, i.e., being infrequent? How is the error 
sometimes made, i.e., being persistent?
Although the Soar account offered by Young was not implemented as a running model, it 
was suggested that correct task performance needs explanation that goes outside the 
model itself. It was suggested that the use of an internal cue, such as self-reminding, or an 
external cue, such as some cues in the task environment, may ensure the rule fires at the 
right time to carry out the PC subgoal. The internal and external cues may be used 
discretely or in combination at the same time; these strategies, which lie beyond the 
model, help account for how the task is carried out correctly without making PCE.
110
Chapter 4 — A meta-theoretical analysis o f post-completion error
While the use of internal and external cues help explain the capability of correct task 
performance of the model, the account still needs to overcome the problem of not 
generating the error behaviour. It was further specified that the internal and external 
cueing strategies are sufficiently fragile in that they are susceptible to a wide range of 
adverse conditions such as time pressure, high working memory demands and general 
distractions. Therefore, while the architectural property of Soar lays down the foundation 
addressing the persistent nature of PCE, the fragility of the compensatory strategies for 
correct task performance addresses how the infrequent nature of the error phenomenon 
may arise within the model.
3.3 Limited working memory capacity account
In accounting for their empirical findings that PCEs are more likely to occur in low- 
capacity subjects under high working memory demands, Byrne & Bovair (1997) offered 
an explanation implemented as a running computational model based on Collaborative 
Activation-based Production Systems (CAPS) (Just & Carpenter, 1992). The basic 
conceptualisation of Byrne & Bovair’s PCE account is similar to Poison et al.’s supergoal 
kill-off approach, in that goals are structured in a GOMS-like hierarchy. Subgoals remain 
active by deriving activation from the top-level goal as long as it, too, is active. The 
occurrence of the error is attributed to the loss of activation supply to the PC subgoal 
when the top-level goal is accomplished. However, instead of postulating goal similarity 
as the cause of the error, Byrne and Bovair operationalise the construct of working 
memory capacity in CAPS and are able to specify the condition under which the error is 
more likely to occur, namely, high working memory load.
There are several memory components responsible for the basic mechanics of CAPS: 
working memory, production memory and long-term memory. The working memory 
system stores dynamic information about the task at hand, and each memory element is 
associated with an activation value which has to be above a threshold level in order to be 
active in working memory for processing. If a memory element has an activation level 
below the threshold it is effectively dropped from working memory. The flow of 
activation between working memory elements is controlled by production rules in the 
production memory system. Productions are matched against working memory elements
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and only active elements may satisfy the conditional side of a production. When 
productions are matched they can fire repeatedly to propagate activation to a memory 
element which has below-threshold activation, or they can fire to request activation for 
maintaining active elements in working memory. Productions in CAPS may fire in 
parallel when more than one production is matched at any one time. There are declarative 
memory structures in the long-term memory system, and these memory structures are not 
subject to activation constraints such as decay.
The essence of CAPS is a limited capacity of the working memory system. The limited 
capacity is instantiated as the total maximum amount of activation available to working 
memory. In general terms, an individual who has a capacity of 52 units is said to have a 
higher working memory capacity than an individual who has 24 units of activation in 
capacity. Constraint of this limited capacity in working memory is manifested through 
trade-offs between storage demand and processing demand. Activation is required for 
both the maintenance of active elements in working memory (i.e. storage) and the 
propagation of activation to other inactive memory elements (i.e. processing). Suppose a 
CAPS model is working at its capacity limit and more activation is required for operation, 
then the amount of activation for both storage and processing will be cut back 
proportionally by a back-scaling mechanism to keep the total amount of activation 
available to the limit. For example, if the total capacity available in working memory is 
40 units of activation and 30 units are required for maintenance of old working memory 
elements, and 20 units are requested for propagating activation to inactive memory items, 
the required amount of activation is 10 units more than the capacity limit. The back- 
scaling mechanism then cuts back both the maintenance and propagation request by 40/50 
(i.e. 4/5), so 24 units are allocated for maintenance and 16 units for propagation. This 
back-scaling mechanism has two consequences in terms of the behaviour of a model. 
First, less activation than requested is obtained for maintenance of old elements in 
working memory. This means some of the working memory elements will lose their 
activation (i.e. decay) and get displaced if their activation levels are below threshold. This 
results in forgetting due to decay of memory items. Second, the amount of activation 
received for propagation to inactive memory items is also less than the requested amount. 
Consequently, in order to boost the activation of the inactive items up to threshold the 
corresponding productions have to increase the number of firing cycles. This leads to a
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slowdown in processing due to increased computation. This constraint imposed by 
storage and processing demands only applies when demands on a CAPS model’s working 
memory exceed its capacity limit.
How is the task carried out correctly?
The limited capacity model addresses performance of routine procedural skills by 
assuming the presence of a complete specification of correct procedural knowledge of a 
task. The procedural knowledge in Byrne & Bovair’s CAPS model was derived from a 
GOMS analysis, and was translated into a set of productions in the production memory 
system.
Similar to the supergoal kill-off approach, one of the assumptions in Byrne and Bovair’s 
CAPS model is that the supply of activation to a task’s subgoals depends on the active 
status of the top-level goal. As long as a task’s top-level main goal remains active in 
working memory, subgoals can receive activation from the firing of a production 
responsible for goal maintenance. On each processing cycle the goal maintenance 
production fires, propagating activation to a subgoal in order to keep it active in working 
memory until it is accomplished. This goal maintenance mechanism enables the CAPS 
model to execute a specified task procedure in the correct order.
Under circumstances when working memory is not taxed, in other words, the CAPS 
model is working within its capacity limit, the task will be carried out without making a 
PCE. If the model’s working memory capacity is not stressed there is no scaling back of 
activation for the use of maintenance and propagation. Therefore, when a task’s top-level 
goal is accomplished it is kept active in working memory without any decay to its 
activation value. This enables the goal-maintenance production to fire and propagate 
activation to the PC subgoal until its activation level reaches threshold, and subsequently, 
it becomes active in working memory and carried out.
However, as Altmann & Trafton (2002) point out, since completed goals do not get 
dropped out of working memory immediately in CAPS, correct task performance of 
Byrne & Bovair’s model depends on a certain level of working memory demands. The
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decay mechanism in CAPS is not time-dependent but load-dependent. The decay of a 
memory item’s activation value only occurs when another memory item requests 
activation. When the model is processing with insufficient working memory load, 
accomplished goals will not get displaced to prevent them from interfering with 
unaccomplished goals. This is because goals in CAPS may still be matched when 
completed as long as it is still active in working memory (this is in contrast to Poison et 
al.’s supergoal kill-off account where completed goals are deactivated immediately). 
Therefore, a CAPS model has to work with a minimum demand on working memory so 
that completed goals decay and get displaced from working memory to ensure the correct 
sequence of actions to be executed. However, people seem to be able to perform tasks, in 
general, correctly without a minimum demand on working memory.
How the error occurs?
Byrne and Bovair’s CAPS model specifies that PCE occurs when working memory 
demands exceed the model’s capacity limit. The occurrence of PCE in CAPS is due to the 
back-scaling mechanism that takes place when the model’s working memory is stressed. 
The back-scaling mechanism results in a cut back of activation for maintenance of old 
working memory items, which may include an accomplished top-level goal, and 
propagation of activation to the to-be-carried-out PC subgoal. If the accomplished top- 
level goal remains active in working memory, the goal maintenance production 
propagating activation to the PC subgoal will have to increase its number of firings in 
order to boost the subgoal’s activation to threshold. This is to compensate for the cut back 
in the amount of activation being propagated resulting in a slowdown of processing. 
However, if the cut back of activation for maintenance involves the top-level goal being 
displaced from working memory before the PC subgoal accumulates enough activation to 
be above threshold, then the goal maintenance production stops firing and the PC subgoal 
stops receiving activation. Consequently, the PC subgoal does not get carried out because 
it is not active in working memory, resulting in a PCE.
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How is the error avoided most o f the time, i.e., being infrequent? How is the error 
sometimes made, i.e., being persistent?
Byrne & Bovair’s account of PCE addresses, partially, the infrequent and persistent 
elements of the error phenomenon by being able to make predictions about when the error 
is going to occur: in this case, under high working memory demands. However, this is 
only a partial success because the model still faces the problem of all-or-nothing error 
generation. The behaviour produced by the model follows that “with a high enough 
working memory capacity, the error does not occur, and with low capacity the error is 
always made.” (p. 41). Although, in Byrne & Bovair’s study, significantly more PCEs 
were found with low-capacity individuals performing an experimental task with extra 
working memory load, the error did not occur in every single trial.
3.4 Activation-based goal memory account
Altmann & Trafton (2002) proposed an activation-based goal memory (AGM) model 
arguing that goal-directed cognitive behaviour can be explained, parsimoniously, by 
treating goals just as ordinary memory elements rather than some special memory 
structures (e.g. Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). The AGM 
model is developed to model processes in goal selection in the Tower of Hanoi task and is 
based on the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) but rather than 
using the entirety of the architecture, ACT-R’s goal stack mechanism was “turned o ff ’ 
and the model was implemented using the basic memory mechanisms of the architecture.
Using the construct of activation, the AGM model suggests that, just like other memory 
elements in the cognitive system, goals have associated activation levels and cognition is 
directed by the most active goal retrieved at any given time. This central idea is 
elaborated through three main components in the model: the interference level, the 
strengthening process and the priming process.
In addition to a retrieval threshold already present in ACT-R, which specifies that a given 
memory item may be retrieved successfully only if its activation level is above the 
retrieval threshold, the AGM model incorporates an interference level, which is a 
threshold value imposed by competition among memory items. The interference level is
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the mean activation value of the most active distractor item, and the target item must have 
an activation value higher than the interference level in order to get retrieved 
successfully. The amount of activation associated with a memory item is subject to decay, 
and this decay process is time-based and gradual. The gradual nature of the decay process 
means that recently retrieved items may still have relatively high activation values during 
the early stage of the process, and interfere with the retrieval of a target item.
In order to overcome interference from distractor items, the AGM model postulates that a 
target item must undergo a strengthening process to become the most active item. The 
strengthening process is a process in which a new goal is encoded; it is during this 
process that the activation of a new memory item gets initialised. In more descriptive 
terms, the strengthening of an item is akin to “focusing attention” on it. During 
strengthening, an item’s activation gets accumulated rapidly until it is above the 
interference level, then it gets retrieved and directs behaviour. However, the system 
cannot spend too long strengthening a target item because the more active it is now the 
more it will interfere with retrievals of later items. The AGM model specifies that the 
time the system spends strengthening a memory item is determined by the retrieval 
threshold (taken to be the activation value when the item is initialised) from below and 
the interference level from above. The strengthening process has to be long enough so 
that the target item gets active enough above the interference level, but not so long that its 
activation persists and interferes with retrievals of new goals at a later stage. However, 
there is noise in the activation values of memory items, so even when a target item has 
activation above the interference level, this does not guarantee retrieval. Therefore, there 
is possibility that, due to noise, the activation level of the target item goes slightly below 
the interference level and does not get retrieved on a given cycle of processing.
Once a goal takes over and directs behaviour, it begins to decay gradually. When the 
system shifts to a new goal, the old goal continues its decay process and becomes less and 
less active. If the cognitive system needs to refocus attention to (or resume) an old goal 
then this old goal needs to undergo a priming process to become active again. On the one 
hand, the priming process is similar to the strengthening process in that it accumulates 
activation for a memory item. On the other hand, the priming process specifies that for an 
old item to be reliably retrieved later, it has to be primed associatively from a retrieval
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cue to boost activation above the interference level. An associative link between a 
retrieval cue and an old goal must be established in the first place in order for the retrieval 
cue to effectively prime the old goal when it comes to resumption. In other words, the 
associative relationship between a retrieval cue and an old goal must be learned before 
goal suspension, so that the occurrence of the retrieval cue can be associated with the 
suspended goal upon resumption. A retrieval cue can be internal, residing in the cognitive 
system; a procedural task step can act as a cue for its following subsequent task step. 
Therefore, task steps in a learned procedural task can be viewed as a sequence of 
associative links priming the execution of their subsequent steps. A retrieval cue can also 
be external, residing in the environment; for example, a loud beeping signal in the ATM 
when it returns the cash card can prime the action of collecting the card back provided the 
relationship between the cue (the beep) and the action (collection of card) is learned.
How is the task carried out correctly?
According to the AGM model, Altmann & Trafton suggest that although the decay 
process is functional because it prevents the perseverance of a memory item’s activation 
from interfering with later retrievals, there is also a cost with the decay process. Unlike 
Byrne & Bovair’s limited capacity account, the decay process in the AGM model is based 
on time rather than the load on working memory; therefore, the longer in time a goal is 
suspended, the more it decays, and consequently the longer it takes to be retrieved 
successfully upon resumption.
In relation to PCE, Altmann & Trafton suggest that because the PC subgoal, by 
definition, is the final step in a procedural PC task, the PC subgoal would have been 
suspended for the longest and so decayed the most. As a consequence, the default 
tendency for the cognitive system is to make the error. However, it is argued that the fact 
people seem to be able to perform PC tasks, in general, without making the error most of 
the time suggests the priming process, in the AGM model, provides “deliberate cognitive 
operations” (p. 64) to overcome the default tendency to err at a PC step. The priming 
process ensures the execution of procedural subgoals in the correct order through 
associative priming between consecutive subgoals. The reliable execution of the PC 
subgoal is because its preceding subgoal serves as a retrieval cue when it is time to carry
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out the PC action. This notion of associative priming between subgoals has also been 
applied to model airline pilots’ visual scanning behaviour in a procedural task (Schoppek, 
2000). Schoppek shows that even low-level cognitive processing, such as visual scanning 
within a procedural task setting, can be modelled as a set of associative links between 
actions: execution of an action acts as a cue spreading activation to its subsequent action 
through the associative linkage.
The AGM model provides a description of correct procedural task performance and its 
time-based decay process addresses one of the limitations in Byrne & Bovair’s CAPS 
model, which requires a constant minimum level of working memory load to ensure 
correct task performance. However, the assumption of the default tendency for the 
cognitive system to make PCE due to the PC subgoal being suspended longest is 
problematic. By the same logic, subgoals that are near the end of a procedural task with a 
considerable number of task subgoals are also likely to be omitted, because these 
subgoals would have been suspended long enough to undergo substantial decay, and this 
argument should not be specific to the PC subgoal. Moreover, the proposal of the PC 
subgoal being suspended requires the assumption that all subgoals of a task were 
somehow set up in working memory in the first place. While the notion of goal 
suspension might be applicable to tasks such as Tower of Hanoi, where suspension of 
subgoals are necessary in some steps in order to proceed in solving the problem, it is not 
clear whether it is necessary or how all the subgoals in a procedural task need to be set up 
and suspended in working memory at the beginning of the task.
A further shortcoming of the AGM model as an account of PCE is that although it makes 
the important distinction of internal and external cueing in task execution, it does not 
make explicit the importance of a false completion signal in a PC task. The presence of a 
false completion signal in a PC task is a significant contribution to the occurrence of 
PCE, as discussed later in the current chapter. Although some of the assumptions made 
by the AGM model might be problematic as an account of PCE, it provides a clearer and 
more detailed theoretical foundation than the CAPS account in terms of the execution of 
procedural task steps.
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How the error occurs?
The PCE account offered by Altmann & Trafton explains how the error is avoided more 
adequately than explaining how the error occurs. Altmann & Trafton applied their 
account tentatively to explain Byrne & Bovair’s general result that PCEs occur under 
high working memory load. It is suggested that because the decay process in the AGM 
model is time-based, when there is a high working memory load more items are to be 
encoded by the system per unit time. This leads to increased interference in memory 
retrievals. However, the explanation is problematic in two ways; firstly, it can easily be 
interpreted as an explanation for errors in general occurring in procedural task execution 
rather than as an explanation specific to PCE. This is because, unlike the CAPS account, 
the AGM explanation does not take into account the notion of task completion, which is 
the essence of PCE that the error occurs after a task is completed. Secondly, even if the 
proposed explanation was to apply specifically to PCE occurrence, it implies that instead 
of retrieving the PC subgoal the cognitive system is likely to retrieve goals that were 
retrieved recently because they would have suffered less decay. However, it is not 
unreasonable to describe that, in everyday life, most PCE situations usually involve one 
omitting the PC step and pursuing the next goal rather than repeating an action one had 
already carried out.
The AGM model is able to provide some theoretical and empirical leverage in generating 
PCE under conditions such as interruption (see Chapter 6), though as an account of PCE 
it has its limitations.
How is the error avoided most o f the time, i.e., being infrequent? How is the error 
sometimes made, i.e., being persistent?
Altmann & Trafton explain that the natural tendency of making PCE is avoided by means 
of some “deliberate cognitive operations”, more specifically, the associative cueing 
between procedural task steps. Furthermore, the AGM account is similar to the Soar 
account of PCE, though starting from quite different mechanisms, that the persistent 
nature of the error phenomenon is explained by the models’ default tendency of making 
the error. However, as mentioned earlier, the AGM model as an account of PCE describes 
better how the error is avoided than how it is generated.
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4 Discussion
Having described and assessed each of the existing PCE accounts against the criteria 
generated from the analytical framework, Table 4.1 is a summary of how each of the 
accounts addresses the specified analytical criteria. In the Table, a Yes represents that a 
criterion has been addressed by a particular account and a No represents the criterion has 
not been addressed by the account. There are a number of short comments in brackets in 
the table; they highlight the extent to which the criterion is addressed by a particular 
explanation. Based on the summary table, the following section compares and contrasts 
the different accounts in relation to the specified criteria.
Correct task 
performance
Occurrence of 
PCE
Infrequent but 
persistent nature
Supergoal kill-off Yes Yes Yes(but only partially)
Soar Yes(but not in detail) Yes Yes
Limited working 
memory 
capacity
Yes
(but problematic 
assumption)
Yes Yes(but only partially)
AGM Yes No Yes(but only partially)
Table 4.1: How each o f the extant PCE accounts addresses the criteria specified in the analvtical
framework
4.1 Compare and contrast of the extant PCE accounts
4.1.1 Correct task performance
Common to all the extant accounts of PCE is that they all address how the task at hand is 
executed correctly; all four accounts cast their explanations in terms of goal management 
and they agree with the assumption of a hierarchical structure of goal organisation in 
procedural PC tasks. Furthermore, apart from the Soar account, all other approaches 
adopt the theoretical construct of activation in explaining the dynamics within the goal 
structure. The difference in the Soar account is mostly an inherent characteristic of the
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architecture, which is most suitable for modelling problem-solving behaviour. However, 
when applied as an explanation for procedural task execution, the Soar account does not 
offer more details than treating a procedural task as a problem space, and the model 
traverses this space by applying operators to different states.
Most of the accounts, apart from the supergoal kill-off account, have a consensus that 
PCE is not due to a lack of correct knowledge; in other words, the presence of correct 
knowledge of the procedural task at hand is one of the assumptions made. Although the 
underlying theory of the supergoal kill-off account was not initially set out to assume the 
presence of complete and correct task knowledge, this is not thought to pose a particular 
problem to the account in terms of its subsequent explanation of PCE occurrence. 
However, a complete account of PCE should also be able to describe and explain 
behaviour of the task in which the error occurs. Given most PCE situations that have been 
documented (e.g. Reason, 1990; 2002; Rasmussen, 1982) and empirically investigated 
(e.g. Byrne & Bovair, 1997) involve procedural task execution, the supergoal kill-off 
approach might be problematic in describing the underlying task execution behaviour.
Byrne & Bovair’s limited capacity account did not explain in more detail how the task 
procedures were coordinated to give rise to the correct sequence, apart from assuming the 
presence of the correct knowledge. Furthermore, correct task performance in Byrne & 
Bovair’s model depends on the assumption of a working memory load minimum, which 
is problematic when people seem to be able to achieve error-free performance under no 
working memory demands.
The AGM approach provides a more parsimonious and detailed description of procedural 
task execution than other existing accounts of PCE. For example, the Soar approach does 
not give detail about task execution; the proposal of “done-it” and “and-then” nodes to 
coordinate action sequences in the supergoal kill-off approach is rather arbitrary; and the 
assumption of minimal working memory load during task execution in the limited 
capacity account is problematic as discussed earlier. In contrast, the proposal of 
procedural task execution offered by the AGM approach is theoretically grounded in 
existing memory structures and mechanisms in a cognitive architecture, namely ACT-R.
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4.1.2 Occurrence of PCE
A commonality between the Soar and the limited capacity account is that they both 
suggest that the occurrence of PCE is due to certain cognitively adverse conditions. The 
limited capacity account is able to operationalise and specify one precise condition under 
which PCE is likely to occur, namely, high working memory load. However, the Soar 
account only provides general conditions such as distractions or shift of attention.
The supergoal kill-off account explains the generation of PCE in terms of similarity 
between subgoals. However, the notion of goal similarity lacks specificity and is, 
therefore, difficult to operationalise and specify when the error is going to occur.
When applying the AGM model to explain PCE, Altmann & Trafton do not account, in 
detail, for how the error may arise from correct task performance. The explanation 
offered by the account describes more how PCE is not made rather than how it is 
generated.
4.1.3 Infrequent but persistent nature
In addressing the infrequent but persistent nature of PCE, the problem is overcoming an 
all-or-nothing error rate faced by any deterministic model of human error. This problem 
is addressed in all of the existing PCE accounts, though rather differently to each other. 
Although the supergoal kill-off account is capable of an error-generating mechanism 
within the model’s scope, the mechanism suffers from the all-or-nothing error problem; 
when the goals are similar the error happens every time, but if the goals are dissimilar 
then the error never occurs. Similarly, the limited capacity account is capable of 
predicting when the error is likely to occur; however, the CAPS model is deterministic in 
that it still suffers from all-or-nothing error behaviour.
The Soar account is the first account that attempts to address the infrequent but persistent 
nature of PCE. The persistent nature of the error is explained by Young’s analysis on the 
tendency of the Soar cognitive architecture naturally making the error. The infrequent 
nature of the error phenomenon is explained in terms of the compensatory strategies to 
overcome the error. Similarly, though starting from quite different theoretical premises,
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the AGM model addresses the persistent nature suggesting a natural inclination in the 
cognitive system to make the error due to decay of suspended goals. The system is 
capable of avoiding the error by some “deliberate cognitive operations” like priming 
between procedural steps. A commonality between the Soar approach and the AGM 
approach is a three-layer form of argument that addresses the all-or-nothing error 
behaviour: first, a natural tendency for the model to make the error; secondly, the 
presence of compensatory strategies or mechanisms to avoid the error; and thirdly, those 
strategies/mechanisms might be fragile enough that they get disrupted under cognitively 
adverse conditions. However, both approaches are rather vague in specifying the nature 
of the conditions that provoke the error. Of the two approaches, the AGM model provides 
a more detailed theoretical description of procedural task execution and this can be 
extended to make empirical predictions about the effect of interruption on PCE in a 
procedural task paradigm. The investigation of the effect of interruption is dealt with in 
the next chapter.
4.1.4 False completion signal and a follow-on task
Further to the number of criteria initially set out by the analytical framework, the analysis 
also makes explicit two important attributes of PCE\ false completion signal and a follow- 
on task. The notion of a false completion signal in a PC task is not new: it was pointed 
out by Reason (2002) in a study analysing what characteristics in a photocopying task 
make the PC step more susceptible to omission relative to other omission errors. 
However, this notion is not made explicit in most of the extant cognitive accounts of 
PCE, apart from the CAPS model. Although the supergoal kill-off account and the AGM 
model have explicit notions of the roles external cues and feedback from the environment 
play in task execution, no reference was made to the presence of false completion signals 
in PC tasks. In the AGM model, Altmann & Trafton suggest that cues used for 
associatively priming the next task step can be internal (to the cognitive system) or 
external (in the environment). Similarly, most PC tasks have false completion signals in 
the environment, for example, the output of photocopies, the withdrawal of cash, the 
dispensing of a train ticket etc., and this false completion signal might act as a miscue 
priming the execution of the next task.
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While it is argued that the presence of a false completion signal might be a source of 
cueing to pursue the next task, a closely related notion, namely a follow-on task, has not 
been addressed explicitly in most of the current PCE accounts. Most PCE situations in 
everyday life involve one moving on to a follow-on task, such as going to a meeting when 
you have the photocopies, going to a restaurant when you have got the cash etc., and the 
idea is that the follow-on task might act as a source of “attractor” as against the PC step 
from a previous task. The notion of a follow-on task is implied in the Soar account 
suggesting the resumption of a main goal when a subgoal is completed and vanished. 
However, all other proposed explanations treat PC tasks as “stand-alone” tasks without 
taking into account the significance of goals/tasks following the PC task.
4.2 What can we learn from the current analysis?
Although it is out of the scope of the current analytical exercise to specify a complete 
account of PCE, the following outcomes from the meta-theoretical analysis suggest 
possible starting points for further theoretical development of the error phenomenon. 
Firstly, except the Soar approach, all existing accounts do not explicitly address the all- 
or-nothing problem in explaining the occurrences of PCE. In order to overcome this 
problem, the current analysis suggests that an adequate account of PCE might require a 
three-layer explanation to describe: (1) how the task in question is carried out, (2) how 
PCE arise from the task performance behaviour, and (3) how the infrequent but persistent 
nature of the error is manifested.
Secondly, the analysis suggests that the AGM approach provides the most detailed and 
theoretically driven description of procedural task execution when compared to the other 
approaches. Therefore, the AGM model might serve as a good theoretical starting point to 
investigate PCE within the context of a procedural task.
Thirdly, in attempting to explain the occurrence of PCE, all current approaches give 
accounts in terms of goal management in the cognitive system. However, the current 
analysis suggests that attributes of PC tasks, such as a false completion signal and a 
follow-on task, might also be important factors provoking the error.
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Fourthly, to address the persistent and infrequent nature of PCE the current analysis 
suggests incorporating a level of fragility into the compensatory mechanism(s) that avoid 
the error in the first place. The level of fragility should be sensitive to the condition under 
which the error is observed. The exact nature of fragility requires further research; 
however, mechanisms within a probabilistic framework might serve as a starting point.
5 Concluding remarks
A meta-theoretical analysis on extant accounts of PCE has been carried out by identifying 
a number of criteria under an analytical framework. The analytical framework enables a 
systematic assessment of the existing accounts identifying their commonalities as well as 
their differences. Furthermore, by comparing and contrasting under the framework it has 
been possible to bring the seemingly disparate accounts under a coherent structure.
In addition to the critical assessment exercise offered by the current analysis, it is possible 
to outline how an adequate account of PCE might require a three-layer explanation to 
describe: first, how the task in question is carried out; secondly, how PCEs arise from the 
task performance behaviour; and, thirdly, how the infrequent but persistent nature is 
manifested. Furthermore, the analysis also suggests that the notion of a false completion 
signal and a follow-on task might be significant attributes present in the error 
phenomenon.
Despite the fact that it is not possible to develop a unified model of PCE in terms of 
detailed cognitive mechanisms with the current analysis, this meta-theoretical analysis 
allows one to think about the error phenomenon within a coherent theoretical structure. 
By postulating high-level descriptions, it serves as a good stepping-stone to further future 
theoretical development. In order to achieve a low-level detailed account of PCE, it is 
necessary to complement the current analysis with the hard work of developing running 
computational cognitive models. Developing a computational cognitive model is not a 
trivial task and it is beyond the scope of the current thesis; however, future research 
should take the ideas from the current analysis into the modelling process.
All in all, the current theoretical explanations of PCE are still in their infancy, and this is 
also true of empirical investigation of the error as indicated by the small number of
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studies carried out. This might be because there are insufficient empirical studies to 
support substantial theoretical development, or it might be the other way round: because 
there are no substantial theoretical accounts guiding empirical research of the error 
phenomenon. Nonetheless, one of the contributions of the current analysis suggests that 
the AGM model is a good theoretical candidate for guiding empirical studies of PCE in a 
procedural task context. Consequently, the subsequent chapters constitute an empirical 
examination of PCE, and an attempt to apply the AGM model to help generate 
predictions of the effect of interruption on PCE in a procedural task context. Chapter 5, is 
a review of research on interruption and this is followed by experimental studies of the 
effect of interruption on PCE in Chapter 6.
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1 Introduction
Interruption in the work place is common and can occur quite frequently, especially in an 
open-plan office environment, such as colleagues dropping by, the telephone ringing, 
other people talking on the phone, etc. As our modern working environment becomes 
more reliant on computers and there is a need for efficient communications, interruptions 
become more prevalent. Just to give a few common examples from office desktop 
applications: notification of newly arrived emails, instant messaging, and even pop-up 
advertisements while surfing the web!
The effect of interruption has been studied from a range of different perspectives from 
occupational psychology to HCI. The general theme of interruption research addresses 
disruption to performance of an ongoing main task caused by some interrupting activity. 
The disruptive effects of interruption have been studied in simulated office environments 
with professional office workers (Zijlstra, Roe, Leonora & Krediet, 1999); although 
interruptions generally have a negative impact on main task performance, some positive 
effects, such as, increased speed of task execution have also been observed. The effect of 
interruptions have also been studied in computerised clerical tasks (Burmistrov & 
Leonova, 1996), instant messaging (Cutrell, Czerwinski & Horvitz, 2000; Czerwinski, 
Cutrell & Horvitz, 2000), data management in telephone operators (Eyrolle & Cellier, 
2000), and professional information workers (Czerwinski, Horvitz & Wilhite, 2004). 
Common to these example studies is that they address the effect of interruption in work 
environments or using work-related computer applications. The general finding that 
emerges from these studies of interruption is that it affects main task performance in a 
negative way, such as slower task performance, increased effort and negative effect on 
emotions. These negative effects might mean decreased efficiency and productivity in an 
office setting; however, in a safety-critical environment the effect of interruption might 
have far more severe consequences.
In the nuclear power industry, it has been suggested that most of the incidents involved 
the operators’ attention being distracted away from the primary task (Bainbridge, 1984). 
In the aviation domain, Dismukes, Young and Sumwalt (1998) carried out a review of the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports and concluded “ ...nearly half of
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these accidents [attributed to human error] involved lapses of attention associated with 
interruptions, distractions, or preoccupation with one task to the exclusion of another 
task.” Dismukes et al. also pointed out that pilots often get interrupted, such as by 
messages from air traffic control, during flight-deck checklist operations. Degani and 
Wiener (1990) noted that there were three aviation accidents, in a period of fifteen 
months, involving omission of items in a checklist and all three accidents involved 
crashes not long after takeoff. Latorella (1999) carried out an empirical study of the effect 
of interruption on pilot’s flight-deck performance. The study revealed that interruptions to 
flight-deck procedural tasks significantly impaired performance by increasing error 
occurrences; it was found that pilots are 53% more likely to commit an error in a 
procedure when being interrupted. As Latorella noted, although some of the errors 
committed due to interruption might not be operationally significant, some might have 
life-threatening consequences.
Clearly, a lot of errors during task execution can be related to interruption. Reason (1990) 
noted that omission errors are especially prone to interruption, suggesting that this is 
because the interrupting activity might be “counted in” as part of the interrupted task 
sequence, or the interruption causes the operator to “lose his place” upon resuming the 
interrupted task. Given that PCE belongs to the bigger family of omission errors, its 
relation to interruptions is worth investigating in order to gain a better understanding of 
the error phenomenon.
The organisation of the following literature review begins with some early basic 
psychological research that started investigating interruption as a topic; this serves as an 
introduction to the history of the research topic. This is then followed by recent 
psychological studies related to interruption, namely task switching and prospective 
memory research. To a certain extent, task switching research illustrates its relevance to 
interruption research in terms of a general cognitive cost when switching between tasks, 
however, the experimental paradigm in task switching does not have a clear distinction 
between a primary task and an interrupting task. On the other hand, the experimental 
paradigm used in prospective memory research provides a clearer distinction between 
primary and interrupting tasks. Results from several recent studies investigating 
interruption are then presented and, as described later, these results, for example on task
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similarity and complexity, are often conflicting because of a lack of a common theoretical 
tool to study interruption. This is then followed by introducing Altmann and Trafton’s
(2002) AGM model again because it has been used as a theoretical framework by a 
number of recent studies to examine different dimensions of interruption such as 
rehearsal strategy, cue availability and the time it takes to resume an interrupted task. 
Finally, findings of interruption duration and position are reviewed and the AGM model 
is discussed to make predictions about the effects of interruption duration and position on 
PCE.
2 Early basic psychological research on interruption
The first series of psychological studies related to interruption research date back to the 
work by Zeigarnik (1927). Zeigarnik’s research focus was on the effect of interruption on 
memory performance; interruption was used as a manipulation to study the memory 
preservation of uncompleted tasks that have been interrupted and the memory of 
completed tasks. Zeigarnik gave her participants a series of tasks to perform ranging from 
manually oriented ones, such as paper folding, to mentally oriented, for instance 
multiplication tasks. The participants were instructed to finish the tasks as rapidly and 
accurately as possible. Among these tasks, half of them were interrupted before 
completion by the experimenter presenting the next task to be carried out, and half of 
them were not interrupted. Zeigarnik found that when the participants were asked to 
recall what the tasks were, the ones that were interrupted before completion were better 
recalled than the ones that were completed. This effect of better memory retention for 
uncompleted activities than completed activities is known as the “Zeigarnik effect” (Van 
Bergen, 1968).
Ovisankina (1928) carried out subsequent studies related to Zeigarnik’s but with a 
different behavioural focus. Ovisankina was interested in whether task resumption occurs 
after an interruption, and if it does under what conditions it occurs. The participants in 
Ovisankina’s experiment were given a series of tasks to carry out, and some of the tasks 
were interrupted “deliberately” by the experimenter presenting the next task to be 
performed; while some other tasks were interrupted “accidentally” by the experimenter,
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such as, asking the participant for help after dropping a box of pins. The participant was 
then left alone for some time after an interruption during which the experimenter 
observed his/her behaviour. Ovisankina found that all accidentally interrupted tasks were 
resumed and almost 80% of deliberately interrupted tasks were resumed within 20 
seconds. It was also observed that resumption occurred most frequently when a task was 
interrupted at the beginning rather than the middle or towards the end of the task.
Early psychological accounts of the results from Zeigarnik’s and Ovisankina’s studies 
proposed a tension system (reviewed in Van Bergen, 1968) in which when an intention is 
formulated, tension is set up and the system tries to resolve that tension by fulfilling the 
intention. When a goal is formulated to complete a task, there is tension in the system and 
the tension is discharged when the task is completed. An interrupted task means tension 
release is blocked and the system is still under tension, and this may have an effect on 
task resumption and memory. The resumption of an interrupted task is viewed as an 
attempt of the system to release the tension by completing an uncompleted task. 
Alternative theories of task interruptions from early psychological principles, such as 
Gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis, have also been proposed. However, a review of 
these early theoretical accounts is beyond the scope of the current thesis.
Although more recent research on interruption, as discussed later in the chapter, is 
concerned more with the disruptive effect it might have on some primary task 
performance, the early studies have shown a number of features of interruption that have 
inspired subsequent research on the phenomenon: first, interruption affects behaviour in 
terms of memory processes; secondly, the affected behaviour also manifests itself in 
subsequent behaviour after the interruption; and thirdly, an interruption may manifest 
itself in different ways and affect behaviour differently.
3 Recent psychological research related to interruption
3.1 Task switching
In the domain of attention and performance, psychological research into cognitive control 
has been investigating the psychological processes underlying task switching: a situation
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where a person is alternating between different tasks. The general findings in the task 
switching literature, as summarised by Monsell (2003), suggest that there is a cost 
associated with task switch, this cost is measured immediately after switching to a 
different task and manifests itself in terms of increased reaction time (RT) and decreased 
accuracy of task performance. Furthermore, although this switch cost can be reduced 
when participants receive a brief period to “prepare” for a task switch, it does not 
eliminate the switch cost completely; there is always a cognitive overhead associated with 
switching task.
Rogers and Monsell (1995) developed an experimental paradigm known as the 
alternating-runs paradigm to investigate task switching. The paradigm involves two 
simple cognitive tasks, such as, a letter-discrimination task and a digit-discrimination 
task. The two tasks are presented on a computer screen and switches between the two 
tasks take place in a predictable manner; in other words, participants know when the task 
switch is occurring. Task cues are usually present to indicate when the task is going to 
switch. The paradigm allows switch cost to be estimated by comparing RTs in switch 
trials to RTs in non-switch trials. The general findings show that there were significant 
increases in RT and errors between task switch, and the switch cost (in terms of time) 
decreased when participants were given up to a 0.6-second preparatory time before task 
switch. However, the switch cost still persisted even when the preparatory period was 
increased to 1.2 seconds. The beneficial effect of a preparatory period to reduce switch 
cost was also replicated by Gamble and May (2002) using the alternating-runs paradigm.
Rogers and Monsell explain switch cost in terms of a penalty imposed by a mental “gear 
change” to enable reconfiguration of cognitive processes for the new task. It is suggested 
that there are two control processes involved in the reconfiguration: endogenous and 
exogenous process. The endogenous process is an internally-driven, top-down process 
which is adopted freely at will before presentation of the next stimuli in a sequence. The 
exogenous process, on the other hand, is a data-driven, bottom-up process which is 
triggered by the presence of stimuli. Rogers and Monsell suggest the persistent switch 
cost that cannot be eliminated by a preparatory period is likely to be due to the exogenous 
process, which cannot be carried out until the presentation of stimuli occurs.
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Instead of a reconfiguration process through a mental “gear change”, Wylie and Allport 
(2000) suggest switch cost can be explained by negative priming or proactive interference 
from a previous task. It is argued that the emphasis of the observed switch cost is on a 
preceding task rather than an upcoming task and that the effect does not need to come 
from the immediate preceding stimuli only.
Gamble and May (2003) examined switch cost associated in switching between task 
sequences rather than a single task unit. Modification was made to the alternating-runs 
paradigm using graphical stimuli-discrimination tasks. Gamble and May manipulated 
switching between two task sequences each consisting of four subtasks, and the primary 
interest of this manipulation was to investigate where the switch cost would occur in a 
task sequence. It was found that switch cost occurred at the first subtask of a task 
sequence, suggesting that the observed switch cost was associated with an entire task set 
rather than individual task steps. This result seems to lend support to the interference 
account of task switching because the reconfiguration account would predict that switch 
cost would occur between subtasks in a task sequence.
There is ongoing debate between the different theoretical accounts and experimental 
manipulations (e.g. Altmann, 2003, 2004; Monsell, 2003) which is not within the scope 
of this thesis. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of task switching is related to interruption at 
a high-level because interruption involves switching from an interrupted task to an 
interruption, and vice versa upon resumption of the primary task. However, there are 
some differences between task switching research and interruption research. Firstly, the 
magnitude of observation in task switching is on a much smaller scale, usually within 
hundreds of milliseconds, whereas the behavioural scale (if measured in RT) in 
interruption research is usually on the seconds level. Secondly, the paradigm used in task 
switching does not make a distinction of primary and secondary task: the paradigm 
consists of rapid presentation of stimuli alternating between two tasks. In interruption 
research, the effect of an interruption is usually measured on some aspect of performance 
on a primary task. Finally, experiments in task switching usually involve tasks with very 
simple and abstract stimuli, but interruption experiments usually adopt tasks with a higher 
level of complexity such as game-like task environments (e.g. Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; 
Trafton, Altmann, Brock & Mintz, 2003). Despite the differences between the two related
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research topics, namely task switching and interruption, the main message to take away 
from the task switching literature is that there is a cognitive cost associated with 
performing more than one task serially.
3.2 Delayed-execute prospective memory
The effect of interruption has also been investigated in the field of prospective memory 
(PM) research. Recent studies have examined the effect of interruption using an 
experimental paradigm called delayed-execute PM. The idea of a delayed-execute PM 
task is to simulate a situation where an intention is retrieved but cannot be carried out 
immediately. For example, a real world situation might be that you are to pass on a 
message to your colleague when you see him/her in the office building. However, when 
you see him/her, he/she is engaged in a phone conversation so you have to wait until the 
phone conversation is over before you can pass on the message to him/her, so there is a 
delay between the retrieval and the execution of the intention.
Einstein, McDaniel, Williford, Pagan and Dismukes (2003) investigated the effect of 
interruption and divided attention on delayed-execute PM performance. The experimental 
paradigm involved participants performing an ongoing primary task, and when they 
encountered a PM cue (when the computer screen turns red) the participant was required 
to retrieve an intention (pressing the slash key on a keyboard) which is to be carried out at 
an appropriate time (when the ongoing primary task is completed and changed to a 
different task). The period between the onset of the PM cue and the appropriate time to 
carry out the intention is the delay, and during this delay participants were required to 
carry on with the primary task. Einstein et al. manipulated the length of the delay (5 
seconds vs 15 seconds vs 40 seconds) and had a condition where there was an 
interrupting task during the 40-second delay. The interruption was a pattern-comparison 
task lasting 15 seconds, so the total delay length was still 40 seconds for this condition. A 
further manipulation was assigned such that some participants were asked to perform a 
digit-monitoring task as well as the ongoing primary task during the delay, whereas some 
participants did not have the digit-monitoring task. The results showed that PM 
performance was worse when the participants had to carry out an attention-dividing task 
(digit-monitoring) during the delay. Inclusion of an interrupting activity during the delay
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did have a significant detrimental effect on PM performance relative to no interruption 
during the delay. Moreover, the effect of interruption was more pronounced when the 
participants’ attention was not divided, suggesting that the effect of divided attention 
overshadowed the effect of interruption during the delay. However, there was no effect of 
delay length on PM performance.
The disruptive effect of interruption on delayed-execute PM performance was replicated 
by McDaniel, Einstein, Graham and Rail (2004) using the same experimental paradigm. 
McDaniel et al. further manipulated the duration of the interruption during the delay 
period. The two interruption durations tested were 10 seconds and 20 seconds. The 
findings suggest that when there was an interruption during the delay, PM performance 
was significantly worsened; however, there was no differential effect between the two 
interruption durations. McDaniel et al. concluded that interruption duration (at least for 
the ones tested) did not have a differential effect on PM performance; however, there is a 
methodological shortcoming in their investigation. The two different interruption 
durations (10 seconds and 20 seconds) were embedded within a 40-second delay so that 
the total delay length was unchanged. However, the design of the manipulation is such 
that there was a delay period after the interruption: 20 seconds for the 10-second 
interruption duration and 10 seconds for the 20-second interruption duration. The 
presence of these post-interruption delay periods might allow participants to develop 
compensatory strategies to overcome any differential effects imposed by the different 
interruption durations. This suggests that a period as brief as 10 seconds after an 
interruption might be long enough to overcome the disruptive effect of the interruption. A 
refined methodology could reduce the post-interruption delay lengths to a minimum (such 
as 1 or 2 seconds) and also make them the same length for the two interruption duration 
groups.
The investigation of the disruption effect of interruption within the delayed-execute PM 
paradigm is similar to most studies in interruption research that there is a clear distinction 
between a primary task and an interrupting task. The main general finding from the PM 
paradigm is that PM performance can be affected negatively by the presence of 
interruption. Furthermore, studies in the PM literature did not measure the disruption
135
Chapter 5 — Literature review o f interruption research
effect immediately after an interruption and this suggests that an interruption might have 
a persistent residual effect, at least in the case of PM, some time after its occurrence.
4 Some recent studies on task similarity and complexity
Studies that treat interruption as a research topic in its own right have started 
investigating different dimensions of the phenomenon. The following sections provide a 
review of the main dimensions that have been examined.
One of the dimensions of interruption that has been investigated is the nature of the 
interrupting task and its relation to the interrupted task. In experimental psychology 
research, Gillie and Broadbent (1989) have examined several characteristics of 
interruption including task similarity and complexity. The primary task adopted in their 
study is a computer-based task involving participants memorising a list of items to be 
collected from various specific locations in a game-like environment. The lists of items to 
be collected vary in number (5 items or 7 items) in order to manipulate memory load 
imposed by the task. In examining the effect of task similarity, Gillie and Broadbent 
found that an interruption involving encoding and recall of stimuli (memory-intensive, 
hence similar to the primary task) is more disruptive than an interruption task of simple 
numerical addition (processing-intensive but dissimilar to the primary task). The effect of 
task similarity was also found in other studies (Edwards and Gronlund, 1998) suggesting 
more disruption results from an interruption when it shares more information with the 
primary task.
However, Gillie and Broadbent suggest that similarity is not the only factor determining 
the disruptive effect of the interruption task. When a dissimilar, yet complex, mental 
arithmetic interruption (involving decoding alphabets into numbers) was used, 
performance on the primary task was significantly impaired. Regarding task complexity 
in terms of primary task memory load, there was no performance difference between the 
5-item and 7-item conditions. This led Gillie and Broadbent to conclude that both 
similarity and complexity of an interrupting task can have detrimental effects on primary 
task performance. Furthermore, it was suggested that memory load imposed by the 
primary task does not seem to make an interruption more disruptive.
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From more applied research in HCI, Bailey, Konstan and Carlis (2000) have also 
investigated the effect of task similarity. Bailey et al. used a range of web-based tasks 
involving counting, addition, image comprehension, reading comprehension, registration- 
type information entry, and word matching as primary tasks to examine disruptiveness 
from interruptions involving reading comprehension and decision-making. However, in 
contrast to one of Gillie and Broadbent’s findings, the effect of similarity between the 
interruption and the primary task was found to be not significant. The conflicting results 
obtained might be attributed to the relatively less controlled methodology in Bailey et 
al.’s study compared to Gillie and Broadbent’s. The notion of similarity was ill-defined in 
Bailey et al.’s study in that both interrupting tasks have substantial overlap in terms of the 
kind of cognitive processing involved, because both tasks consist of elements of 
comprehension and decision-making. This makes detecting differential effects between 
the two interruptions difficult. On the other hand, a result consistent with one of Gillie 
and Broadbent’s results was obtained: that high memory load at the point of interruption 
does not make an interruption more disruptive to the primary task. However, there is a 
shortcoming in Bailey et al.’s study that, unlike Gillie and Broadbent’s, memory load 
imposed by the primary task was not formally operationalised in terms of task demand 
such as number of operations that need to be carried out. Therefore, face value of the 
results suggest consistency but caution needs to be taken in order to draw firm 
conclusions from it.
In terms of complexity of the primary task, a recent study, however, has obtained 
conflicting results. Speier, Vessey and Valacich (2003) suggest that interruptions disrupt 
complex primary task while facilitating simple task performance. The behavioural focus 
of Speier et al.’s study is accuracy and pace in decision-making tasks. The simple primary 
tasks used in the study involve information acquisition, simple addition or subtraction 
calculations, and identifying trends in data. The complex primary tasks involve order 
ranking of options after assessing a fairly large number of relevant parameters and 
carrying out some calculations; in some tasks participants are also required to memorise 
outcomes from their previous performances. The interrupting tasks adopted are simple 
information acquisition tasks. The general results show that interruption has a disruptive 
effect on complex primary task performance: decisions made are slower and less accurate
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relative to performance in simple primary tasks. The results also show that interruptions 
occurring in simple primary tasks facilitate performance in terms of faster decision times 
relative to non-interrupted simple tasks. Speier et al. conclude that while interruptions can 
facilitate performance on simple tasks, complex task performance can be hindered by 
interruptions. The facilitation of simple task performance by interruptions is attributed to 
increased levels of stress narrowing the decision-maker’s focus of attention. Ratwani, 
Trafton and Myers (2006) also found speed-up of actions with the presence of 
interruptions in a simple task and suggest that the observed benefit might be due to 
improved perceptual processing in interrupted situations.
The problem with the above studies producing conflicting or incompatible results about 
certain dimensions of interruption, such as task similarity and complexity, is not only 
because of differences in their experimental methodologies; the lack of a common 
theoretical framework providing commensurable guidance also contributes to the 
incoherent results obtained in the studies. Although there are theoretical attempts to 
characterise and describe different dimensions of interruptions for investigations (e.g. 
Latorella, 1999; Walji, Brixey, Johnson-Throop & Zhang, 2004; Speier et al., 2003), 
these frameworks have their origins in the applied HCI domain and do not provide 
enough specificity to make predictions about the cognitive processes involved in 
examining the phenomenon. Although general memory theories in cognitive psychology 
have been applied to HCI research studying interruption (e.g. Oulasvirta & Saariluoma, 
2004), the theories and the applications of them were not able to make predictions about 
the specific processes involved in resuming an interrupted task.
Recent studies, however, have been able to utilise a common theoretical framework to 
guide the design of an experimental paradigm examining interruption, and produce 
harmonious results that can be explained in terms of similar theoretical constructs. One 
such cognitive theoretical framework that is particularly useful in studying interruption is 
the AGM model (Altmann and Trafton, 2002). The model has been described earlier in 
Chapters 2 and 4, but the following section re-introduces the most pertinent aspects of the 
model to interruption.
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5 A common theoretical framework in interruption research
In contrast to the traditional view of goal memory as having a “special status” in the 
cognitive system (Anderson and Liebere, 1998), the AGM model treats goals the same 
way as other memory elements, having activation values and being subject to decay. The 
goal with the highest level of activation is retrieved by the cognitive system and directs 
behaviour. Other active memory elements that have been recently retrieved or 
associatively linked to the context in use may compete in the retrieval process. This 
competition forms an interference level (or a “mental clutter”) which gives rise to 
potentially retrieving the wrong goal. When an interruption occurs, a goal from a primary 
task is suspended in order for the cognitive system to direct attention to deal with the 
interrupting task. During the interruption, the activation level of the suspended goal is 
subject to a time-based decay process if it is no longer in use. Successful retrieval of the 
suspended goal upon task resumption depends on its activation value being above the 
interference level and this, in turn, depends on whether some kind of rehearsal activity is 
possible for the suspended goal during or before the interrupting activity. If the suspended 
goal is rehearsed throughout the interrupting period, this might counter substantial decay 
to its activation and still be the most active goal upon primary task resumption.
The AGM model provides several recent studies with theoretical tools to further 
investigate and explain the seemingly contradicting empirical findings in interruption 
research. In examining task complexity in interruptions, Hodgetts and Jones (2005) found 
evidence consistent with Gillie and Broadbent’s findings that complex interruptions have 
more disruptive effects on primary task performance than simple interrupting activities. 
Hodgetts and Jones adopted a computer-based problem-solving task called Tower of 
London (ToL) as the primary task. The ToL task is similar to the Tower of Hanoi task 
(see Simon (1975) for more details on the task) but the discs involved are all of the same 
size in order to do away with the disc-size constraint, which imposes a limit that a disc 
cannot be placed on top of a smaller disc. The discs are of different colours so the 
challenge of the ToL task is to move the discs around so that the configuration of the disc 
colours matches a desired goal-state configuration. The ToL task is essentially a simpler 
version of the Tower of Hanoi puzzle. Using the ToL task, Hodgetts and Jones (2006a, 
2006b) carried out a series of experiments investigating different aspects of interruption
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effect; therefore, multiple citations of the two papers will appear in the various sections 
that follow according to which aspect of interruption is being discussed.
In one of their experiments (Hodgetts & Jones, 2005), participants were required to plan 
and memorise their solutions and solve the ToL task from memory; the discs on the 
computer screen were concealed. Two interrupting tasks were used: the simple 
interruption involved a straightforward checklist of the participant’s mood state, and the 
more complex interruption involved a verbal reasoning task. The findings suggest that 
participants took significantly longer to resume the ToL task after being interrupted by 
the complex verbal reasoning task than after the simple-checklist interruption. The same 
result was replicated even when the participants were not required to solve the ToL task 
from memory: that is, the discs on the computer screen were not concealed (Hodgetts & 
Jones, 2006a). Hodgetts and Jones explain their finding in terms of the AGM model: that 
a complex interrupting task involves more subgoals than a simple interruption, and the 
larger number of subgoals imposes greater retroactive interference to the cognitive system 
upon task resumption. Monk (2004) investigated the effect of frequent versus infrequent 
interruptions and suggests that one might expect more detrimental performance from 
frequent interruptions due to increased retroactive interference. However, it was 
speculated that if the interrupting task is not cognitively demanding then enough goal 
rehearsal might be possible during the interruption to mitigate the adverse effect of 
frequent interruptions. The AGM model is, thus, able to explain the effects of interrupting 
tasks of different complexity in a coherent fashion in terms of interference and goal 
rehearsal opportunity.
6 Rehearsal strategy in interruption
There are only a handful of studies that touch upon the nature of goal rehearsal and its 
beneficial effect in relation to interruption. Articulatory rehearsal of a piece of memory 
may help maintain it in the cognitive system (Baddeley, 1990); however, the beneficial 
effect of verbal rehearsal was not found in PM performance (Einstein et al., 2003). 
Einstein et al. instructed their participants to verbally rehearse the PM task during a delay 
before the intention could be carried out in the delayed-execute paradigm. During the 
delay, participants were to carry on with the primary task and perform a concurrent
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attention-demanding task. However, no significant improvement on PM performance was 
found even though the participants received explicit instruction to rehearse the required 
action. This led Einstein et al. to conclude that this verbalisation strategy might not 
alleviate the disruptive effect of interruption while participants’ attention was divided. 
However, caution should be taken with Einstein et al.’s conclusion: in their study 
participants who did not receive the rehearsal instructional also indicated that they had 
rehearsed the required action in a post-experiment questionnaire. Although the 
participants who received the rehearsal instruction indicated more rehearsal ratings, the 
fact that all participants had employed rehearsal strategies might have already benefited 
their observed performance. Therefore, the explicit instruction given to some of the 
participants might not have any additional benefit. This does not lend support to the claim 
that verbal rehearsal is ineffective in mitigating the disruption effect of interruption.
Recent interruption research seems to suggest that rehearsal of a suspended goal may take 
the form of non-verbal activity. Gillie and Broadbent (1989) argue that a mental 
arithmetic task with two digits is demanding enough to suppress verbal rehearsal and, yet, 
results from one of their experiments suggest that performance on the primary task is not 
affected by the interruption. This led Gillie and Broadbent to conclude that information 
about the primary task may be retained in another form of temporary memory storage 
rather than a verbal form. In doing the ToL task, Hodgetts and Jones (2006b) asked their 
participants informally if they verbally reminded themselves about the move they were 
supposed to carry out after an interruption. Most participants indicated that they tried to 
remember the spatial relations between the pegs rather than verbally rehearsing the move 
sequence to be executed. In support of this claim, Trafton, Altmann, Brock and Mintz
(2003) analysed their participants’ verbal protocols and found that the information to be 
retained over the interrupting period was always in reference to cues in the external task 
environment. This emphasises the important role of environmental cues in resuming an 
interrupted task.
7 The effect of cue availability on interruption
The AGM model also makes predictions about the effect of cue availability on 
interruption. The priming constraint in the model specifies that in order for a cue to be
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effective in priming the to-be-resumed goal, associative links between that goal and the 
cue have to be formed before the interruption (goal suspension) and that the cue must be 
present upon goal resumption. Moreover, the cue does not have to be in the external 
environment but can also be a mental cue in the internal cognitive system. Altmann and 
Trafton (2004) carried out an experiment manipulating the presence of cues before the 
occurrence of interruption. Participants were provided brief periods (2, 4, 6 or 8 seconds) 
before the interruption and during these periods the computer screen “froze” so that no 
cue was present during this “frozen” period; in the no-cue condition, the computer screen 
was blank. It was found that cue availability was only effective in mitigating disruption 
from the interruption in the 6-second and 8-second “frozen” period. Altmann and Trafton 
suggest that it might take the cognitive system 6 to 8 seconds to establish associations 
between cognitive representations and the external environment. However, one of the 
weaknesses of Altmann and Trafton’s results is that they compared performances across 
experiments; this suggests subsequent research should include a full factorial design to 
avoid possible confounds from changes in subject population.
Hodgetts and Jones (2006b) examined the effect of cueing before, during and after 
interruption using the ToL task paradigm. In one experiment, participants were provided 
with a number of interruption conditions: one interruption covered only part of the 
computer screen so the primary task environment was still visible during the interruption; 
one full-screen interruption occluded the primary task environment completely; and one 
full-screen interruption had a 2-second “frozen” period during which the primary task 
environment was visible but no actions could be performed, and during the interruption 
the primary task was completely invisible. It was found that the time it took to resume the 
primary task in the full-screen interruption with a 2-second “frozen” period was quicker 
than the full-screen-interruption-only condition, but not significantly quicker than the 
partial-screen-cover condition. Contrary to Altmann and Trafton’s finding, Hodgetts and 
Jones suggest that even as brief as a 2-second cue can be effective in resuming the 
primary task. Moreover, Hodgetts and Jones’s experiment provides stronger evidence as 
they carried out their manipulation in a single experiment. In a further experiment, 
Hodgett and Jones manipulated cue availability after interruption by changing the colour 
of the discs. The results showed that the change of disc colours after interruption had a 
detrimental effect resulting in slower performance in resuming the primary task. Hodgetts
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and Jones explain the result within the AGM framework, suggesting that the impaired 
resumption performance is due to disruption of associative links between the to-be- 
resumed goal and the environmental cues upon task resumption.
8 Detecting the disruptive effect of an interruption using more 
sensitive measures
Grounding analysis in low-level memory processes, the AGM model also has 
implications in terms of designing experiments to investigate interruptions. Altmann and 
Trafton (2002) suggest that the low-level view of goal memory offered by the AGM 
model allows one to dissect the temporal structure of an interruption under fine-grain 
detail. In essence, the occurrence of an interrupting event can be viewed as three 
temporally related components: first, the occurrence of an alert which does not 
necessarily demand immediate engagement with the interrupting activity, such as the 
ringing of a telephone; secondly, is the interruption proper in which engagement is 
required with the interrupting activity itself, such as the telephone conversation —  the 
period between the alert and the interruption proper is termed interruption lag; thirdly, is 
the resumption of the interrupted task —  the period between interruption proper and the 
re-engagement of the primary task is termed resum ption lag. This temporal 
characterisation has direct implications for measuring and designing the dependent and 
independent variables in examining the effect of interruption.
Using resumption lag to measure the disruptiveness associated with an interruption is 
suggested to be a more sensitive measurement (Altmann and Trafton, 2002) than global 
measurements such as task completion time (e.g. Gillie and Broadbent, 1989 and Bailey 
et al., 2000). Measuring resumption times allows one to assess the disruptiveness 
immediately after an interruption and prevents participants using compensatory strategies 
to maintain primary task performance, which might not be reflected in overall task 
completion time. When manipulating the length of interruption lag as an independent 
variable, Trafton et al. (2003) found that participants given an 8-second interruption lag 
significantly reduced their resumption times when compared to participants who were 
required to engage with the interruption immediately. The primary task adopted by
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Trafton et al. is a resource-allocation task and the interrupting task is a forced-choice 
decision-making task. Consistent results are produced across other task domains, such as 
the problem-solving ToL task. Results suggest that interruption lag as short as 3 seconds 
followed by a verbal reasoning interruption (Hodgetts and Jones, 2003), or 2 seconds 
followed by a mood-checklist interruption (Hodgetts and Jones, 2006b) are still effective 
in reliably reducing the resumption times. The AGM model attributes the benefits of an 
interruption lag to the opportunity for the cognitive system to associatively encode the to- 
be-suspended goal with the cue necessary in resuming that goal.
9 The effect of interruption duration
One of the dimensions of interruption that illustrates the particular relevance of the AGM 
model is the duration of an interrupting event. Previous studies, such as Gillie and 
Broadbent (1989), investigated interruption duration of 30 seconds versus 165 seconds 
and found no differential effect in terms of disruptiveness. The primary task used is a 
computer-based memory game (as mentioned earlier) and the interrupting task is a 
double-digit mental arithmetic task with its duration varied. Gillie and Broadbent 
conclude that duration alone does not seem to determine the disruptiveness of an 
interruption. Bailey et al. (2000) also found that interruptions of different lengths do not 
contribute to the disruptiveness of an interruption. However, one of the main weaknesses 
of these two studies is the way they measured the disruptive effect of an interruption: 
global measures such as overall task completion times were taken as an indication of 
disruptiveness. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the use of global measures 
cannot be an accurate indication of disruptiveness because participants could engage in 
various compensatory strategies after an interruption. This highlights one of the benefits 
offered by the AGM model, which is the use of resumption times measuring how long it 
takes a participant to re-engage with a primary task immediately after an interruption.
The effect of interruption duration is one of the main focuses of the current study and the 
AGM model is particularly useful in making predictions about its effect. The gradual 
time-based decay process in the AGM model specifies that the activation level of a goal 
memory is subject to decay through time. If a primary task goal is not in use (or 
suspended) during an interrupting event its activation level decays more the longer the
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interruption duration. In order for a suspended goal to undergo decay the interruption has 
to be cognitively demanding enough to prevent goal rehearsal. Therefore, the AGM 
model predicts two consequences with interruption duration: first, when an interruption 
duration is long enough for a suspended goal to decay below an activation threshold level, 
as specified by the interference level, it takes longer to retrieve the suspended goal 
successfully than when an interruption duration is so short that the suspended goal has not 
undergone substantial decay below the interference level. This is because the cognitive 
system takes time to boost up the activation level of a suspended goal through the 
strengthening and priming processes, as proposed by the AGM model. Secondly, an 
alternative consequence is that an incorrect competing goal is retrieved, leading to an 
error, when the interruption duration lasts long enough for substantial decay to occur. 
Monk, Boehm-Davis and Trafton (2004) compared resumption times after interruption 
durations of 0.25 second, 1 second and 5 seconds. The results show that the 5-second 
interruption condition yields a significantly longer resumption time than the two shorter 
interruption conditions. Although resumption times for the 0.25-second and the 1-second 
conditions are not significantly different, both are reliably longer than a control condition 
with no interruption. Monk et al. suggest that not only do different interruption durations 
have differential disruptive effect, even interruptions as brief as 0.25 seconds can result in 
a cost in resumption time.
The effect of interruption duration is also obtained in a recent study (Hodgetts and Jones, 
2006a). Hodgetts and Jones adopted the ToL task as the primary task, and a mood status 
checklist as the interrupting task. The durations tested were 6 seconds versus 18 seconds; 
only one checklist was to be completed in the 6-second condition and three checklists in 
the 18-second condition. A control condition with no interruption was also incorporated. 
In order to ensure their participants were retrieving an old goal after an interruption and 
not re-planning the puzzle solution, the participants were instructed to spend 8 seconds to 
plan and memorise the solution before solving the task. It was found that the 18-second 
condition resulted in significantly longer resumption times than the 6-second condition, 
and resumption times from these two conditions were reliably longer than those in the 
control condition.
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Recent studies examining the effect of interruption duration are able to obtain results that 
are consistent with the prediction made by the AGM model. Moreover, using resumption 
time as a sensitive behavioural measure, these studies suggest the opposite to the claims 
made by earlier studies about the null effect of interruption duration.
10 The effect of interruption position
Another dimension of interruption of interest to the current investigation is interruption 
position, that is, where in the primary task the interrupting event occurs. Adamczyk and 
Bailey (2004) examined the effect of interruption at different moments within task 
execution. A range of computer-based tasks including editing, media usage and searching 
were used as primary tasks. A reading comprehension of news extracts task was used as 
the interrupting task. An event perception technique (Zacks & Tversky, 2001) was used to 
elicit participants’ mental models of the structure of a task. The technique involved 
showing some sample tasks to the participants and having them decide where major and 
minor breakpoints are in the tasks. Based on the task models elicited from the 
participants, predictions of “best” (least disruptive) and “worst” (most disruptive) 
moments in the primary tasks were made; for example, in the editing task the “best” 
interruptive moment was upon completion of an edit like correcting a spelling mistake, 
whereas the “worst” interruptive moment was during an edit like typing or selecting some 
text. The results show that interrupting the participants at the “worst” moments during 
primary task execution can lead to changes in emotional state, such as increased 
annoyance, and changes in social attitude such as losing respect for the primary task. The 
implication of this study is that interruption position can have an effect on primary task 
execution.
Monk, Boehm-Davis and Trafton (2002), and Monk & Trafton (2004) obtained results 
that suggest differential disruptive effects of interruption position. In their study, 
participants were asked to program a simulated VCR as the primary task. The interrupting 
task was a perceptual-motor task, which involved tracking an on-screen target with a 
mouse. The interruption occurs every 5 seconds and the authors categorised the 
interruption occurrences into three positions for analysis: start-subtask (at the beginning 
of a new subtask), mid/end-subtask (in the middle or near the end of a subtask), and
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scrolling (subtask involving repetitive scrolling operations). The dependent measure of 
disruptiveness was resumption time after interruption. The findings show that mid/end- 
task interruptions result in significantly longer resumption times than start-subtask and 
scrolling interruptions. Monk et al. explain the findings in terms of the AGM model 
suggesting that the encoding demand in the middle (or towards the end) of a subtask is 
higher than at the beginning of a subtask or in a repetitive operation. The higher encoding 
demand results in longer resumption times because more information needs to be 
rehearsed about the goal state and its associative links to the next task step. This finding is 
consistent with Adamczyk and Bailey’s that, across the range of primary tasks (editing, 
media usage and searching), the “worst” moments for interruptions to occur are during 
execution of a task. The “best” moments to minimise disruption effect from an 
interruption are after completion of a task.
The effect of interruption position was also found in the ToL problem-solving task 
(Hodgetts and Jones, 2005). Participants were required to first plan and memorise the 
solution of the problem then execute the solution moves from memory. The optimal 
solution to the problem was four moves. Two interruption positions were tested: the first 
move and the third move. Disruptiveness of an interruption was measured by resumption 
time after the interruption. The results suggest that interruption occurring before the first 
move yields longer resumption time than interruption occurring before the third move. 
Hodgetts and Jones suggest that at the beginning of the problem there are more 
competing goals active in the cognitive system than towards the end of the problem. The 
more the competing goals, the more the interference during goal retrieval, resulting in 
longer resumption time. This empirical finding, however, is the opposite of Monk et al.’s 
finding which suggests interruptions occurring at the beginning of a subtask result in less 
encoding demand than in the middle of a subtask. Although there appears to be 
inconsistency between the two findings, explanations offered by Monk et al. and 
Hodgetts & Jones suggest consistency in terms of the AGM model. The seemingly 
different empirical findings between the two studies are more likely to be attributable to 
differences between the primary tasks used. In solving the ToL task, participants were 
required to memorise the solution moves at the beginning of a trial. This suggests a high 
load of working memory is involved before the first move can be executed. On the other 
hand, the VCR paradigm used in Monk et al.’s study is, essentially, a display-based task
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which a participant’s working memory load could be “offloaded” to the task environment. 
While encoding demand might be higher in the middle of a subtask because, for example, 
more information on the display has to be differentiated, there might be less working 
memory demand at the start of a VCR subtask than at the beginning of the ToL task. 
Whatever the ultimate explanation is, the important message from these findings is the 
significant effect of interruption position on primary task performance. Moreover, the 
AGM model can accommodate these findings in terms of differential encoding demands 
and interference imposed by different points in a task.
The effect of interruption position and the perceptual processes involved upon task 
resumption have also been investigated by a recent study using an eye movement tracking 
technique (Ratwani and Trafton, 2006). Instead of using a task with a hierarchical goal 
structure (Monk et al., 2004), Ratwani and Trafton used a rather linear task with a flat 
goal structure as the primary task. The task involved categorising numbers on a 
spreadsheet application. The interrupting task is a single-digit addition task and 
interruption positions were either early (occurring early in the task) or late (occurring 
nearer the end of the task). Results on resumption times suggest that there were no 
significant differences between early and late interruptions. This finding is contrary to 
earlier results on resumption times in relation to the effect of interruption position, but the 
null effect is most likely due to the nature of the primary task with a flat goal structure. 
Ratwani and Trafton suggest that instead of retrieving specific subgoal information, 
analysis on eye movement data shows that the participants were able to use spatial 
memory to resume the primary task after an interruption. Moreover, the spatial heuristic 
used for task resumption was more imprecise for later interruptions than early 
interruptions. This study shows that different interruption position in a linear task may 
also have differential disruptive effect on spatial memory upon task resumption.
11 Summary and the relations between interruptions and PCE
The literature on interruptions shows that studies ranging from applied HCI research to 
cognitive psychology research have examined different dimensions of interruption such 
as task similarity, complexity, the nature of primary task rehearsal, cue availability upon 
resumption, interruption position and duration. Some of the findings and explanations
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appear to be inconsistent or even sometimes contradictory between different studies. This 
is mainly because of the lack of a common theoretical framework in early interruption 
research to guide the design of experiments, and to explain findings in terms of similar 
cognitive constructs. However, the recent development of the AGM model (Altmann & 
Trafton, 2002) has helped rectify the situation and has inspired a number of controlled 
experimental studies examining different dimensions of interruption. The AGM model is 
not only able to provide theoretical tools to explain various findings in a coherent fashion, 
but also to offer a fine-grained view of interruptions in terms of low-level memory 
processes. This fine-grained dissection of interruption has enabled the use of resumption 
time to measure the disruptiveness of an interruption, and arguably it is a more sensitive 
measure than other global measures, such as overall task completion time that has been 
used in early studies (e.g. Gillie & Broadbent, 1989).
As discussed in the literature review earlier, recent studies have used resumption time as 
the dependent measure in examining various aspects of interruption. The successful 
adoption of this dependent measure is best illustrated in the investigation of interruption 
duration; studies that used global measures such as the total time spent on primary tasks 
conclude that there was no differential disruptive effect of different interruption durations 
(Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; Bailey et al., 2000). However, findings from recent studies 
suggest that interruptions of different durations result in differential disruption when 
measured locally using resumption time (Hodgetts & Jones, 2006a; Monk & Trafton, 
2004).
Although research on interruptions is becoming more coherent and mature in terms of 
providing explanations of various findings and the use of experimental methodologies, 
there is only one study (Mortenson, 2003) that has explored the effect of interruption on a 
specific kind of error, namely PCE. Mortenson implemented a brief interruption message 
that the participants were sometimes required to read and dismiss just before a PC step in 
the robbery game task. It was found that the interrupting message did not increase the 
likelihood of PCE. However, a methodological shortcoming in Mortenson’s experiment 
might contribute to the null effect of interruption on PCE: the interrupting message itself 
was found to be easy to ignore by participants with little cognitive demands placed on 
them. As described earlier, previous studies (e.g. Hodgetts & Jones, 2005; 2006a and
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Monk, 2004) suggest that simple interrupting tasks are not as disruptive as complex 
interruptions in terms of primary task performance.
Given that various statistics and reports have indicated that interruption can be one of the 
main factors resulting in human error, and sometimes vital accidents, it seems a logical 
and fruitful avenue to examine the effect of interruption on PCE, in more depth relative to 
Mortenson’s study.
The AGM model is a particularly useful theoretical framework in terms of examining the 
effect of interruptions on PCE for two reasons. First, its suitability to interruption research 
has been shown by recent studies which adopt the AGM model and are able to make 
predictions about various dimensions of interruption effect. Secondly, Altmann and 
Trafton have proposed an account of PCE within the AGM model. Although the PCE 
account is far from satisfactory, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the attempt suggests a 
direct relevance to the current research agenda. The essential component of the PCE 
account is the notion of task execution in routine procedural tasks. Grounded in the 
priming constraint, the AGM account of PCE specifies a mechanism of rote associative 
learning in procedural tasks. Rote associative learning describes the cueing mechanism 
between consecutive steps in a learned procedural task: the execution of a task step acts 
as a cue to prime the execution of the following task step in sequence. In a task involving 
a PC step, the execution of the preceding step before the PC action comes to serve as a 
cue to prime the execution of the PC step. Therefore, the AGM account suggests that the 
occurrence of PCE in a procedural task is minimal under usual circumstances: for 
instance, no high working memory load.
The notion of associative cueing between procedural task steps has a direct implication 
for the effect of interruption position. Recent studies examining the effect of interruption 
position, as described earlier, are concerned with the immediate disruptive effect in terms 
of resumption time. However, the current investigation is concerned with the effect of 
interruption position on PCE. The execution of the PC step is, by definition, the final 
action in a PC task; whether an interruption occurring early in a task has any residual 
effect on the error remains an open question. In the PM literature, the findings seem to 
suggest that an interruption might have a residual effect some time later after its
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occurrence. Therefore, more specifically, the research question is “Is there any position in 
a PC task where an interruption occurs that is more likely to give rise to PCE?”. The 
AGM account makes predictions regarding the research question; since associative 
cueing occurs between procedural task steps, as a result, interruptions occurring early in 
the task should not increase the likelihood of PCE as long as the step preceding the PC 
action is executed. However, if associative cueing between the PC step and its preceding 
step is disrupted, the PC step is more likely to be forgotten, resulting in PCE. In other 
words, interruptions occurring just-before the PC step are more likely to give rise to PCE 
than interruptions occurring earlier in the task.
Another dimension of interruption that is of interest to the current investigation is the 
duration of an interruption. The gradual decay process of the AGM model suggests that 
the disruptiveness of an interruption depends on the duration of the interruption. An 
interruption has to be cognitively demanding enough to prevent rehearsal of a to-be- 
resumed goal in a primary task, and the interruption has to last long enough for the goal 
activation to undergo substantial decay. Therefore, according to the AGM account of 
PCE, the occurrence of an error not only depends on where an interruption occurs in a PC 
task but also depends on the duration of the interrupting activity. The series of 
experiments presented in the next chapter investigate the effect of interruption position 
and duration on the occurrence of PCE.
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Overview
The series of experiments in this chapter investigate the effect of interruption on PCE. 
Specifically, two dimensions of interruption are being examined: where an interruption 
occurs in relation to a primary task (interruption position), and how long the interrupting 
activity lasts (interruption duration). For the purpose of the current set of studies, an 
interruption is taken to mean the abrupt onset of a different task activity during the 
execution of a primary task. The experimental methodology used in the current 
experiments adopts a procedural task paradigm in which the primary task involves 
participants following and executing a set of pre-defined instructions in a task 
environment.
A series of four experiments was carried out to examine the effect of interruption position 
on PCE. The first experiment served as a preliminary study to set up an appropriate task 
and experimental paradigm to generate the error in a laboratory setting. The primary task 
is a game-like procedural task in which the participants make doughnuts using a fictional 
doughnut machine. Consideration of an interrupting task was also taken into account. 
This first experiment failed to generate enough PCEs to allow for further investigation 
into the effect of interruption position. The primary task was analysed and compared to 
Byrne & Bovair’s Phaser task, and a number of characteristics were identified as 
contributing to the failure to provoke the error. The identified characteristics include (1) 
the presence of a competing signal, (2) the prominence of the PC step button, and (3) the 
issue of a less practised PC step.
The second experiment involved making modifications to the primary task addressing, 
specifically, characteristics (1) and (2). The modified primary task was able to generate a 
high enough level of error and results of the effect of interruption positions were 
obtained. The interruption task was a complex mental arithmetic task, which lasted 75 
seconds. The effect of interruption position suggests that PCEs are more likely to occur 
after an immediately preceding interruption than an interruption occurring earlier in the 
task or no interruption at all.
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The third experiment investigated the effect of interruption duration on PCE and 
replicated the effect of interruption position. Two shorter interruption durations, 45 
seconds and 15 seconds, were used in the experiment. Results suggest that PCEs are 
sensitive to the disruptive effect of an interruption as brief as 15 seconds.
The fourth experiment involved modifying the PC action so that it only required 
execution in some trials. A consistent result of interruption position effect was produced; 
moreover, an increase in the overall PCE rate was obtained. The increase in PCE rate 
suggests that the nature of the less frequently practised PC step might have added extra 
memory demand to the participants.
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Experiment 6a: a preliminary study 
1 Introduction
The task paradigm adopted in this study is similar to Byrne & Bovair’s (1997) —  the 
primary task is a computer-based fictional game, it is a procedural task consisting of a set 
of pre-defined procedures to be followed in order to complete the task. The current set of 
experiments could adopt the Phaser task (a game-like task designed by Byrne and Bovair 
to study PCE) as the primary task to study the effect of interruption on PCE. However, 
experimental studies on the error phenomenon are scant and it was decided that it would 
be a contribution to generate the error using a different task environment with similar 
underlying principles to the Phaser task, namely a procedural task with a PC step to be 
carried out after task completion. Details of the primary task are described in the next 
section.
An interrupting task needs to be cognitively demanding to ensure that it would cause 
disruption to the performance on the primary task. In order to assess this, two types of 
interruption need to be designed; a complex, cognitively demanding type on the one hand 
and a simple, less cognitively demanding type on the other, and their disruptive effects to 
the primary task compared. The cognitively demanding interruption is a complex mental 
arithmetic task, which lasts for 75 seconds. The simple interruption is a perceptual-motor 
task, which involves locating and clicking on a target appearing on a computer screen. 
The next section describes more detail of these interruption tasks.
This first experiment has two objectives: first, using the proposed primary task and 
interrupting tasks to generate a high enough PCE rate for statistical comparisons. Second, 
to test the effect of interruption position on PCE occurrences. The AGM model (Altmann 
& Trafton, 2002) is used as a theoretical framework to make predictions about the effect 
of interruption position on the error in procedural task execution.
The AGM model suggests that task steps in a learned procedural skill can be viewed as a 
sequence of associative links: each action step acting as a retrieval cue for the next. This 
procedural cueing mechanism explains how PCE is usually avoided; people usually
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manage to carry out PC tasks, such as photocopying, without committing the PCE most 
of the time. However, if associative cueing between the PC step and its preceding step is 
disrupted, the PC step is more likely to be forgotten, resulting in PCE. The following 
hypothesis is proposed: interruptions occurring just-before the PC step are more likely to 
give rise to PCEs than interruptions occurring earlier in a procedural task or no 
interruption at all.
2 Method 
2.1 Tasks
Two computer-based tasks were designed for the current study. The primary task was a 
procedural task in which participants were required to operate a doughnut-making 
machine following a set of procedures. The secondary (interrupting) task was a mental 
arithmetic task.
2.1.1 Primary task —  The Wicket Doughnut Machine
The Wicket Doughnut Machine is a procedural task in which participants are required to 
carry out a set of predefined procedures to operate the machine correctly in order to 
produce a required number of doughnuts. Figure 6.1 is a screen shot of the Wicket 
Doughnut machine:
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Figure 6.1: The Wicket Doughnut Machine.
The Order Sheet in the centre contains information about how many and what kinds of 
doughnuts are to be made in each order. Two sets of doughnuts are to be made every time 
in one order. To produce the doughnuts as specified on the Order Sheet a participants 
have to operate the five different compartments in the machine in a specific sequence. 
The compartments need to be operated in the following sequence: 1) Dough Port, 2) 
Puncher, 3) Froster, 4) Sprinkler and 5) Fryer. Each compartment needs to be activated, 
using the Selector on the right, before any parameters can be entered. Figure 6.2 
summarises all the steps required to operate the machine in a trial.
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Interruption P
Interruption Q
Interruption R
Interruption S
Interruption T
Step
number
Step name Actions involved
0 Next Order
Return to the Doughnut Machine and click on the 
Next Order button to show order details.
1 Select_DP
opt_DP(x)
Click on the Dough Port Selector button.
2t opt_DP(y) 
opt_DP (Total)
Enter parameters in the Dough Port compartment.
3 DP_OK
Click on the OK button in the Dough Port 
compartment.
4
DP_ProgBar_Filling
Wait for the progress bar in the Dough Port 
compartment to fill up.
S Select_Puncher Click on the Puncher Selector button.
6*
opt_Puncher(x)
opt_Puncher(y)
Enter parameter in the Puncher compartment.
7
Puncher_OK
Click on the OK button in the Puncher 
compartment.
'W
8 Select_Froster Click on the Froster Selector button.
9*
opt_Froster(x)
opt_Froster(y)
Enter parameter in the Froster compartment.
10
Froster_OK
Click on the OK button in the Froster 
compartment.
w
11 Select_Sprinkler Click on the Sprinkler Selector button.
12*
Opt_Sprinkler(x)
Opt_Sprinkler(y)
Enter parameter in the Sprinkler compartment.
13
Sprinkler_OK
Click on the OK button in the Sprinkler 
compartment.
■ w
14 Select_Fryer Click on the Fryer Selector button.
15*
opt_Fryer(x)
opt_Fryer(x)
Enter parameter in the Fryer compartment.
16
------- ►-----
Fryer_OK Click on the OK button in the Fryer compartment.
1 These steps have different number of parameters to enter: step 2 has three, step 6, 9 12 & 15 
have two each. The different number of parameters to enter is a by-product of the cover story of 
the task.
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Interruption Z  ►
19 Clean
18n
Report_OK
17 Process Click on the Process button.
Wait for the doughnut report to appear, read it and 
click on the OK button to dismiss it.
Click on the Clean button. (This is the PC step)
Figure 6.2: Details of the steps required to operate the Doughnut Machine.
With each of the compartments, participants need to click OK when finish selecting or 
typing in various parameters. Once the OK button is clicked, information just selected or 
typed in that compartment are erased and its appearance returns to its beginning state. 
This ensures that there are no cues in the task environment to distinguish where one is at 
in the doughnut-making process. After finishing entering various parameters into the five 
compartments, participants need to click Process (bottom right) to obtain a report 
indicating how many doughnuts are made. Figure 6.3 is a screen shot showing a 
completion report.
t+ This step does not afford an error to occur because it involves clicking a modal dialog box.
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Figure 6.3: A completion report when the task is completed.
When finish reading the completion report participants have to dismiss the report by 
clicking OK and the screen returns to what it looks like at the beginning of the trial (see 
Figure 6.1). The final step is then to clean the machine by clicking the Clean button on 
the top right. Forgetting to execute this step of cleaning the machine is counted as a PCE. 
To begin the next trial participants have to get the next order by clicking the Next Order 
button on the Order Sheet.
2T.2 Complex interrupting task —  Doughnut Packaging Express
The complex interruption used in this study is a mental arithmetic task. The task is to 
pack a certain number of doughnuts following some simple rules. Figure 6.4 shows that 
there are 52 doughnuts to be packed using two boxes of different sizes, in this case the 
smaller one can hold 4 doughnuts and the bigger one can hold 9 doughnuts.
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Pack
Figure 6.4; The Doughnut Packaging Express.
The task is to calculate how many boxes one might need to pack all 52 doughnuts. In this 
example, participants might use 13 of the smaller box or 4 of each box type. However, 
using 6 of the bigger box (which packs 54 doughnuts) results in an incorrect answer since 
it is required to pack precisely the number of doughnuts as requested. The accuracy score 
increases when participants get a trial correct but decreases with an incorrect trial.
When an interruption occurs at any point during the doughnut-making task, the computer 
screen switches to the doughnut-packing task. Participants then have to perform as many 
packing trials as possible until the screen switches back to the doughnut-making task. 
After the interruption, participants have to continue the doughnut-making task from 
where one left off.
D o u g h n u t  P a c k a g in g  E x p r e s s
Accuracy
! 66.67% 62 douqhnu ts have arrived!
B ox capacity: 4 d ou gh n u ts 9  d o u g h n u ts
N o. of b o x e s  n e e d e d :
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The design of this complex mental arithmetic as the interrupting task is based on findings 
that simple tasks such as single-digit mental arithmetic (Gillie & Broadbent, 1989) or a 
perceptual-motor tracking task (Monk, 2004) might not be complex enough to have a 
disruptive effect on primary task performance.
2.1.3 Simple interrupting task
The simple interruption used in this study is a perceptual-motor task. The interruption 
involves the appearance of a blank screen with a button occurring at a random location. 
Participants are required to click on the button to dismiss the blank screen in order to 
return to the primary doughnut-making task. Figure 6.5 below shows a screen shot of the 
task.
Figure 6.5: The simple perceptual-motor interrupting task.
2.2 Design
The experiment is a 2 x 3 mixed factorial design. The between-subject factor is 
interruption type which has two levels: simple and complex. Participants in the complex
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condition have the Doughnut Packaging Express task for 75 seconds as an interruption, 
whereas participants in the simple condition have the perceptual-motor task as as 
interruption. The inclusion of the simple interruption condition is expected to have 
minimal disruptive effect since clicking on an on-screen button requires considerably less 
cognitive effort than a 75-second mental arithmetic task. The simple interruption has no 
fixed duration as it disappears whenever the button is clicked.
The within-subject factor (interruption position) has three levels: Just-Before (position Z 
-  see figure 6.2), Other (position P, Q, R, S or T -  see figure 6.2) and Nil (no 
interruptions). Interruption at position P, Q, R, S or T corresponds to an interruption 
occurring after operating on the Dough Port, the Puncher, the Froster, the Sprinkler or the 
Fryer compartment respectively. It should be noted that an interruption only occurs when 
the OK button in a compartment is clicked. Interruption at position Z corresponds to an 
interruption occurring just before the PC step (clicking Clean), in other words, 
interruption that occurs when the completion report is dismissed by clicking its OK 
button. Nil corresponds to trials without any interruption at all.
Each experimental session consists of 11 trials in the testing phase; 4 trials with 
interruption position Z, 4 trials with interruption position Other and 3 trials with no 
interruption. The 4 interruptions at position Other are selected randomly from positions P, 
Q, R, S or T, and no repeating position is selected in a given testing session. The order of 
trial presentation is randomised.
2.3 Materials
The program was implemented in Visual Basic 6 and run on an HP notebook.
2.4 Participants
20 participants, either university undergraduates or postgraduate students, took part in this 
study. Ages ranged from 21 to 36 with a mean of 27.4. There were 9 female and 11 male. 
All participants were paid £6 for their participation.
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2.5 Procedure
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the two interruption conditions: simple or 
complex. The participant was then asked to read some introductory documents describing 
the experiment (Appendix D). This was then followed by a demonstration phase where 
participants in the 75s-interruption condition observed the experimenter performing both 
the doughnut-making and the doughnut-packing task separately first. In the training 
phase, the participant was given two training trials on the doughnut-making task: one 
with and one without the interrupting task. Any errors occurring in this training phase 
result in on-screen warning messages and beeps; participants were required to identify 
and correct the error in order to continue. Participants in the simple condition received the 
same training procedure except they did not have training on the doughnut-packing task 
but on the simple perceptual-motor task as the interrupting task. The experimenter was 
present in the room with the participant during training, and the participant was allowed 
to ask questions about the tasks if necessary.
Before moving on to the testing phase, participants were encouraged to perform as 
quickly and as accurately as possible in both the doughnut-making and doughnut-packing 
task. It should be pointed out that although participants were instructed to produce the 
correct number of doughnuts by successively guessing the dough “estimation” in 
operating the Dough Port, the actual number of doughnuts being produced in a trial is 
random. This is intended to distract the participants away from the real purpose of the 
experiment.
In the testing phase, any error made results in a beep, but no on-screen message, to 
remind participants that they have made an error. Each participant was required to 
perform 11 trials and the experimenter left the participant to carry on the session alone at 
this point. The entire experiment took approximately fifty minutes.
2.6 Measures
The dependent measure that is of primary interest is the number of PCEs. Two other 
dependent measures were also taken: a) task resumption error which measures whether 
the primary task was resumed correctly or not immediately after an interruption, and b)
164
Chapter 6 — The effect o f interruption on post-completion error: Experiment 6a
task resumption time which measures the time it takes to resume the primary task after an 
interruption, i.e. the time difference between the end of an interruption and the first 
mouse click made. These other measures were taken because, as previous studies suggest 
(e.g Altmann & Trafton, 2004), they are able to measure any disruptive effect on primary 
task performance locally. Global measures such as overall task completion time might not 
be an accurate measure of disruptiveness of the interruption as discussed earlier.
3 Results 
3.1 The effect of interruption on PCE rate
Across the two interruption conditions there were only 3 PCEs, 2 of which were 
committed by the same participant in the complex condition, both after interruption 
position Z. The remaining PCE was observed in the simple condition and it occurred after 
interruption position Other. The overall low PCE rate obtained does not support any 
reliable comparisons between the two interruption conditions and the different 
interruption positions. However, the data showed that 2 out of 3 PCE occurrences were 
obtained after the cognitively demanding interruption at position Z.
Since statistical comparisons in interruption conditions and positions were made 
impractical by the low PCE rate generated, it is necessary to look at other dependent 
measures in order to establish whether the two interruption conditions have any 
differential effect in terms of task performance. It would seem pointless to adopt the 
current experimental paradigm, using the same cognitively demanding interruption, for 
future investigations if the interruption itself did not have any disruptive effect on the 
performance of the primary task.
3.2 Differential effects between the two types of interruptions
The first other primary task performance measure to look at was task resumption error 
after an interruption. In the current context, a task resumption error is defined as an 
incorrect step executed immediately after an interruption. If there were three consecutive 
incorrect actions occurring at the same step immediately after an interruption, it only 
counts as one task resumption error. Therefore, after an interruption each participant
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would only get a count of 0 or 1 for the error(s). This scheme of error count is to 
characterise error in terms of the number of incorrect task step executions rather than the 
number of incorrect actions made in a single task step. This is to eliminate erroneous 
actions due to trial-and-error behaviour. The same error counting scheme has been 
adopted by Byrne and Davies (in press).
Since each participant had 8 interruptions in total (4 with position Z and 4 with position 
Other), a score of a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 8 was obtained for each participant. 
Furthermore, a task resumption error after interruption Z is operationalised differently to 
a PCE; a resumption error is any incorrect step made except getting the next order 
(clicking Next Order), whereas a PCE is a click on Next Order before clicking the Clean 
button.
In each condition, across participants and trials, there were 80 interruptions. There were 5 
task resumption errors (6% error frequency) in the simple condition and 11 task 
resumption errors (13% error frequency) in the complex condition. A resumption error 
proportion score was calculated for each participant. The proportion score was obtained 
by the number of errors divided by the number of interruptions each participant received 
(8 in this case). An independent-sample t-test showed that there was no reliable 
differences in the error proportions scores between conditions complex (Mean = 0.14, 
S.D. = 0.11) and simple (Mean = 0.06, S.D. = 0.12), f(18) = 1.45, n.s.. However, the trend 
of the data indicates that there were more resumption errors in the complex condition than 
the simple condition.
The results suggest that there were no differences in terms of resumption errors between 
the two interruption conditions; however, that does not necessarily suggest that the two 
interruption types do not differ in disruptiveness in terms of other measures. As Trafton et 
al. (2003) suggest, when other more sensitive measures are looked at the disruptiveness of 
an interruption is then revealed. The next section looks at the measure of task resumption 
times.
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3.3 The effect of interruption on task resumption times
Another measure of primary task performance is task resumption times. Resumption 
times were taken for correct performance only, i.e. only resumption times from the 
correct first mouse click after an interruption were included in the analysis. Resumption 
times for incorrect performance might contain trial-and-error behaviour and, therefore, do 
not accurately reflect a participant genuinely trying to remember what he/she was about 
to do. These resumption times for incorrect performance were not included for 
comparison.
Mean task resumption times were calculated for each participant according to the 
different task steps: PC step and non-PC step. Because only correct task resumption data 
were included, the mean resumption times calculated for each participant were not 
necessarily an average of 4 (4 trials for each of the two task steps) but were fewer in some 
cases if there were incorrect resumption times.
The mean task resumption times violated the assumptions of homogeneity of variance 
and covariance; as a consequence, a logarithmic transformation was performed prior to 
submitting the data to a 2 x 2 (interruption condition x task step) mixed ANOVA. In the 
analysis that follows, summary statistics, such as the mean and variability, are reported 
using the geometric means (GM; antilog of the transformed means) and the interquartile 
range (IR) of the transformed data respectively. Means and standard deviations of the 
untransformed data are provided in footnotes. All statistical tests were conducted using 
the transformed data.
Table 6.1 shows the GM and IR of the transformed resumption time data for the two 
interruption positions.
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PC step Non-PC step
Simple 1.48s 2.32s
interruption (0.71) (1.33)
Complex 4.95s 7.30s
interruption (2.92) (5.51)
Table 6.1: GM and IR (in bracket) of the transformed resumption time data according to PC step
and non-PC step3.
A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of the within-subject factor; task 
step (F(l, 18) = 23.171, p < .001, Eta squared = .563), and a significant main effect of the 
between-subject factor; interruption condition (F(l, 18) = 39.283,/? < .001, Eta squared = 
.686). The interaction was found to be not significant, F (l, 18) = .124, p  = .7294. Post hoc 
comparisons using paired-sample t-tests with Bonferroni correction yielded a reliable 
difference between PC step and non-PC step in both the simple condition and the 
complex condition.
However, the resumptions at the two different task steps involve clicking on buttons of 
different locations and sizes on the computer screen. Different positions of the buttons 
require different physical movement times, which might contribute to the differences in 
resumption times detected. Therefore, Fitts’ Law (Fitts, 1954) was used to approximate 
the physical movement times for resuming the PC step and any of the non-PC steps (i.e. 
the “Selector” steps) after an interruption. This is meant to be a rough approximation, so 
the distance of the movement measured is based on the assumption that the starting 
position is the location of the “Pack” button of the interrupting Doughnut Packing task. 
The calculation is not feasible for the simple condition because its interrupting task 
involves clicking an on-screen button occurring at random locations. This makes
3
Summary statistics from the untransformed data: in the simple condition, mean task resumption times
were shorter for PC step (M = 1.60s, SD = 0.74) than non-PC step (M = 2.50s, SD = 0.99). The same 
pattern was observed in the complex condition with mean resumption times PC step (M = 5.56s, SD = 3.16) 
shorter than non-PC step (M = 8.33s, SD = 4.60).
4 The same analysis on the untransformed data yielded a very similar pattern of results; both main effects 
were found significant; the within-subject task step (F(l, 18) = 19.67, p  <  0.001) and the between-subject 
interruption condition (F(l, 18) = 16.4, p  = 0.001). The interaction was found significant (F(l, 18) = 5.07, p  
= 0.037).
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assuming a reasonable starting position of the movement impractical. So physical 
movement times are calculated for the complex condition only.
Fitts’ Law yielded movement times of 0.5 sec and 0.67 sec for PC step and non-PC step 
respectively (see Appendix E for more details of the calculations). These movement times 
were taken out from the untransformed resumption times in the complex condition 
accordingly and the data was subjected to the same transformation and analysis as before. 
Table 6.2 below shows the GM and IR of the transformed resumption time data, in the 
complex condition, after taken out the corresponding movement times.
PC step Non-PC step
^  . 4.41s 6.53sComplex (292) (551)
Table 6.2; GM and IR (in bracket) of the transformed resumption time data with movement times 
taken out according to different interruption positions5.
Resumption times, with movement times removed, in the complex condition were 
analysed together with resumption times in the simple condition. A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA 
yielded the same pattern of results as earlier. Both main effects were significant with 
large effect sizes: task step (F (l, 18) = 21.616, p < .001, Eta squared = .546) and 
interruption condition (F( 1, 18) = 27.471, p  < .001, Eta squared = .604). The interaction 
was found to be not significant, F{ 1, 18) = .091, p  = .766. Post hoc comparisons, with 
Bonferroni correction, comparing PC step and non-PC step in the complex condition 
yielded a reliable difference. Planned contrasts also revealed reliable differences between 
complex and simple condition with respect to PC step (t( 18) = 5.235, p  < .001) and non- 
PC step (r(18) = 4.405, p  < .001).
5 Summary statistics from the untransformed data, with movement times taken out, in the complex
condition: PC step (M = 5.06s, SD = 3.16) and non-PC step (M = 7.66s, SD = 4.60).
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4 Discussion
The original hypothesis predicting a significant increase in PCEs with a cognitively 
demanding interruption (a mental arithmetic task) just before the PC step (position Z) is 
not supported by the observed results. Overall there were only 3 PCE occurrences, with 2 
committed by the same participant in the experimental condition and 1 occurring in the 
control condition. Interestingly, consistent with the prediction, the 2 PCEs in the 
experimental condition occurred after interruption position Z and not other positions. 
However, the overall low PCE rate makes investigation of the interruption position effect 
impractical.
The cognitively demanding interruption was found to have a disruptive effect on primary 
task performance. Although no significant difference was detected in terms of task 
resumption errors between the complex and simple conditions, the trend of the data 
suggests that there were more resumption errors in the complex condition than the simple.
Results from task resumption times suggest that participants took longer to resume the 
primary task after a cognitively demanding interruption than a simple perceptual-motor 
interruption for both PC and non-PC steps. This suggests that the 75s mental arithmetic 
task was successful in engaging the participants, preventing them from rehearsing where 
they were in the primary doughnut-making task, and exhibiting a detrimental effect on 
primary task performance. Although the reliable difference between interruption 
conditions was based on resumption times in the complex condition having the physical 
movement time estimated and removed, the same could not be carried out in the simple 
condition due to the design of the interrupting task. The comparison is still valid and, in 
fact, it is a more conservative one, because if estimation of the physical movement times 
were obtainable in the simple condition and removed, the difference between the two 
conditions would be even larger, giving the same conclusion.
Differences in resumption times were also detected between PC step and non-PC step. 
Results suggest that it was faster to resume the PC step than to resume one of the five 
non-PC task steps. The same result was obtained even when the approximate physical 
movement times were removed in the complex condition.
170
Chapter 6 — The effect o f interruption on post-completion error: Experiment 6a.
Similar results were found on a study investigating the effect of interruption positions on 
programming a VCR (Monk, Boehm-Davis & Trafton, 2004). It was found that 
resumption times were longer for mid-subtask interruptions than interruptions before a 
new subtask or during a repetitive procedure like scrolling. The difference is explained in 
terms of the AGM model that different task or subtask points impose a greater encoding 
demand. The longer resumption times is due to the need to rehearse more information 
about the goal state and its links to the next step. Extending the explanation to our current 
finding, it is possible that because after interruption Other (which happened at position P, 
Q, R ,S  or T) the task still remains incomplete, in order to resume the next correct step, 
the cognitive system needs to successfully encode/differentiate between the different 
states of the five similar subtasks. On the other hand, after interruption Z the task has 
already been completed (doughnuts were made) so the encoding of the goal state might 
be relatively less demanding. This is because the PC step is “standalone” in the sense that 
it has no similar subtasks to differentiate with, resulting in shorter resumption times. 
Although the same difference in interruption position was also present in the simple 
condition, the result is less conclusive. This is because the corresponding physical 
movement times could not be obtained and, thus, not removed. As a result, the observed 
difference in this condition might be confounded.
Using task resumption time as a behavioural measure (Trafton et al, 2003), a differential 
disruptive effect between the two interruption conditions was observed in the current 
experiment. The difference observed in resumption times is also consistent with previous 
findings showing that even an interruption of 5 seconds results in longer resumption times 
than a 1 or 1/4 second interruption (Monk & Trafton, 2004). However, the current designs 
of the two interruption conditions were not to investigate the effect of different 
interruption duration, but to establish whether the 75-second mental arithmetic task is 
disruptive to primary task performance as an interruption.
The main objective of the current experiment investigating the effect of interruption 
position on PCE is not fulfilled because it failed to generate a high enough number of 
PCEs. The overall low PCE rate, which is 1.4% (3 out of 220 opportunities), generated 
from the current experiment has not reached the 5% threshold of systematicity.
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The current study adopts a similar experimental paradigm to Byrne & Bovair’s study 
utilising a procedural task, which has a predefined sequence of operations that 
participants have to follow. Participants were trained to perform the task correctly to 
ensure they have the correct knowledge of the task procedures; this ensures that any 
errors that arise from the task are procedure-based and not knowledge-based. However, 
the task used in this experiment differs from Byrne & Bovair’s task on a number of 
dimensions. One might question the validity of the task for investigating PCEs: in other 
words, whether the null effect of interruption on PCE rate might be attributed to the 
current task being an unsuitable candidate to generate PCEs. Therefore, the following is a 
systematic comparison between the current task and the one used in Byrne & Bovair’s 
study. The purpose is to identify if there are any characteristics that the current task might 
lack which contribute to generating PCEs.
4.1 An analytical comparison and contrast between the doughnut- 
making task and Byrne & Bovair’s Phaser task
A very simple comparison between Byrne & Bovair’s task, and the current task, identifies 
a structural similarity arguing for validity of the current task in studying PCEs. The 
essence of the comparison is that in both tasks, the execution of the final step occurs after 
one has acknowledged a completion signal (see Table 6.3). The omission of the final step 
is then a PCE. Nevertheless differences between the Phaser task and Doughnut task 
should be considered in more detail and this contrast might shed light on the different 
level of PCE rate obtained.
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Phaser Task (Byrne & 
Bovair’s task)
Doughnut Task (current 
task)
Pre-completion
steps A set of fixed procedures A set of fixed procedures
Completion signal
Decide if the goal has been 
completed or not (whether the 
enemy ship had been 
destroyed or not)
A report of the completed 
goal (a report of how many 
doughnuts are made)
Final step of the task Clicking on “Tracking” button Clicking on “Clean” button
Table 6.3: A simple descriptive comparison o f Bvme & Bovair’s task and the current task in
terms of task structure.
A closer look at the Phaser and Doughnut-making tasks reveal some important 
differences as follow:
Presence of a competing signal:
When the completion signal (a doughnut report) occurred in the Doughnut task 
participants were required to acknowledge the report then dismiss it by clicking an “OK” 
button on the report. The resulting screen is the same as before the task was completed; in 
other words, there is no information on screen to differentiate the pre-completion and 
postcompletion state of the task. In contrast, the completion signal remains on screen 
once the Phaser task is completed (see arrow 1 in Figure 6.5). Having the completion 
signal remaining on screen helps one to differentiate the state of the task, and this might 
“urge” participants to move on to the next step and omit the PC step. This luring effect 
might be stronger especially when the completion signal includes information such as 
“Return to main control”. The term “competing” signal is used to describe the signal 
competing against the PC step so that upon completion of a task, one has the choice of 
executing the PC step or of responding to the competing signal, omitting the PC step. The 
inclusion of a competing signal upon task completion is an attempt to exploit the notion 
that when resuming a task after an interruption one uses cues in the external environment 
to help “reconstruct” the next step in the task sequence.
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Prominence o f the PC step button:
In the doughnut-m aking task the PC step  is execu ted  by p ressing  a separate button  
(“Clean”) on the task interface; on the other hand, the PC step (turning o f f  the “Tracker”) 
in the Phaser task is carried out by pressing the ‘T rack in g” button w hich  is a lso  used for 
turning on the “Tracker” (see arrow 2. in Figure 6 .6 ). So the sam e button is used for tw o  
different fu n ction s (“on” and “o f f ’) in the Phaser task. T he first c lick  to turn the  
“Tracker” on is analogous to pressing the “P rocess” button in the D oughnut task, and the 
second click  to sw itch the “Tracker” o ff  is like pressing the “C lean” button.
Arrow 1. is the completion signal indicating
“Romulan vessel destroyed. Return to main control. ” 
Arrow 2. highlights the “Tracking ” button.
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Figure 6.6: A screen shot of the Tactical task (adapted, with permission, from Chung & Bvme 
(2004) which is the same as the Phaser task in Byrne & Bovair. 1997).
A less practised PC step due to a cyclic task structure:
The com pletion  signal in the Phaser task is essentia lly  a d ecision  point; w hen the goal has 
been com pleted  m ove on to the PC step (c lick in g  “Tracking”) o f  the task, otherw ise carry 
out the previous sequence o f  steps again. T his cy c lic  (or loop in g) o f  the pre-com pletion
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steps means that, within a given trial, these steps are executed more often than the PC 
step. However, this particular property is not present in the Doughnut task as the 
completion signal is not a decision point but simply a task completion report. Therefore, 
the pre-completion steps and the PC step in the Doughnut task are practiced equally often 
within a single trial. The cyclic pre-completion property in the Phaser task might increase 
the chances of one making the PCE due to the PC step being a less practised step 
compared to all other steps within the procedure. One could imagine that a participant 
carrying out this task going through a few cycles of “Am /  done yet? No, do it again.” 
When the task is finally done this might give the participant the feeling of “Ah, now I am 
done. Let’s move on”, and subsequently forgetting about the PC step.
Each of the three main differences outlined between Byrne & Bovair’s Phaser task and 
the current task might contribute to the different level of PCE rate obtained between the 
two studies. Although it is difficult to pinpoint whether one factor or a combination of 
factors from the analytical comparison contributes to a higher PCE rate, the analysis is a 
useful contribution to the task repertoire used in investigating PCEs. Given that there are 
only a limited number of studies examining PCE and that Byrne and Bovair’s Phaser task 
is the main task paradigm in successfully generating PCE, it is the objective of the 
subsequent experiments to use the current procedural task paradigm (doughnut-making 
task) to address the identified factors: presence of a competing signal, prominence of the 
PC step button and a less practised PC step.
The research question concerning the effect of interruptions on PCE rate set out in the 
current experiment could not be answered adequately because of the overall low PCE rate 
generated. The PCE rates obtained were 1.8% (2/110 opportunities) and 0.9% (1/110 
opportunities) in the complex interruption condition and the simple interruption condition 
respectively. The obtained error rates are considerably lower than the 9.3% (13/140 
opportunities) generated in Byrne & Bovair’s study using the Phaser task with no 
working memory manipulation. The goal of the next experiment is to redesign the 
doughnut-making task to attempt to generate a higher PCE rate than the current 
experiment, so that the effect of interruption position on PCE rate can be assessed.
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Experiment 6b: The effect of interruption position 
1 Introduction
In retrospect, apart from the three factors identified in the analytical comparison between 
the doughnut-making task and the Phaser task, there might be a further reason for the low 
PCE rate obtained in the previous experiment. When the goal of making doughnuts is 
completed one has to click on a button labelled “Clean” to clean the machine before 
clicking “Next Order” to begin the next trial. However, to the participants clicking “Next 
Order” might not be viewed as the first step to start the next trial but clicking the “Clean” 
button first instead. In order to make it clear to the participants that the “Next Order” 
button is the beginning of a new trial, a clear separation between trials is needed. In most 
real-world examples where PCEs could occur, there is a subsequent task awaiting when 
the main goal is accomplished. For example, forgetting to collect the original after 
photocopying, one might have a task to distribute the photocopies when they are done; 
when using an ATM and forgetting to take the cash card back, one might need to go to a 
restaurant after the withdrawal is done. On reflection, the absence of a task to separate 
one trial from the next might not resemble situations where PCEs arise. Therefore, one of 
the changes made to the doughnut-making task in Experiment 6a is to include a relatively 
small task to separate one trial from the next. Furthermore, this small task should offer a 
competing signal so that it “urges” one to move on to it upon completion of the main task 
of making doughnuts.
In the current experiment, the following changes are made to the task paradigm: firstly, a 
small task is included to separate one trial from the next to address the issue of having a 
subsequent task to carry out after the main goal is completed. Secondly, in order to 
address the absence of a competing signal, a competing signal is included upon 
completion of the doughnut-making task to “urge” the participant to move on to the 
subsequent task. Thirdly, to address the issue of prominence of the PC step button, the 
“Clean” button is integrated with the existing “Process” button so that the PC action is not 
on a separate button.
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The effect of interruption position on PCE could then be studied if the changes made to 
the task paradigm managed to generate an overall error rate for statistical comparisons. 
The issue of a less practised PC step is addressed in the final study —  Experiment 6d.
2 Method 
2.1 Tasks
In this experiment, an additional task was used apart from the doughnut-making and 
doughnut-packing tasks. The additional task is a relatively small task and is implemented 
on a separate computer terminal. Two computer terminals were used in this experiment: 
the rationale is to simulate an environment where one has to physically move away from 
the main task (making doughnuts) when it is completed in order to move on to a different 
task. It was felt that a lot of the real-world PCE situations involve one physically moving 
away from the artefact once the task is accomplished.
2.1.1 The primary task —  Call Centre and Doughnut-making
The Call Centre is a simple search task where one has to find a specified location from 
the London Underground Map to get an order to make doughnuts. This search task is to 
be carried out at the beginning of each trial. Figure 6.7 depicts the transition between the 
modified version of the Doughnut-making task and the Call Centre.
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Figure 6.7: The Wicket Doughnut Machine and the Call Centre.
A t the b eginn ing o f  a trial, the centre o f  the W ick et D ou gh nu t M achine ind icates a 
location  to co llec t an order (St. Paul’s in this ca se) and the participant is required to 
p h ysica lly  turn to the Call Centre com puter term inal to  find  the location . O nce the 
location is found and entered fo llow in g  tw o sim ple steps, the participant then returned to
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the Wicket Doughnut Machine terminal to show the order by clicking Show Order and 
begin making the doughnuts following the same procedure as in Experiment 6a.
2.1.2 A modified version of the Wicket Doughnut Machine
The current version of the Wicket Doughnut Machine is a slight modified version of the 
one used in the previous experiment. The basic underlying procedures in carrying out the 
doughnut-making task is the same as the previous version but with a couple of changes to 
the interface. Figure 6.7 depicts some of the screen transitions of the Wicket Doughnut 
Machine.
When one finishes finding the specified location in the Call Centre and returns to the 
doughnut machine, one then clicks on Show Order to reveal the order and start executing 
the same procedures as the previous experiment in making doughnuts, as indicated by 
arrow 1 in figure 6.8. Once the task is completed, the completion report appears as 
indicated by arrow 2 in figure 6.8. When the completion report is dismissed, the centre of 
the doughnut machine then flashes up another signal indicating the location for the next 
order, arrow 3 in figure 6.8 indicates the corresponding screen transition. The PC step 
(clicking “Clean”) needs to be executed before responding to the next specified location 
in the Call Centre, otherwise it is classified as a PCE. The signal indicating a location acts 
as a competing signal against the PC step because once the task is completed there is a 
choice to either clean the machine or to go to the Call Centre directly. The other change 
to the interface is the integration of the Clean button with the Process button at the bottom 
right of the machine interface.
Figure 6.9 below summarises the high-level steps of the modified task. The task steps 
involved are very similar to the previous experiments with the addition of the Call Centre 
at the beginning.
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Interruption P
Interruption Q
Interruption R
Interruption S
Interruption T
Step
number
Step name Actions involved
0 Call Centre
Respond to Call Centre to pick up an order from 
the required location.
1 Next Order
Return to the Doughnut Machine and click on 
the Next Order button to show order details.
2 SelectJOP Click on the Dough Port Selector button.
3
optJDP(x) 
opt_DP(y) 
opt_DP (Total)
Enter parameters in the Dough Port 
compartment.
4 DP_OK
Click on the OK button in the Dough Port 
compartment.
5
DP_ProgBar_Filling
Wait until the progress bar in the Dough Port 
compartment to fill up.
6 Select_Puncher Click on the Puncher Selector button.
7
opt_Puncher(x)
opt_Puncher(y)
Enter parameter in the Puncher compartment.
8
Puncher_OK
Click on the OK button in the Puncher 
compartment.
------►9 Select_Froster Click on the Froster Selector button.
10
opt_Froster(x)
opt_Froster(y)
Enter parameter in the Froster compartment.
11
Froster_OK
Click on the OK button in the Froster 
compartment.
w
12 Select_Sprinkler Click on the Sprinkler Selector button.
13
Opt_Sprinkler(x)
Opt_Sprinkler(y)
Enter parameter in the Sprinkler compartment.
14
Sprinkler_OK
Click on the OK button in the Sprinkler 
compartment.
15 Select_Fryer Click on the Fryer Selector button.
16
opt_Fryer(x)
opt_Fryer(y)
Enter parameter in the Fryer compartment.
17 
------►
Fryer_OK
Click on the OK button in the Fryer 
compartment.
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19”
Report_OK
18 Process Click on the Process button.
Wait for the doughnut report to appear, read it 
and click on the OK button to dismiss it.
Interruption Z >
20 Clean Click on the Clean button. (PC step)
Figure 6.9: Details of the steps required to operate the Doughnut Machine.
2.1.3 Interrupting task
The interrupting task of packing doughnuts with the Doughnut Packaging Express is 
identical to the one in the previous experiment.
2.2 Design
The design of the current experiment is identical to the previous experiment except there 
is no between-subject factor. This is a within-subject design with one independent 
variable —  interruption position —  which has three levels: Just-Before (position Z), 
Other (position P, Q, R, S or T) and None (no interruption). The interruption used is the 
75-sec mental arithmetic task.
Each experimental session consists of 11 trials in the testing phase; 4 trials with 
interruption position Z, 4 trials with interruption position Other and 3 trials with no 
interruption. The 4 interruptions at position Other are selected randomly from position P, 
Q, R, S or T, and no repeating position is selected in a given testing session. The order of 
trial presentation is randomised.
2.3 Materials
The programs were written in Visual Basic 6 and run on two different computer 
terminals: a HP Desktop and a Compaq desktop. The doughnut machine program and the 
doughnut-packing program were run on the HP desktop and the Call Centre was run on 
the Compaq desktop. The two computer terminals were arranged at 90° so that the
+t This step does not afford an error to occur because it involves clicking a modal dialog box. 
Therefore, it is not included in calculating the overall error opportunities in the analysis
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participant had to turn away from either computer depending which task s/he was 
carrying out.
2.4 Participants
35 participants, either university undergraduate or postgraduate students, took part in this 
study. Ages ranged from 19 to 37 with a mean of 24.8. There were 20 female and 15 
male. None of the participants had taken part in the previous experiment. All participants 
were paid £6 for their participations.
2.5 Procedure
The procedures were very similar to the previous experiment. Participants read some 
documents describing the experiment then went through a demonstration and training 
phase. Participants first observed the experimenter performing both the doughnut-making 
and the doughnut-packing task separately first. When performing the doughnut-making 
task the experimenter explained one needs to respond to the Call Centre when the 
location signal flashes in the doughnut machine. The experimenter also demonstrated 
how to respond to a call using the Call Centre and that the doughnut machine needs to be 
cleaned by clicking the “Clean” button, after each completed order, before responding to 
the Call Centre. Participants were then given two training trials on the doughnut-making 
task; one with and one without the interrupting doughnut-packing task. Any errors 
occurring in this training phase result in on-screen warning messages and beeps; 
participants were required to identify and correct the error in order to continue. The 
experimenter was present in the room with the participant during training, and the 
participant was allowed to ask questions about the tasks if necessary.
In the testing phase, participants were required to perform 11 trials in total and the 
experimenter left the participant to carry on the session alone at this point. The entire 
experiment took approximately an hour.
2.6 Measures
Two dependent measures are of primary interest: first, the number of PCEs made; 
secondly, the time one takes to resume an action after an interruption. Other errors are 
also of interest and recorded.
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3 Results
Data from four participants were excluded in the analysis; two of them were making the 
PCE on every trial. The pattern of results from these two participants suggests the PCEs 
made may be due to incorrect knowledge of the task, so that the observed PCEs may not 
be genuinely procedural errors. One other participant did not follow the task instructions 
properly and one had a lost data file.
3.1 Overall errors
There were a total of 330 errors across the 31 participants. An error is defined as any 
incorrect action deviating from the correct sequence. The error count for each participant 
was carried out in relation to the task steps; for example, if there was more than one error 
at task step X, the error count is still one for that task step. The same scheme of error 
counting was used as the previous experiment: characterise error in terms of the number 
of incorrect task step executions rather than the number of incorrect actions made in a 
single task step. This is to eliminate erroneous actions due to trial-and-error behaviour.
Over half of the participants (20 out of 31) made at least one PCE (error at “Clean” step) 
and a total of 56 PCEs were obtained. If the occurrences of errors, in general, were 
random then each task step should account for 5% (1/20) of the total errors. The obtained 
number of PCEs account for about 17% of the total errors. A Binomial test suggests the 
occurrences of PCE is above chance level, z = 9.98, p < .001.
An alternative way of interpreting the data is assessing the error against its systematicity 
level (e.g. Byrne & Bovair, 1997, and Payne & Squibb, 1990). Systematicity is defined as 
a proportion ratio of number of occurrences to the number of opportunities for that error. 
Since there were 11 trials for each of the 31 participants, this gives a total of 341 
opportunities for an error at each task step. Figure 6.10 shows the systematicity, also 
referred to as error rate, for all task steps6.
6 Task step [19] has been omitted from the figure and also from subsequent analysis because it 
involves only a mouse click on a modal dialog box, which does not afford an opportunity for error 
occurrence.
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Figure 6.10: Error rate (%) of each task step across trials and participants.
A 5% level of systematicity has been used as an indicator of an error occurring in a 
systematic fashion (see Byrne & Bovair, 1997). PCE appears to be highly systematic with 
an error rate of 16%. A number of non-PCEs also appear to be systematic and they mostly 
occurred at one of the 5 “Selector” steps with “Selector DP” having the highest error rate. 
The occurrence of errors at these “Selector” steps is discussed later in the chapter. Task 
step [5] involves waiting for a progress bar to fill up; an error occurs when an action is 
made before the progress bar is filled up. The occurrences of this error suggest that the 
participants were being impatient: not waiting long enough for the progress bar to fill up 
before carrying out the next action. This error is not pursued further in the analysis 
because its nature is not of particular interest to the current thesis.
3.2 Interruption position effect on PCE
Table 6.4 shows the distribution of the PCE occurrences according to the different 
interruption positions. Each participant received 4 interruptions at position Z, 4 
interruptions at position Other and 3 trials with no interruptions; the total number of 
opportunities for each interruption position was calculated across all 31 participants.
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Error rates (%) of PCE occurrences were calculated for the three different interruption 
trials for each participant. The error rates are the number of PCEs divided by the number 
of opportunities for the error. The use of error rates for comparison eliminates biases 
imposed by the different number of opportunities among the interruption positions.
Interruption position
Z Other Nil
Total no. of PCE 37 11 8
(Total no. of opportunities) (124) (124) (93)
Mean error rate 29.8% 8.9% 8.6%
(SD) (32.5) (19.9) (21.0)
SD = Standard deviation
Table 6.4: Number o f PCEs and their mean error rates with respect to the different interruption
positions.
A one-way repeated ANOVA on the error rates showed a large significant main effect of 
interruption position. The scores did not conform to the assumption of sphericity, the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used, F( 1.338, 40.149) = 9.921 p  = .001; Eta squared 
= 0.249. Planned contrasts comparing position Z to position Other showed a reliable 
difference, r(30) = 3.297, p  = .003, and position Z versus Nil also showed a significant 
difference, r(30) = 3.339, p  = .002. There was no reliable difference between position 
Other and Nil, r(30) = .09, p  = .929.
3.3 Interruption position effect on non-PCE
The next question is concerned with whether the observed interruption position effect is 
unique to PCEs? In other words, does interruption position have the same effect on errors 
occurring at other non-PC steps in the task? For the purpose of the comparisons, all non- 
PCEs were categorised into “immediately after interruption”, “later after interruption” 
and “no interruption” (including errors before an interruption). These are equivalent to the 
PCEs’ interruption position Z, Other and Nil respectively.
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The calculation of error opportunities and error count for each of the categories is as 
follows:
3.3.1 “Immediately after interruption”
Error count
An action following immediately after an interruption is counted as an error if it was 
executed on the incorrect task step.
Error opportunity
Each participant has 4 opportunities for the error from the 5 interruption positions P, Q, 
R, S or T.
3.3.2 “Later after interruption”
Error count
Any action on the second task step onwards following an interruption is counted as an 
error if it was carried out on the incorrect task step.
Error opportunity
For example, after an interruption on position P (before Selector Puncher) there are 12 
opportunities for a non-PCE. The step before the PC step was excluded as an opportunity 
because there is no alternative action a participant could perform, which would count as 
an error, apart from clicking on a modal dialog box.
There were no opportunities for this category of error after interruption T and Z, 
therefore, their subsequent task steps were not counted as error opportunities. Depending 
on which 4 of the 5 interruption positions a participant received, each participant might 
have different error opportunities. The minimum error opportunities computed is 18 and 
the maximum is 30.
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3.3.3 “No interruption”
Error count
Any action on the non-PC steps not following the correct sequence was counted as an 
error. These error counts include errors from trials with no interruptions, i.e. Nil, and also 
errors before an interruption in trials with an interruption.
Error opportunity
The error opportunities for each participant might be different due to trial variations in 
interruption position. Each participant could have a minimum of 181 error opportunities 
or a maximum of 193.
Table 6.5 shows the number of non-PCEs and their respective mean error rates according 
to the three interruption position categories. About half of the errors in the “no 
interruption” category (117 out of 228) occurred at “Selector DP” (step [2]), however, the 
interruption manipulation does not involve an interruption just before the step. Therefore, 
errors at “Selector DP” are excluded from the following analysis and their occurrence will 
be addressed later in the chapter.
Interruption position Total no. of non-PCE
Immediately
after
Later
after
No
interruption
No
interruption*
Total no. of non-PCE 
(Total no. of opportunities)
31
(124)
13
(750)
228
(5605) 272
111
(5264)
Mean error rate 
(SD)
25%
(25)
1.7%
(2.6)
4.1%
(2.2)
2.1%
(1.4)
* This “no interruption" category excludes errors at “Selector DP" step
Table 6.5: Number of non-PCEs and their mean error rates with respect to the different
interruption positions.
A one-way repeated ANOVA on the error rates yielded a large significant main effect of 
interruption position. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used because of violation 
of sphericity (F(1.015, 30.439) = 25.6, p  < .001; Eta squared = .46). Post hoc
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comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed a reliable difference between 
“immediately after” and “later after”, the difference between “immediately after” versus 
“no interruption” was also significant. No reliable difference was detected between “later 
after” and “no interruption”. The result suggests that interruption position had the same 
disruptive effect on other non-PCEs as on PCEs: an interruption occurring just before a 
task step was more likely to result in an error than an earlier interruption or no 
interruption at all.
3.4 PCE and non-PCE resumption pattern
Given that the above results suggest that interruption position had the same general 
disruptive effect on PCE as well as non-PCE, are there any characteristics suggesting 
PCE might be different to non-PCE? This question is best addressed by looking at the 
pattern of task step resumption after an interruption. All 37 PCEs that occurred 
immediately after an interruption had the same pattern of resumption; that they were 
errors omitting the PC step and moving on to the Call Centre task. In contrast there was a 
qualitatively different resumption pattern among the non-PCEs that occurred immediately 
after an interruption; 45% (14 out of 31) involved resuming to a major task step just 
before the interruption (the previously operated compartment), and the remaining lacked 
a consistent pattern of resumption. The difference in resumption pattern between PCE and 
non-PCE suggests cues in different task steps play a role in aiding task resumption; the 
presence of a false completion signal at the PC step lures one to carry out the next task, 
but such a cue was not present at the non-PC steps in the task.
3.5 Resumption times between different task steps
The time it took one to resume the primary task after an interruption was analysed. 
Resumption times were taken only for correct task resumptions. For the same reason as in 
the previous experiment, resumption times for incorrect performance might not accurately 
reflect a participant genuinely trying to remember what he/she was about to do. As a 
consequence, these resumption times for incorrect performance were not included in 
calculating the mean resumption times.
The purpose of this analysis is to examine whether there was a difference in resumption 
times between the PC step and non-PC steps. Like the analysis of the previous
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experiment, mean task resumption times were calculated for each participant according to 
the PC step and non-PC steps. Because only correct task resumption data were included, 
the mean resumption times calculated for each participant were not necessarily an 
average of 4 (4 trials for each of the two interruption positions) but might be less in some 
cases if there were incorrect resumption times. Since there were three participants who 
did not resume the PC step after interruption Z for all 4 trials, no resumption times were 
obtained for the PC step. Data from these three participants were excluded from the 
analysis since comparison of mean resumption times was not possible between PC step 
and non-PC steps. As a consequence, the analysis is based on data from 28 participants 
who resumed correctly at least once for the PC step and the non-PC steps.
Table 6.6 below shows the mean resumption times for the PC step (after interruption Z) 
and non-PC steps (after interruption Other). A reliable difference was detected between 
position Z and position Other, t{21) = 7.179, p  < .001.
PC step Non-PC step
Mean resumption time 3.4s 7.4s
(SD) (1.5) (2.9)
Table 6.6: Mean resumption times of PC step and non-PC step.
The result further supports the notion of usage of cues in the task environment upon 
resumption. Although the presence of a false completion was more likely to lure one in 
omitting the PC step, when one did not make the error the signal results in faster 
resumption by indicating where one was in the task sequence. Such a cue was not present 
after an interruption at other non-PC steps in the task.
However, there were differences in terms of the location and button sizes between the 
“Clean” button and the various “Selector” buttons. These differences might contribute to 
the difference found in the resumption times due to different physical movement times. 
As a consequence, Fitts’ Law was used to calculate the approximate physical movement 
times for resuming the PC step and the non-PC steps (any of the “Selector” steps) after an
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interruption. This is meant to be a rough approximation, so the distance of the movement 
measured is based on the assumption that the starting position is the location of the 
“Pack” button of the interrupting Doughnut Packing task.
Fitts’ Law calculation yielded 0.31 seconds and 0.67 seconds for the movement times 
from the “Pack” button to the “Clean” button and “Selector” buttons respectively (see 
Appendix E for details of the calculations). These movement times were taken out from 
the resumption times for each participant. Table 6.7 shows the resumption times with the 
estimated movement times taken out.
Interruption position
Z Other
Mean resumption time 3.0s 6.7s
(SD) (1.5) (2.9)
Table 6.1: Mean resumption times (minus estimated movement times! after interruption Z and
Other.
A reliable difference was still present between the resumption times, f(27) = 6.536, p < 
.001.
3.6 Categorisation of non-PCE
Since there were a substantial number of other non-PCEs it is necessary to subject these 
errors to finer grain analysis. There were a total of 274 errors at the non-PC steps in the 
task. About 77% (212 out of 274) occurred at the one of the five “Selector” steps and the 
remaining 23% (62 out of 274) occurred at various steps in the task.
An examination of the error patterns based on the first mouse-click at a task step 
identified a number of error kinds, which are described as follow:
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3.6.1 Skip-selector error
Error involving an action on the correct compartment in the task sequence, but omitting 
the corresponding “Selector” step to activate the compartment. This kind of error can be 
described as the correct task sequence execution but incorrect usage of the device 
interface.
3.6.2 Incorrect-sequence error
Error involving an action on the incorrect compartment in task sequence, but correct 
action at the corresponding “Selector” step to activate the compartment. This kind of 
error can be described in terms of incorrect task sequence execution but correct usage of 
the device interface.
3.6.3 Skip-and-incorrect error
Error involving an action on the incorrect compartment and omitting the corresponding 
“Selector” step to activate the compartment. This error kind can de described as incorrect 
task sequence execution and incorrect usage of the device interface.
3.6.4 Miscellaneous error
These errors occurred at various different steps in the task sequence with no particularly 
meaningful description in terms of the current study. Examples of these error include 
proceeding to the next task step while waiting for a progress bar to fill up, and incomplete 
specification of parameters in one of the compartments.
Table 6.8 shows the relative proportions of the four identified error kinds.
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Selector-step errors Miscellaneouserrors
Skip-selector
error
Incorrect-sequence Skip-and-incorrect 
error error
No. of 
errors 172 33 7 62
Proportion 63% 12% 2.5% 22.5%
Table 6.8: The relative proportion (%) of the different identified error kinds.
3.7 Interruption position effect on selector-step errors
The following analyses explore the effect of interruption position on selector-step errors, 
which made up the majority of the non-PCEs. The purpose of the analysis is to examine 
the errors in finer detail, in order to see if they behave the same or differently to PCEs in 
relation to interruption position.
3.7.1 Skip-selector errors
The first kind of error to examine is skip-selector error. Among the 172 errors 
approximately 67% (115 out of 172) were skip-selector errors occurring at the first 
compartment — Dough Port (“Selector DP”). Since manipulation of the interruption did 
not involve a position occurring before the Dough Port compartment, these skip-selector 
errors were excluded from the analysis. The remaining 57 errors were categorised into 
“immediately after interruption”, “later after interruption” and “no interruption”. The 
logic of counting the errors and their opportunities is the same as for all non-PCEs earlier, 
the only difference is that the counting was carried out on the respective “Selector” steps 
only.
Table 6.9 below shows the number and the mean error rates for skip-selector errors in 
relation to the different interruption positions. An error rate for each interruption position 
category (no. of errors / no. of opportunities) was computed for each participant. On a 
descriptive level, the trend of the data suggests that interruption did not increase the error 
as it did on PCE. A one-way repeated ANOVA yielded no significant effect of
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interruption position, with Greenhouse-Geisser correction, F  (1.676, 50.265) = 0.814, p  = 
.429.
Interruption position
Immediately
after
Later
after
No
interruption
Total no. of Skip-selector error 3 9 45
(Total no. of opportunities) (99) (151) (1114)
Mean error rate 3.2% 6.0% 4.0%
(SD) (10.0) (12.7) (5.0)
Table 6.9: Number and mean error rates of skip-selector errors according to different interruption
position.
3.7.2 Incorrect-sequence errors and PCEs
The second kind of error to examine is the incorrect-sequence error. The skip-and- 
incorrect errors were also included in the analysis since they share a common 
characteristic with the incorrect-sequence error, namely, selecting the incorrect step in the 
task sequence. These errors were grouped into the three interruption position categories: 
“immediately after interruption”, “later after interruption” and “no interruption”. The 
logic of counting the occurrences of the error and calculating the error opportunities are 
the same as the skip-selector errors, except that the counting also include the “Process” 
step, which was sometimes preceded by an interruption (position T), as well as the 
respective “Selector” steps.
There were a total of 40 incorrect-sequence errors (including 7 skip-and-incorrect errors). 
2 of them occurred at the Dough Port compartment and they were excluded from the 
analysis since they could not be preceded by an interruption. Table 6.10 shows the 
number and mean error rates for incorrect-sequence errors and PCE in relation to 
different interruption positions. The error rate of incorrect-sequence error for each 
participant was calculated according to the respective opportunities.
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Error rates of incorrect-sequence error and PCE were subjected to a 2 x 3 (error type x 
interruption position) repeated ANOVA yielding a significant main effect of interruption 
position, F(1.253, 37.582) = 30.903,/? < .001, with Greenhouse-Geisser correction. The 
main effect of error type was also significant, F (l, 30) = 5.391, p  = .027. The interaction 
was found not to be significant, F( 1.259, 37.756) = .007, p  = .956, with Greenhouse- 
Geisser correction.
Interruption position
Immediately Later No
after after interruption
Total no. of Incorrect-sequence error 28 2 8
(Total no. of opportunities) (124) (250) (1331)
Mean error rate 22.6% 1.1% 0.6%
(SD) (22.7) (4.2) (1.8)
Total no. of PCE* 37 11 8
(Total no. of opportunities)* (124) (124) (93)
Mean error rate* 29.8% 8.9% 8.6%
(SD)* (32.5) (19.9) (21.0)
*These figures are the same figures from Table 6.4.
Table 6.10: The number and mean error rates of incorrect-sequence error and PCE according to
the different interruption positions.
A simple effect analysis on incorrect-sequence error yielded a significant effect of 
interruption position, F(1.06, 31.789) = 26.951, p < .001. Post hoc comparisons with 
Bonferroni corrections revealed a reliable difference between “immediately after” versus 
“later after” and “immediately after” versus “no interruption”, but no reliable difference 
between “later after” versus “no interruption”. The results suggest that interruption 
position has an effect on the occurrences of incorrect-sequence error; furthermore, the 
non-significant interaction suggests that there was no difference between PCE and 
incorrect-sequence error with regards to the interruption effect.
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3.8 Errors at the Dough Port selector step
A total of 117 errors occurred at the very first compartment step in the task sequence, 
namely, the Dough Port (DP) compartment. Almost all of the errors (98%; 115 out of 117 
errors) were identified as skip-selector errors while the remaining two were classified as 
incorrect-sequence. The pattern of the data suggests that participants mostly carried out 
the task sequence correctly at the DP step but kept using the device interface incorrectly. 
The occurrence of this error is discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
4 Discussion
The obtained overall error rate of 16% for PCEs (56 out of 341 opportunities) in the 
current experiment exceeds the 5% systematicity criterion and it is considerably higher 
than that generated in Experiment 6a (about 1%; 3 out of 220 opportunities). The current 
error rate obtained from trials without interruptions (8.6%; 8 out of 93 opportunities) is 
also comparable to the 9.3% (13 out of 140 opportunities) obtained in Byrne & Bovair’s 
(1997) Experiment 1, which did not have working memory load manipulation. We can 
claim with reasonable confidence that the current paradigm has successfully generated 
PCEs at a level that allows investigation in a laboratory setting.
A significant difference was found in the PCE rate between the different interruption 
positions. As predicted in the original hypothesis, the results suggest that it is more likely 
for a PCE to occur when the task was being interrupted just-before  (position Z) the 
execution of the PC step than any other positions during the task (positions P, Q, R, S or 
T). This finding can be explained in terms of Altmann & Trafton’s framework of AGM; 
the low PCE rate in trials with no interruptions or with interruptions at other earlier 
positions in the task is because upon task resumption there are still remaining procedures 
to be carried out until task completion, and when the preceding step of the PC step is 
executed this provides associative priming to the PC action. The results suggest that as 
long as the associative link between the PC step and its preceding step are not disrupted, 
interruptions occurring early in the task are not likely to increase the occurrences of PCE. 
Evidence comes from the data showing that there was no reliable difference in trials with 
interruption Other and no interruptions in terms of PCE occurrences; this finding is
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consistent with the AGM model’s notion of associative priming between task steps in 
routine procedural tasks.
On the other hand, interruptions just before the PC step will have disrupted the 
associative priming from its preceding step and upon task resumption the goal of 
executing the PC step will have decayed below retrieval threshold. Moreover, the task 
environment indicates the task has been completed with a signal prompting one to collect 
the next order from the Call Centre. As a consequence, when returning to the interrupted 
task, the goal of moving on to the next task is more likely to be primed by the completion 
signal than the goal of executing the PC step, because its associative links with the 
preceding step had been disrupted and underwent considerable decay. This highlights a 
situation where one relies on cues in the environment to resume a disrupted task; 
however, the environmental cues are priming a new task goal, whereas the PC goal 
requires priming from memory cues. This provides support to the idea that the execution 
of a PC step requires some kind of “deliberate” process so that the error can be avoided 
most of the time (Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Young, 1994).
In the previous experiment, the difference in resumption times between the PC step and 
non-PC steps was found to be significant in the condition with the 75-sec mental 
arithmetic interruption. The same pattern of results was found: resumption of the PC step 
is quicker than resumption of the non-PC steps. This provides further support for the 
explanation that when resuming after an interruption at any of the positions during the 
task (position P, Q, R, S or T), the encoding demands for these sub-task points were 
greater because there was no differential information indicating the current state of the 
task. On the other hand, the interruption at position Z occurred after the task was 
completed and the encoding demand for the remaining PC step should be relatively less 
because it is a ‘standalone’ step with no similar steps to be differentiated from. However, 
this finding might be a by-product of the design of the experimental task rather than 
general to all procedural PC tasks. For example, in the general case of a photocopying 
task, completion of other task steps (e.g. entering how many copies are to be 
photocopied) might also result in cues (e.g. feedback from a small screen) differentiating 
one’s current state in the overall task, which could facilitate one’s resumption time after
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an interruption. Therefore, in this photocopying example, it is not just the PC step that has 
differential cues but other task steps as well.
Nonetheless, the main message from the observed faster resumption at the PC step than at 
non-PC steps in the current experiment is that it suggests the participants use cues in the 
task environment upon resuming an interrupted task. This is also consistent with the data 
on the qualitative pattern of resumption after interruption position Z: that all occurrences 
of forgetting to execute the PC step involved moving on to the Call Centre rather than 
carrying out any other actions. This suggests the presence of the completion signal has 
achieved its purpose in urging one to move on to the next task goal.
Further analysis into other procedural errors in the task has shed some light onto the 
question regarding whether PCEs are unique to the effect of interruption position. When 
treating all other errors as non-PCEs the result suggests that they were sensitive to the 
position of the interruption; more errors occurred immediately after an interruption. The 
same general disruptive effect of interruption was obtained for non-PCEs as well as for 
PCEs.
When the non-PCEs were subjected to finer grain analysis categorising them into 
different error types by their pattern of occurrences, it was found that incorrect-sequence 
errors were also sensitive to interruption position. Furthermore, the interaction between 
error type and interruption position was found not to be significant suggesting that PCEs 
and incorrect-sequence errors were equally sensitive to the disruptive effect of 
interruption. Both kinds of error were more likely to occur immediately after an 
interruption than later after or having no interruption at all. This suggests that resuming 
the PC step immediately after an interruption is similar to resuming the correct sequential 
step in the task; in other words, the correct resumption depends on whether the 
associative links between consecutive task steps in memory remain intact or not. The 
similarity between PCE and incorrect-sequence error with respect to interruption position 
suggests that, immediately after an interruption, the associative link between the to-be- 
carried out step and its preceding step is disrupted. As a result, one forgets which task 
step had been executed which leads to difficulty in retrieving the next correct step.
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In contrast to PCE and incorrect-sequence error, the occurrence of skip-selector error was 
found to be independent of the effect of interruption position. The error was not more 
likely to occur immediately after an interruption. This kind of error has an interesting 
property that it is not an error of executing the incorrect task sequence, but an error of 
using the interface incorrectly. Strong evidence supporting this notion comes from data 
showing that almost all of the errors at the very first compartment (“Selector DP”) were 
skip-selector errors and only a few were incorrect-sequence errors. This suggests that one 
remembers quite well the Dough Port compartment as the first operation in the task 
sequence, but still forgets the correct way of using the interface: selecting the desired 
compartment using the “Selector” first. The occurrence of the skip-selector error provides 
a neat contrast to PCE highlighting that PCE is not a result of deficiency in one’s 
knowledge about the interface, but an error of forgetting one’s place in the task sequence.
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Experiment 6c7: The effect of interruption duration 
1 Introduction
Experiment 6b successfully generates PCE and produces the interruption position effect 
on the error as predicted by the AGM model. The disruptive effect of an interruption is 
explained in terms of the decay of activation of goal memory. The time-based decay 
process specified in the AGM model suggests that the longer a memory item is left 
unrehearsed (or unretrieved), the more its activation decays. The next experiment in the 
series investigates the effect of the duration of an interrupting activity on PCE.
This experiment is a continuation of Experiment 6b examining the effect of two different 
interruption durations: 45 seconds and 15 seconds. Based on the AGM model, the 
following hypothesis is made about the effects of interruption position and duration:
With an interruption duration long enough for a memory item to decay below retrieval 
threshold, the interruption position effect should persist —  there is more likely to be a 
PCE immediately after an interruption just before the PC step than an interruption 
occurring earlier in the task. On the other hand, the effect should disappear if the 
interruption duration is too short for substantial decay to take place —  interruptions 
occurring just before the PC step should not be any more likely to give rise to PCEs than 
interruptions occurring earlier in a task. More specifically, we should expect an 
interaction effect between interruption position and duration on PCE if a 15-sec 
interruption is too short for any substantial decay of memory.
Furthermore, analysis on non-PCEs from the previous experiment suggests that some of 
these errors are sensitive to the disruptive effect of interruption. Therefore, it is expected 
that the same general result for non-PCEs will be obtained in the current experiment. 
More specifically, the occurrences of skip-selector errors should be independent of 
interruption. The occurrences of incorrect-sequence errors should be sensitive to the 
effect of interruption such that we should expect an interaction effect between
7 This experiment was administered by Aliza Abeles as part o f her undergraduate project. The 
design and data analysis of the experiment are the author’s original work.
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interruption position and duration if the 15-sec interruption is too short for memory of the 
next task step to decay.
2 Method
2.1 Design
The experiment is a mixed design. It has two independent variables; the within-subject 
variable is interruption position with three levels; Z, Other and Nil. The between-subject 
variable is the duration of the interruption with two levels; Short (15 seconds) or Long 
(45 seconds).
2.2 Participants
There were 24 participants and they were randomly allocated to either condition Short or 
Long (12 in each condition). Participants were university undergraduates and 
postgraduates, age ranging from 20-24 with a mean age of 21.4 years. None of the 
participants had taken part in the previous experiments.
2.3 Materials and procedures
Adjustments were made to the computer program to change the duration of the 
interruption to 15 seconds for the Short interruption condition and 45 seconds for the 
Long interruption condition. In all other ways, the tasks, apparatus and procedures were 
as described in Experiment 6b.
2.4 Measures
The dependent measure of primary interest is the same as Experiment 6b, namely, the 
number of PCEs. Resumption times and other errors are also of interest and recorded.
3 Results
The data from one participant in the Long condition and two participants in the Short 
condition were removed as they made a PCE on every trial suggesting that they had not 
correctly understood the task.
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3.1 Overall errors
A total of 286 errors were obtained across the 21 participants. More than half of the 
participants (16 out of 21) committed at least one PCE yielding a total of 71 PCEs. About 
25% of the total errors were accounted for by the occurrences of PCE. A Binomial test (p 
= 0.05) shows the occurrences of PCE is above chance level, z = 15.38, p < .001.
As in Experiment 6b, there were 11 trials for each participant and this gives 231 error 
opportunities for each task step in calculating the error rates. Figure 6.11 below shows the 
distribution of the error rates for each task step.
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Figure 6.11: Error rate o f each task step.
A consistent pattern of error rates across the task steps as Experiment 6b was obtained; 
the “Selector DP” step has the highest error rate (about 45%) followed by the PC step 
(“Clean”; about 30%). Error rates at the other “Selector” steps either exceed the 5% 
systematicity criterion or just about reach the criterion. Errors at the “DP ProgBar filling” 
are also near the criterion but they are not to be further pursued for the same reason as 
mentioned in Experiment 6b; the occurrence of these errors suggests the participants may 
be impatient. Further pursuit of this error is not the focus of this study and is probably not 
going to help the understanding of PCEs.
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3.2 Interruption position effect on PCE
Table 6.11 shows the number of PCEs and their error rates in relation to the different 
interruption positions and durations.
Interruption position
Z Other Nil
No of PCEs
Short °J. 
interruption opportunrties)
16
(40)
8
(40)
6
(30)
(15secs) Mean error rate 40.0% 20.0% 20.0%
(SD) (39.4) (30.7) (28.1)
No of PCEs
Lonq (n0- o f
interruption opportunities)
23
(44)
12
(44)
6
(33)
(45secs) Mean error rate 52.2% 27.3% 18.2%
(SD) (48.0) (30.5) (31.1)
Table 6.11: Number of PCEs and their error rates with respect to different interruption positions
in the two experimental conditions.
PCE rates were calculated for the three different interruption positions for each 
participant in the two conditions. The error rates were analysed using a mixed 2 x 3  
ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of interruption position (F( 1.504, 28.568) = 
7.166, p  = .002) with a large effect size (Eta squared = .274). Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was used due to violation of sphericity. Planned contrasts, across the two 
conditions, revealed significant difference between Z and Other (r(20) = 2.576,/? = .018) 
and Z versus Nil (r(20) = 3.324, p  = .003). There was no significant difference between 
Other and Nil (r(20) = .946, p = .355).
There was no main effect of interruption duration (F(l,19) = .215, p  = .648). The data in 
both duration conditions, show that in trials where there was no interruption, or where the 
interruption occurs in any of the Other positions, one would not expect any difference 
between the groups in terms of the error rate. In trials where the interruption occurs
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immediately before the PC step, there was an increase in the error rate. Although the 
predicted effect of interruption duration on PCE was not significant, the trend of the data 
shows a relatively higher PCE rate in each interruption position in condition Long than 
condition Short.
The interaction, interruption position x duration, was not statistically significant (F( 1.504, 
28.568) = .436, p  = .595) suggesting that the effect of interruption position on PCE did 
not differ between the two interruption durations.
3.3 PCE and non-PCE resumption pattern
Two of the 39 PCEs that occurred after interruption Z had slightly different resumption 
patterns to the operationalised criterion: the “Next Order” button was clicked before the 
Call Centre task was carried out. Despite the difference, they show a qualitatively 
consistent resumption pattern: that of getting the next order rather than performing other 
actions in the task. This suggests a systematic bias towards committing a PCE after 
interruption Z. The systematic bias suggests that cues in the external task environment 
might prompt participants about the completion of the task. In contrast, over 50% (15 out 
of 27) of the non-PCEs that occurred immediately after an interruption involved repeating 
the preceding task step, i.e. selecting a previously operated compartment. There was not a 
consistent resumption pattern in the remainder. The trend of resumption patterns in the 
current experiment is consistent with that of Experiment 6b.
3.4 Resumption times between different task steps
Like the analyses on resumption times carried out in Experiment 6b, the current analyses 
were performed on correct resumption data only to eliminate potential biases from 
incorrect resumption behaviour. The exclusion of reaction times from incorrect 
resumptions yielded valid data from 8 participants in condition Short and 6 participants in 
condition Long. These participants resume correctly at least once for both PC step and 
non-PC steps.
Table 6.12 shows the mean resumption times for PC and non-PC steps in the Short and 
Long conditions. A 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA yielded a large significant main effect of task 
step on resumption times, F (l, 12) = 33.904, p < .001, Eta squared = .739. There was no
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significant difference between conditions Short and Long, F( 1, 12) = 1.619, p = .227. The 
interaction, interruption position x duration, was found not to be significant, F (l, 12) = 
.001,/? = .973.
PC step Non-PC step
2.8s 5.7s
Short
(0.6) (1-8)
3.8s 6.6s
Long
(LI) (2.7)
Table 6.12: Mean resumption times (standard deviation in bracket! after interruptions Z and
Other.
However, in order to avoid possible confounding effects from different physical 
movement times between the interruption positions, the same movement times estimated 
in Experiment 6b (0.31s and 0.67s for PC step an non-PC step respectively) were 
removed from the resumption times. Table 6.13 shows the mean resumption times with 
the estimated movement times removed.
PC step Non-PC step
2.5s 5.0s
Short
(0.6) (L8)
3.5s 6.0s
Long
(1.1) (2.7)
Table 6.13: Mean resumption times with estimated movement times removed (standard deviation
in bracket! after interruption Z and Other.
The same results were obtained: a large significant main effect of interruption position 
was found (F (l, 12) = 25.93, p  < .001, Eta squared = .684); there was no reliable 
difference between conditions Short and Long (F (l, 12) = 1.619, p  = .227); and the 
interaction was found not to be significant (F (l, 12) = .001,/? = .973). Simple effect
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analysis yielded a reliable difference in conditions Short (r(7) = 5.044, p  = .001) and Long 
(f(5) = 2.68 l ,p  = .044).
3.5 Interruption position effect on non-PCE
Just as Experiment 6b, the effect of interruption position was also assessed against the 
obtained non-PCEs. There were a total of 215 non-PCEs across the two interruption 
duration conditions: 84 in condition Short and 131 in condition Long. For each condition, 
the non-PCEs were categorised into “immediately after interruption”, “later after 
interruption” and “no interruption” (including errors before an interruption as well as 
errors from trials with no interruption). The procedures for counting the error occurrences 
and calculating their respective error opportunities are the same as Experiment 6b.
Table 6.14 below shows the number and mean error rates in relation to the different 
interruption position. In the two conditions, more than half of the errors in the “no 
interruption” category (41 out of 67 in condition Short, 62 out of 107 in condition Long) 
consist of errors occurring at “Selector DP” (step [2]); for the same reason as the previous 
experiment’s analysis, these errors and their error opportunities are excluded from the 
following analysis.
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Interruption position Total no. of non-PCE
Immediately Later No 
after after interruption
No
interruption’'
Short
Total no. of non- 
PCE
(no. of opportunities)
Mean error rate 
(SD)
10
(40)
25%
(23.6)
7
267
2.6%
(4.0)
67
(1783)
3.8%
(2.0)
84 26(1673)
1.6%
(1.4)
Total no. of non- 18 6 107 45
Long
PCE
(no. of opportunities) (44) (261) (1994)
131 (1873)
Mean error rate 41% 2.4% 5.4% 2.4
(SD) (30.2) (3.2) (2.6) (1.5)
*This “no interruption ” category excludes errors at “Selector DP  ” step
Table 6.14: Number of non-PCEs and their mean error rates with respect to the different
interruption positions.
A 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was performed on the mean error rates and yielded a large 
significant main effect of interruption position, F(1.016, 19.302) = 25.895, p < .001, Eta 
squared = .577. The assumption of sphericity was violated; therefore, the Greenhouse- 
Geisser correction was adopted. Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed 
a reliable difference between “immediately after” and “later after”, and “immediately 
after” vs “no interruption”. No significant difference was detected between “later after” 
and “no interruption”.
The main effect of interruption duration was found not to be significant, F (l, 19) = 1.925, 
p  = .181. There was no significant interaction between interruption position and duration, 
F( 1.016, 19.302) = 1.675,/? = .211.
3.6 Categorisation of non-PCE
The obtained non-PCEs in the two experimental conditions were classified into different 
kinds of errors as in Experiment 6b: the identification of the errors was based on the first 
mouse-click at a task step. The same four categories of errors were identified (skip-
207
Chapter 6 — The effect o f interruption on post-completion error: Experiment 6c
selector, incorrect-sequence, skip-and-incorrect and miscellaneous) as the previous study; 
Table 6.15 summarises the number of occurrences and the approximate relative 
proportions in condition Short and Long. Consistent with the pattern of results in 
Experiment 6b, the majority of the non-PCEs were selector-step errors. The relatively 
small proportion of miscellaneous errors consists of errors occurring at various task steps.
Selector-step errors Miscellaneouserrors
Skip-selector Incorrect-sequence 
error error
Skip-and-incorrect
error
Short
No. of 
errors 61 4 5 14
Proportion 72% 5% 6% 17%
Long
No. of 
errors 91 17 1 22
Proportion 69% 13% 1% 17%
Table 6.15: The number and relative proportion (%) o f the different error kinds in condition Short
and Long.
3.7 Interruption position effect on selector-step errors
As in the analysis carried out in Experiment 6b, the obtained selector-step errors are 
subjected to finer detail analysis according to the identified error categories. The same 
logic and procedures of error count and error opportunities calculations are adopted.
3.7.1 Skip-selector errors
In both interruption duration conditions, more than half of the skip-selector errors 
occurred at the “Selector DP” step: 40 out of 61 in condition Short, and 61 out of 91 in 
condition Long. As in the way these errors were dealt with in Experiment 6b, they are 
excluded from the following analysis because the interruption manipulation did not occur 
before the “Selector DP” step. Analysis including these errors would confound 
comparisons between the different interruption positions.
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Table 6.16 shows the number and mean error rate of skip-selector errors with respect to 
the interruption positions.
Interruption position
Immediately Later No 
after after interruption
Total no. of Skip-selector error 3 4 14
Short
(Total no. of opportunities) (33) (56) (351)
Mean error rate 9.2% 7.0% 4.0%
(SD) (14.9) (12.0) (4.7)
Total no. of Skip-selector error 4 5 21
Long
(Total no. of opportunities) (36) (51) (397)
Mean error rate 9.8% 10.9% 5.4%
(SD) (17.8) (17.3) (5.8)
Table 6.16: Number and mean error rates o f skip-selector errors according to different 
interruption position in condition Short and Long.
A 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA was carried out on the mean error rates. The main effect of 
interruption position (F(1.348, 25.608) = .84, p  = .401, with Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction) and interruption duration (F(l, 19) = .35, p  = .561) were not significant. There 
was no significant interaction effect, F( 1.348, 25.608) = .087, p  = .842. The results 
suggest that the occurrences of skip-selector errors were not sensitive to the effect of 
interruption position in condition Short and Long.
3.7.2 Incorrect-sequence errors
There was one incorrect-sequence error occurring at “Selector DP” step in condition 
Short, and it was excluded from the following analysis because it was not preceded by the 
interruption manipulation. None of the incorrect-sequence errors in condition Long 
occurred at “Selector DP” step.
As in the analysis in Experiment 6b, skip-and-incorrect errors were included in the 
analysis of incorrect-sequence errors. This is because both kinds of error have a
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commonality of executing the incorrect sequential step in the task. This yielded a total of 
8 and 18 incorrect-sequence errors in condition Short and Long respectively. Table 6.17 
shows the number and mean error rates of incorrect-sequence error in the two 
experimental conditions with respect to the interruption positions.
Interruption position
Immediately Later No 
after after interruption
Total no. of Incorrect-sequence error 3 1 4
Short
(Total no. of opportunities) (40) (89) (421)
Mean error rate 7.5% 1.3% 0.9%
(SD) (12.1) (4.0) (2.9)
Total no. of Incorrect-sequence error 13 0 5
Long
(Total no. of opportunities) (44) (87) (474)
Mean error rate 29.5% 0% 1.1%
(SD) (29.2) (0) (1.2)
Table 6.17: The number and mean error rates of incorrect-sequence error according to the 
different interruption positions in the two experimental conditions.
A 2 x 3 ANOVA on the mean error rates yielded a large significant main effect of 
interruption position, F(1.003, 19.054) = 12.562, p  = .002, Eta squared = .398, with 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction. There was a marginal significant main effect of 
interruption duration, F (l, 19) = 4.227, p  = .054. The interaction, interruption position x 
duration, was also found to be significant, F(1.003, 19.054) = 5.127, p  -  .035, Eta 
squared = .212, with Greenhouse-Geisser correction. The significant interaction suggests 
that the effect of interruption position on incorrect-sequence errors might be sensitive to 
the effect of interruption duration.
Simple effect analysis revealed no significant effect of interruption position in condition 
Short, F(1.007, 9.062) = 2.33, p  = .161, with Greenhouse-Geisser correction. A 
nonparametric test was used in analysing the effect of interruption position in condition 
Long because of the occurrence of zero variance in one of the interruption position cells.
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Post hoc comparisons using Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, with Bonferroni correction, 
yielded reliable differences between “ “immediately after” versus “no interruption”.
The results suggest that there was an effect of interruption position on incorrect-sequence 
error in condition Long but not in condition Short. Moreover, the interruption position 
effect on the error was found to be consistent with the predicted direction: an increase in 
the error immediately after an interruption. The marginally significant difference between 
“later after” and “no interruption” is contrary to the predicted trend. However, 
interpretation of this result needs caution because the difference between the two 
interruption positions is relatively small, and the floor rate of error in “later after” is likely 
to be contributing most to the significant difference.
3.8 Errors at “Selector DP” step
Across the two interruption duration conditions, a total of 103 errors occurred at the very 
first compartment step — “Selector DP”. The same consistent pattern as Experiment 6b 
was obtained; that over 95% (101/103) of the errors at “Selector DP” step were skip- 
selector errors and the remaining two were incorrect-sequence error and miscellaneous 
error.
4 Discussion
The results suggest that interruptions occurring just before the PC step are more likely to 
result in PCEs than interruptions occurring at other positions in the task. The effect is 
robust in that it is replicated in the current experiment. Both the 15-second and 45-second 
interruptions are of sufficient length to result in an increase in PCEs when interrupted at 
position Z -  almost twice the rate -  than at Other and Nil. Although the results suggest a 
trend in the predicted direction, that the length of the interruption itself can also influence 
the error rate: higher in the 45-second duration than the 15-second duration, the results 
did not show the anticipated interaction effect between interruption position and duration. 
This suggests that the shorter interruption is not short enough to have a significantly 
reduced effect on the PCE rate.
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Although the trend of the resumption time data suggests faster resumption times after the 
15-second interruption than the 45-second interruption, there was no statistical difference 
in resumption times between the two interruption durations. Monk & Trafton (2004) 
showed that even very brief interruption of 5 seconds results in reliably slower 
resumption time than 1/4-second and 1-second interruptions, and the current findings are 
consistent with the general observation in that cognitive overheads, in terms of increased 
resumption times, are associated with interruptions. However, conclusion regarding the 
difference in resumption times between the 15-second and 45-second interruptions needs 
caution. This is because of the overall small sample of valid data for a between-subject 
comparison (six valid data points in condition Short and eight in condition Long), due to 
the exclusion of resumption times from incorrect resumption data in the current data set.
Faster resumption times of the PC step than other task steps are obtained and these are a 
replication of findings from previous experiments. The resumption patterns of PCEs and 
non-PCEs immediately after an interruption are also consistent with those obtained in 
Experiment 6b. These results provide support for the role of cue usage upon resuming an 
interrupted task.
Analysis on non-PCEs produced results consistent with those of Experiment 6b, 
suggesting that these errors are also sensitive to the disruptive effect of interruption. 
There were, generally, more errors immediately after an interruption than some time later 
after an interruption or no interruption at all. This was found to be the same for the 15- 
second interruption and the 45-second interruption. Finer grain analysis of non-PCEs 
obtained the same result on skip-selector error: the occurrence of this kind of error is not 
sensitive to the effect of interruption position. The same result was found in the two 
interruption duration conditions.
Consistent with the results from Experiment 6b, the effect of interruption position was 
found to be significant in the analysis of incorrect-sequence error. There were reliably 
more incorrect-sequence errors immediately after an interruption than some time later 
after an interruption or with no interruption at all. The difference in the occurrence of 
incorrect-sequence errors between the two different interruption durations was found to 
be marginally significant. Moreover, the significant interaction effect between
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interruption position and duration reveal that the interruption position effect was present 
in the 45-second condition but less so in the 15-second condition. This suggests that the 
disruptive effect of interruption on incorrect-sequence error has lessened with the shorter 
interruption duration. Although the trend of the data shows more errors immediately after 
an interruption than some time later after an interruption or no interruption at all, the 
increase in incorrect-sequence error rate with an immediately preceding interruption did 
not reach statistical significance. This finding is consistent with the prediction made from 
the AGM model: with short-enough interruption duration the to-be-resumed goal would 
have undergone the time-based decay process, but not so much that it is no longer the 
most active goal in memory. Therefore, the to-be-resumed goal still has a high-enough 
level of activation to be the most active memory element upon task resumption and gets 
retrieved successfully.
There was no significant difference in PCE rate between the two duration conditions in 
the current experiment: evidence that even relatively short interruptions can result in a 
significant increase in PCE rate immediately after an interruption. The initially predicted 
interaction effect between interruption position and duration was not obtained with 
respect to PCE; however, it was present with the analysis of incorrect-sequence error. 
Results from Experiment 6b suggest that both kinds of error —  PCEs and incorrect- 
sequence errors —  are sensitive to the interruption position effect. Current results confirm 
this finding but also further suggest that these two kinds of error are differentially 
sensitive to the duration of an interruption. The currently adopted short interruption 
duration of 15 seconds was found to be disruptive to incorrect-sequence errors but not 
PCEs. The observed difference between the two kinds of errors due to different 
interruption durations is a surprise finding and is not predicted by the AGM model. As a 
speculation, the observed difference between the two kinds of errors suggests that 
remembering to execute the PC step might be more vulnerable to interruption than 
remembering ones place in a task sequence during task execution. In terms of a time- 
based decay process, as specified in the AGM model, memory for a PC step might decay 
faster or have a lower activation value than memory for maintaining one’s place in the 
task sequence. However, this explanation is highly speculative and requires further 
experimentation to test out the assumption before a conclusion can be made.
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The current experiment obtained an overall PCE rate of about 34% (41 out of 121 
opportunities) in the 45-second interruption condition and about 27% (30 out of 110 
opportunities) in the 15-second condition. The PCEs rates in these two interruption 
durations are higher than that obtained in Experiment 6b’s 75-second interruption, which 
is about 16% (56 out of 341 opportunities). The trend of the PCE rate in these different 
interruption durations suggests the contrary to the prediction made by the AGM model: 
the shorter an interruption duration the lesser the disruptive effect of the interruption, 
consequently, fewer PCEs obtained. The generally higher PCE rate in the current 
experiment might be explained by the fact that a different experimenter administered this 
experiment and that the participants were not paid for their participations. These factors 
might have had a motivational effect on the participants resulting in an overall higher 
PCE rate than the previous experiment. As a consequence, this makes comparison of the 
results of the current experiment and Experiment 6b impractical. All in all, results from 
the current experiment should be interpreted in their own right for this very reason.
In Experiment 6b the primary doughnut-making task was modified to address issues 
discussed in the analytic comparison made between the doughnut-making task and the 
Phaser task, such as the prominence of the PC step button, the separation of testing trials 
with an additional task, and the presence of a competing signal. The successful generation 
of PCEs using the modified version of the doughnut-making task allows investigation of 
interruption position (Experiment 6b) and interruption duration (Experiment 6c) to be 
carried out. However, the issue of a less-well-practised PC step identified in the analytical 
comparison remains to be addressed and this is what the next experiment set out to 
examine.
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Experiment 6d: A change to the PC step
1 Introduction
In the Phaser task used in Byrne & Bovair’s study, there is a peculiar feature to its task 
structure such that participants were required to repeat all the steps in the task, except the 
PC step, until the task is completed. We term this task structure a “cyclic” task structure 
because when the task is not completed, the participant could be stuck in a “loop” cycling 
through a set of procedures repeatedly. The PC step is executed only when the task has 
been completed, which means that the execution of the PC step is relatively less well 
practised than the other steps in the task. In contrast, the PC step in the doughnut-making 
task was to be executed after only one cycle of executing all the steps in the task, so the 
PC step receives as much practice as all other steps in the procedure. It is the very feature 
of a less-well-practised PC step that might be one of the contributing factors to the 
effectiveness of the Phaser task in provoking PCEs.
In the current experiment, the same primary tasks (Doughnut Machine and Call Centre), 
interruption task (Doughnut Packing Express) and interruption duration (75 seconds) as 
Experiment 6b were used. Only one modification was made to the Doughnut Machine 
task: the requirement of the PC action (cleaning the Doughnut Machine after each order) 
is conditional upon the presence of a notification signal at the beginning of each trial. The 
notification of the need to clean the Doughnut Machine only appears in 1/3 of the total 
number of trials; as a consequence, the need to carry out the PC step is less frequent 
relative to other steps in the task.
The objective of this experiment is to mimic the less-well-practised PC step in Byrne and 
Bovair’s Phaser task by including a conditional PC step in the current task paradigm. It is 
expected that, with all else being equal, the effect of interruption position on PCE will be 
replicated and a general increase of PCE rate will be obtained relative to Experiment 6b. 
Moreover, a replication of the result on non-PCEs should also be expected: skip-selector 
error not affected by interruption, whereas the occurrence of incorrect-sequence error is 
sensitive to an immediately preceding interruption.
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2 Method
2.1 Tasks
The tasks used in this experiment, namely the interrupting doughnut-packing task and the 
Call Centre task were identical to the ones used in Experiment 6b. The doughnut-making 
task used in the current experiment is a variant of the one used in the previous 
experiment. The basic procedures in operating the machine to make doughnuts are the 
same but the PC step (clicking the Clean button) is not required to be executed in every 
single trial; it is only required when specified at the beginning of 1/3 of the total number 
of trials. Figure 6.12 shows the screenshot at the beginning of a trial requiring the PC step 
to be carried out when the task is completed.
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Figure 6.12: Screen transitions of the beginning of a PC trial.
In a trial requiring the PC step (a PC trial), when the Call centre task is completed and 
returning to the doughnut-making machine, once the “Show Order” button is clicked a
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message saying “There is some gunk in the machine, please clean it after this order” will 
be displayed specifying that one should carry out the PC step of clicking the “Clean” 
button when the task is completed.
2.2 Design
The basic design of the current experiment is the same as Experiment 6b in that it is a 
within-subject design with one independent variable —  interruption position —  which 
has three levels: Just-Before (position Z), Other (position P, Q, R, S or T) and None (no 
interruption).
The current experimental design differs in terms of its trial composition. Each 
experimental session consists of 18 trials in the testing phase: 6 PC trials and 12 non-PC 
trials. Table 6.18 summarises the distribution of the interruption positions among the PC 
and non-PC trials.
6 PC Trials 12 non-PC Trials
Distribution of
2 trials with 
position Z
interruption 2 trials with interruption 
position Z
interruptions 
among trials
2 trials with 
position Other
interruption 2 trials with interruption 
position Other
2 trials with no interruptions 8 trials with no interruptions
Table 6.18: The distribution of interruption positions among the 18 trials in one testing session.
The rationale for the particular design of trial composition is that the execution of the PC 
step is only required in 1/3 of the trials, making it a less frequently executed step relative 
to all other steps in the task. The order of trial presentation was randomised. In order to 
maintain the duration of the experiment to be about the same as the previous experiment 
(about an hour), each trial only requires one to make one set of doughnut instead of two 
sets as in the previous two experiments.
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2.3 Materials
The materials used were the same as Experiment 6b’s, that is two different computer 
terminals: an HP Desktop and a Compaq desktop were used. The doughnut machine 
program and the doughnut-packing program were run on the HP desktop and the Call 
Centre was run on the Compaq desktop. The two computer terminals were arranged at a 
90° configuration.
2.4 Participants
37 participants, either university undergraduate or postgraduate students, took part in this 
study. Ages ranged from 21 to 48 with a mean of 26.2. There were 18 female and 19 
male. None of the participants had taken part in the previous experiments. All participants 
were paid £6 for their participations.
2.5 Procedure
The procedures were very similar to Experiment 6b with some slight changes. 
Participants read some documents describing the experiment then went through a 
demonstration and training phase. Participants first observed the experimenter performing 
both the doughnut-making and the doughnut-packing task separately. The experimenter 
performed two trials (one PC and one non-PC trial) on the doughnut-making task during 
the demonstration phase. Participants were then given three training trials on the 
doughnut-making task: two without and one with the interrupting doughnut-packing task. 
The two training trials without interruption were one non-PC and one PC trial; the trial 
with interruption was a PC trial. Any errors that occur in this training phase result in on­
screen warning messages and beeps; participants were required to identify and correct the 
error in order to continue. The experimenter was present in the room with the participant 
during training, and the participant was allowed to ask questions about the tasks if 
necessary.
In the testing phase, participants were required to perform 18 trials in total and the 
experimenter left the participant to carry on the session alone at this point. The entire 
experiment took approximately an hour.
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2.6 Measures
The same dependent measures as the previous experiments were used: number of PCEs, 
resumption times and other errors.
3 Results
A total of three participants’ data was excluded from analysis. One participant did not 
perform the task according to the instructions, one participant terminated the experiment 
without completing the entire session and one participant had a lost data file.
The design of the current experiment consists of PC trials and non-PC trials; therefore, 
the results are presented and analysed according to the two trial types. Data from the PC 
trials are presented first, followed by data from the non-PC trials.
3.1 Analysis of PC trials
3.1.1 Overall errors
A total of 245 errors were obtained in the PC trials across the 34 participants. More than 
half of the participants (24 out of 34) made at least one PCE yielding a total of 56 PCEs. 
The PCEs account for about 23% of the total number of errors. A Binomial test shows the 
occurrence of PCE is above chance level, z = 12.82, p  < .001. Figure 6.13 shows the error 
rate of each individual task step8. Since there were 6 PC trials for each participant, this 
gives 204 error opportunities for each task step in calculating the error rates.
8 Task step [2] and [20] involve clicking on a modal dialog box, which do not afford errors to 
occur. Therefore, both steps are excluded from the analysis.
219
Chapter 6 — The effect o f interruption on post-completion error: Experiment 6d
40 -j
35 - 
30 -
Task step
Figure 6.13: Error rate of each task step in PC trials.
The pattern of errors occurring across the task steps is consistent with the pattern from 
Experiment 6b; errors at the “Selector DP” have the highest error rate (about 36%), 
followed by errors at the PC step (“Clean”; about 27%). Other errors that have an error 
rate exceeding the 5% criterion are mostly occurring at one of the “Selector” steps. Error 
at step [6] also reached systematicity but, just as in the previous experiments, this error is 
not to be further analysed because it is symptomatic of participants being impatient: not 
waiting long enough for the progress bar to fill up before carrying out the next action. The 
nature of this error is not of particular interest to the current thesis.
3.1.2 Interruption position effect on PCE
Table 6.19 shows the number and error rate of PCE in relation to the different 
interruption positions. Each participant received 2 trials for each interruption position; the 
total number of opportunities are computed across all 34 participants.
220
Chapter 6 — The effect o f interruption on post-completion error: Experiment 6d
Interruption position
Z Other Nil
Total no. of PCE 28 12 16
(Total no. of opportunities) (68) (68) (68)
Mean error rate 41.2% 17.6% 23.5%
(SD) (43.5) (30.0) (30.7)
SD = Standard deviation
Table 6.19: Number of PCE and their mean error rates with respect to the different interruption
positions.
A one-way repeated ANOVA yielded a large significant main effect of interruption 
position, F{2, 66) = 4.938, p = .01, Eta squared = .13. Planned comparisons between 
positions Z and Other showed a reliable difference, r(33) = 2.61, p  = .014, and difference 
between positions Z and Nil was also significant, t(33) = 2.244, p  = .032. Comparison 
between positions Other and Nil did not show a reliable difference, t(33) = .941, p  = .353. 
The overall pattern of results is consistent with the previous experiments.
3.1.3 PCE and non-PCE resumption pattern
There was one error occurring at the PC step after interruption Z, which involved 
omitting the PC step but the resumed action was not at the Call Centre, instead it was at 
one of the steps in the doughnut-making task. This error was not classified as a PCE, but 
as a non-PCE for later analysis, because it did not follow the operational criteria which 
required responding to the Call Centre when the PC step was omitted. All other PCEs that 
occurred immediately after interruption Z had the same pattern of resumption: they were 
errors omitting the PC step and moving on to the Call Centre task.
In contrast there was a qualitatively different resumption pattern in the non-PCEs that 
occurred immediately after an interruption; 38% (13 out of 34) involved resuming to the 
task step just before the interruption, and the remainder lacked a consistent pattern of 
resumption. The trends of the results are consistent with those obtained in the previous 
experiment. This further confirms that the cues in the task environment play a part in 
resuming an interrupted task.
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3.1.4 Resumption times between different task steps
Just as in previous experiments, the analysis of resumption times was carried out on 
correct resumption data only to avoid potential biases from incorrect resumption 
behaviour. Valid data from 15 participants were subjected to analysis, these participants 
resumed correctly at least once for the PC step and the non-PC steps.
Table 6.20 shows the mean resumption times for PC and non-PC steps. The same pattern 
of results was obtained as the previous experiments; resumption times between the task 
steps was found to be significantly different, t( 14) = 4.365, p  = .001.
PC step Non-PC step
Mean resumption time 3.4s 7.1s
(SD) (1.2) (2.7)
Table 6.20: Mean resumption times after interruption Z and Other.
Like the analysis in the previous experiment, movement times estimated using Fitts’ Law 
were taken out from the resumption times to avoid possible confounds. The same 
movement times from the previous experiment were used because the screen and button 
layout are identical in the current experiment. Table 6.21 below shows the mean 
resumption times with the movement times taken out.
PC step Non-PC step
Mean resumption time 3.2s 6.4s
(SD) (1.2) (2.7)
Table 6.21: Mean resumption times (minus estimated movement timesl after interruption Z and
Other.
The difference between the task steps was still found to be significant, t( 14) = 3.92, p  = 
.002.
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3.1.5 Interruption position effect on non-PCE
There were a total of 189 non-PCEs and they were categorised into “immediately after 
interruption”, “later after interruption” and “no interruption” (including errors before an 
interruption). The procedures for counting the error occurrences and calculating their 
respective error opportunities are the same as the previous experiment. Table 6.22 shows 
the number and mean error rates in relation to the different interruption position. About 
half of the errors in the “no interruption” category (73 out of 144) consist of errors 
occurring at “Selector DP” (step [3]). For the same reason as the previous experiment’s 
analysis, these errors and their error opportunities are excluded from the following 
analysis.
One of the non-PCEs was a resumption error at the PC step after interruption Z, as 
mentioned earlier, this error is excluded from the analysis to avoid confounding the 
calculation of error opportunities in the “immediately after interruption” category. The 
occurrence of this error will be discussed later in the chapter.
Interruption position Total no. of non-PCE
Immediately
after
Later
after
No
interruption No interruption*
Total no. of non-PCE 
(Total no. of opportunities)
34
(68)
10
(372)
144
(3436) 188
71
(3232)
Mean error rate 
(SD)
50.0%
(44.4)
3.1%
(6.8)
4.2%
(3.5)
2.2%
(2.4)
*This “no interruption" category excludes errors at “Selector DP" step
Table 6.22: Number of non-PCEs and their mean error rates with respect to the different
interruption positions.
A one-way repeated ANOVA was performed and obtained a large significant main effect. 
The data did not conform to the assumption of sphericity; therefore, the Greenhouse- 
Geisser correct was used; F(1.028, 33.918) = 40.875, p < .001, Eta squared = .553. Post 
hoc comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed a reliable difference between
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“immediately after” and “later after”, and “immediately after” versus “no interruption” 
also yielded a significant difference. There was no reliable difference between “later 
after” and “no interruption”. The result of interruption position effect on non-PCEs is 
consistent with the finding from the previous study.
3.1.6 Categorisation of non-PCE
The same analysis on the obtained non-PCEs was carried out as in the previous 
experiments. The identification of the errors was based on the first mouse-click at a task 
step. The same four categories of errors (skip-selector, incorrect sequence, skip-and- 
incorrect and miscellaneous) were identified as in the previous study and their number of 
occurrences and relative proportions are summarised in Table 6.23. Consistent with the 
pattern of results of the previous experiment, the majority of the non-PCEs were selector- 
step errors. The relatively small proportion of miscellaneous errors consists of errors 
occurring at other task steps.
Selector-step errors Miscellaneouserrors
Skip-selector
error
Incorrect-sequence Skip-and-incorrect 
error error
No. of 
errors 113 44 2 30
Proportion 60% 23% 1% 16%
Table 6.23: The relative proportion (%) o f the different identified error kinds.
3.1.7 Interruption position effect on selector-step errors
Like the analysis carried out in the previous study, the obtained selector-step errors are 
subjected to finer detail analysis according to the identified error categories. The logic 
and procedures of error count and error opportunities calculations are the same as the 
previous experiment.
3.1.7.1 Skip-selector errors
More than half of the skip-selector errors (68 out of 113) occurred at “Selector DP” and 
these errors are excluded from the following analysis, for the same reason as the previous 
studies, because action executed on this step was not preceded by the interruption
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manipulation. Table 6.24 shows the number and mean error rate of skip-selector errors 
with respect to the interruption positions.
Interruption position
Immediately Later No
after after interruption
Total no. of Skip-selector errors 1 7 37
(Total no. of opportunities) (49) (73) (692)
Mean error rate 1.5% 11.5% 5.2%
(SD) (8.6) (24.1) (7.6)
Table 6.24: Number and mean error rates of skip-selector errors according to different
interruption position.
A one-way repeated ANOVA was performed and found no significant main effect of 
interruption position, F{ 1.297, 42.791) = 3.093, p  = .076 (with Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction).
3.1.7.2 Incorrect-sequence errors and PCEs
Like the analysis of the previous study, skip-and-incorrect errors were also included in 
the analysis of incorrect-sequence errors; yielding a total of 45. There were 5 incorrect- 
sequence errors occurring at “Selector DP” step, and they are excluded from the analysis. 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, there was one resumption error occurring at the PC 
step and it is also excluded from the analysis. Table 6.25 shows the number and mean 
error rates of incorrect-sequence error and PCE in relation to the interruption positions.
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Interruption position
Immediately Later No 
after after interruption
Total no. of Incorrect-sequence errors 33 0 7
(Total no. of opportunities) (68) (124) (828)
Mean error rate 48.5% 0% 0.9%
(SD) (45.2) (0) (2.2)
Total no. of PCE* 28 12 16
(Total no. of opportunities)* (68) (68) (68)
Mean error rate* 41.2% 17.6% 23.5%
(SD)* (43.5) (30.0) (30.7)
* These figures are the same figures from Table 6.19 
Table 6.25: The number and mean error rates o f incorrect-sequence errors and PCE according to
the different interruption positions.
A 2 x 3 (error type x interruption position) repeated ANOVA was performed on the error 
rates of incorrect-sequence error and PCE. A large reliable main effect of interruption 
position was found, F(1.439, 47.501) = 30.1, p  < .001, Eta squared = .477 (with 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction). A moderate significant main effect of error type was 
also found, F{ 1, 33) = 5.588, p — .024, Eta squared = .145. The interaction between error 
type and interruption position was also found to be significant with a moderate effect size, 
F{ 1.421, 46.905) = 5.381, p  = .015, Eta squared = .14 (with Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction).
A nonparametric test was used in analysing the effect of interruption position on 
incorrect-sequence error because of the occurrence of zero variance in one of the 
interruption position cells. Post hoc comparisons using Wilocoxon Signed Rank test, with 
Bonferroni corrections, obtained a reliable difference between “immediately after” versus 
“no interruption”.
The results suggest that interruption position has the same general effect on incorrect- 
sequence error as on PCE, which is consistent with the findings from the previous
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experiments. The significant interaction between incorrect-sequence error and PCE is 
likely to be due to the error rate difference between the two error types in the “later after” 
and “no interruption” categories. In the case of PCE, the mean error rates in both 
interruption categories (“later after” and “no interruption”) are higher than those in 
incorrect-sequence error. This suggests PCE has a generally higher rate of occurrence 
than incorrect-sequence error when it is not preceded immediately by an interruption.
3.1.8 Errors at “Selector DP” step
A total of 73 errors occurred at the very first compartment step — “Selector DP”. The 
same consistent pattern as the previous experiment was obtained: that over 90% (68/73) 
of the errors at “Selector DP” step were skip-selector errors and the remaining were 
incorrect-sequence errors.
3.2 Analysis of non-PC trials
3.2.1 Overall errors
Among the non-PC trials, there were 368 errors in total across the 34 participants. There 
were 12 non-PC trials for each participant; therefore, each task step has 408 opportunities 
for an error to occur. Figure 6.14 below shows the distribution of the error rates across all 
task steps9.
9 The numbering of the task steps is slightly different from the one in the PC trials because there 
was not an extra step (acknowledging the PC step modal dialog box) after “Next Order” (step [1]) 
in the non-PC trials.
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Figure 6.14: Error rate of each task step in non-PC trials.
The pattern of error rates across task steps is the same as the PC trials; errors that reached 
the 5% systematicity criterion were almost all occurring at the “Selector” steps with 
“Selector DP” having the highest error rate (about 31%). Error at step [5] also has an 
error rate above the criterion but its nature is not overly interesting as mentioned earlier.
Error at the PC step (“xClean”) also appears systematic; although they occur at the PC 
step, they are not PCE as such according to the definition operationalised in the task. 
These errors can be thought of as “extra Cleaning” errors as they were the execution of 
the “Clean” step that was not required in the first place. There were 45 xClean errors in 
total and table 6.26 shows the number and mean error rates in relation to the interruption 
positions.
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Interruption position
Z Other Nil
Total no. of xClean 8 11 26
(Total no. of opportunities) (68) (68) (272)
Mean error rate 11.8% 16.2% 9.6%
(SD) (24.8) (26.7) (16.9)
Table 6.26: Number of xClean and their mean error rates with respect to the different interruption
positions.
A one-way repeated ANOVA on the error rate did not find a significant effect of 
interruption position, F(2, 66) = 1.129, p  = .329. The occurrence of these errors is 
discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
3.2.2 Interruption position effect on non-PCE
There were a total of 323 non-PCEs and they were categorised into “immediately after 
interruption”, “later after interruption” and “no interruption” (including errors before an 
interruption). Table 6.27 shows the number and mean error rates for the non-PCEs 
according to the different interruption positions. 7 of the non-PCEs were resumption 
errors at the PC step after interruption Z. The error is excluded from the analysis to avoid 
confounding the calculation of error opportunities in the “immediately after interruption” 
category. The occurrence of this error is discussed later in the chapter.
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Interruption position Total no. of non-PCE
Immediately Later No 
after after interruption No interruption*
Total no. of non-PCE 
(Total no. of opportunities)
38
(68)
8
(414)
270
(7261) 316
143
(6853)
Mean error rate 
(SD)
55.9%
(36.4)
1.6%
(3.3)
3.7%
(2.5)
2.1%
(1.4)
*This “no interruption" category excludes errors at “Selector DP" step
Table 6.27: Number of non-PCEs and their mean error rates with respect to the different
interruption positions.
Almost half of the errors in the “no interruption” category (127 out of 270) are errors 
occurring at “Selector DP” (step [3]); for the same reason as the previous analysis on PC 
trials, these errors and their error opportunities are excluded from the analysis. A one-way 
repeated ANOVA revealed a large significant interruption position effect, F(1.012, 
33.402) = 74.041, p < .001, Eta squared = .692. Post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni 
correction yielded a reliable difference between “immediately after” and “later after”; the 
difference between “immediately after and “no interruption” was also found to be 
reliable. No significant difference was found between “later after” and “no interruption”.
3.2.3 Categorisation of non-PCE
The non-PCEs were categorised into the same categories identified in the previous 
analysis on the PC trials. Table 6.28 shows the number and the relative proportion of each 
error category. The same pattern of error proportions as the PC trials was obtained; most 
errors were selector-step errors and a relatively small proportion of errors occurred at 
other steps in the task.
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Selector-step errors Miscellaneouserrors
Skip-selector
error
1 nco rrect-seq uence 
error
Skip-and-incorrect
error
No. of 
errors 202 51 5 65
Proportion 63% 16% 1% 20%
Table 6.28: The relative proportion (%) o f the different identified error kinds.
3.2.4 Interruption position effect on selector-step errors
Like the previous analysis, selector-step errors were analysed in relation to interruption 
position. Categorisation of errors into the different interruption positions adopted the 
same logic and procedures as before.
3.2.4.1 Skip-selector errors
More than half of the skip-selector errors (124 out of 202) occurred at “Selector DP” and 
these errors are excluded from the following analysis for the same reason as the analysis 
on PC trials. Table 6.29 below shows the number and mean error rate of skip-selector 
errors with respect to the interruption positions.
Interruption position
Immediately
after
Later
after
No
interruption
Total no. of Skip-selector errors 0 6 72
(Total no. of opportunities) (58) (83) (1491)
Mean error rate 0% 6.3% 4.8%
(SD) (0) (16.1) (5.9)
Table 6.29: Number and mean error rates of skip-selector errors according to different
interruption position.
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A nonparametric test was used in analysing the effect of interruption position on skip- 
selector error because of the occurrence of zero variance in one of the interruption 
position cells. Post hoc comparisons using Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, with Bonferroni 
correction, revealed no reliable difference between “later after” and “no interruption”. As 
there was no error occurrence in “immediately after”; therefore, this is still consistent 
with the previous finding on skip-selector error: its occurrence is not affected by an 
immediately preceding interruption.
3.2.4.2 Incorrect-sequence errors
Skip-and-incorrect errors were also included in the analysis of incorrect-sequence errors; 
yielding a total of 56 errors. Three incorrect-sequence errors occurring at the “Selector 
DP” step were excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, there were 7 resumption errors 
occurring at the PC step and, as in the previous analysis, they were also excluded from 
the analysis. Table 6.30 shows the number and mean error rates of incorrect-sequence 
error and PCE in relation to the interruption positions.
Interruption position
Immediately
after
Later
after
No
interruption
Total no. of Incorrect-sequence errors 38 0 8
(Total no. of opportunities) (68) (141) (1831)
Mean error rate 55.9% 0% 0.4%
(SD) (36.4) (0) (0.8)
Table 6.30: The number and mean error rates of incorrect-sequence errors and PCE according to
the different interruption positions.
A nonparametric test was used in analysing the effect of interruption position on 
incorrect-sequence error because of the occurrence of zero variance in one of the 
interruption position cells. Post hoc comparisons using Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, with 
Bonferroni correction, revealed a reliable difference between “immediately after” versus 
“no interruption”. The result is consistent with the previous findings that there is more
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likely to be an incorrect-sequence error immediately after an interruption than after an 
earlier interruption or no interruption at all.
3.2.5 Errors at “Selector DP” step
A total of 127 errors occurred at the very first compartment step — “Selector DP”. The 
same consistent pattern as the previous experiment was obtained; of all the errors at 
“Selector DP”, over 95% (124/127) were skip-selector errors and the remaining were 
incorrect-sequence errors.
4 Discussion
The current experiment has also successfully generated an overall level of PCEs (about 
27%; 56 out of 204 opportunities) that allows further investigations into the error 
occurrence with respect to the effect of interruption. This further confirms that the design 
of the current task is a successful paradigm in provoking PCEs in an experimental setting. 
Furthermore, a relatively higher overall PCE rate than Experiment 6b (about 16%; 31 out 
of 341 opportunities) is generated with the inclusion of a conditional PC step.
The main finding of the effect of interruption position on PCE has been replicated in the 
current experiment: that an interruption is more likely to result in a PCE when it occurs 
just before the PC step than earlier in the task or with no interruption at all. Moreover, the 
difference in resumption times between the PC step and non-PC steps was also replicated. 
Resuming the PC step after an immediate interruption (i.e. Z) was faster than resuming 
earlier non-PC steps immediately after an interruption (i.e. Other). This further confirms 
that cues in the task environment facilitate resumption of an interrupted task.
Further analysis of other errors for both PC trials and non-PC trials replicated the same 
effect of interruption position; that an error is more likely to occur immediately after an 
interruption than later after or with no interruption at all. Finer grain analyses on errors 
occurring on the selector steps suggest consistent results across both PC and non-PC 
trials: skip-selector errors are not sensitive to the disruptive effect of an immediately 
preceding interruption, whereas incorrect-sequence errors are more likely to occur
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immediately after an interruption. These same patterns of results for skip-selector errors 
and incorrect-sequence errors were also obtained in Experiments 6b and 6c.
The interaction between error type (PCE and incorrect-sequence error) and interruption 
position was found to be significant, which is in contrast to the results of Experiment 6b. 
While the interaction effect might suggest the effect of interruption position has a 
differential effect on PCE and incorrect-sequence error, interpretation of the result needs 
caution. The statistically significant interaction effect is likely to be due to the general 
increase in PCE rate in the current experiment. The average PCE rates for interruption 
positions Other and Nil is about 20% in the current experiment, whereas, in Experiment 
6b the average PCE rate for the two interruption positions is about 8.7%. The increased 
PCE rate in interruption positions Other and Nil in the current experiment might serve as 
an elevated baseline for comparing the error rate immediately after an interruption 
(position Z). As a consequence, the disruptive effect immediately after an interruption 
might be reflected as less pronounced than in Experiment 6b where there is a lower 
baseline PCE rate. However, what is clear in the results of the current experiment and 
Experiment 6b is that both error types — PCE and incorrect-sequence error — are 
sensitive to the disruptive effect of an immediately preceding interruption.
In the current design of the experiment, another type of error — xClean — was obtained 
at the PC step in the non-PC trials. The occurrence of this error is a result of executing the 
PC step when not required to do so. The error appears to be systematic in terms of its 
occurrence. Furthermore, the error was not found to be sensitive to the disruptive effect of 
an immediately preceding interruption. The occurrence of the error suggests 
misremembering, or confusion, of an occasionally required action.
The original objective of the task modification in the current experiment was to imitate 
the less-practised PC step characteristic of Byrne & Bovair’s cyclic task structure in order 
to obtain a higher overall PCE rate. However, the current modification is slightly different 
to Byrne & Bovair’s cyclic task structure. Instead of cycling through a task procedure a 
number of times before completion as in Byrne and Bovair’s task, participants in the 
current experiment were asked at the beginning of some trials to carry out the PC step. In 
retrospect, the modified task has a different element to it, namely a prospective memory
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element, concerned with whether one remembers to carry out some actions in the future 
when the appropriate time comes. Arguably, a conditional-PC step seems to relate to 
prospective memory in that both require remembering to perform some actions in the 
future. The nature of the conditional-PC step is discussed in more detail in the next 
section.
In relation to the current experiment, the occurrence of the xClean error is likely to be the 
result of extra memory load imposed by the prospective nature of the task causing 
misremembering of the action. Similarly, the relatively higher overall PCE rate obtained 
in the PC trials compared to Experiment 6b is also likely to be due to the extra memory 
demand imposed by the conditional PC step. While the PCEs obtained in the current 
experiment might include occasions when participants misremembered the PC action 
(whether to carry it out or not) rather than genuinely forgetting to carry it out, it is 
unlikely that all PCEs obtained are due to misremembering or confusion about the 
required action. This is because the omission of the PC step in the current experiment is 
still found to be sensitive to the effect of interruption position, as was found for PCEs 
obtained in the previous experiments. However, the xClean error, which is suggested to 
be due to misremembering, is not found to be sensitive to the effect of interruption 
position.
The resumption pattern at the PC step involved a few errors carrying out other actions 
rather than moving on to the Call Centre, whereas such errors did not occur in the 
previous experiment. In the PC trials, there was one such error (less than 1 %) and in the 
non-PC trials there were 7 (about 1%). Although the occurrence of the error did not 
appear systematic, as a speculation of the presence of the error, the occasional 
requirement of the PC action might add more memory demands to the PC step resulting 
in other unpredicted erroneous actions.
Consistent results were obtained between PC and non-PC trials in terms of errors at the 
“Selector DP” step: almost all of the errors at that step were skip-selector errors and only 
a few were incorrect-sequence errors. This further confirms the previous finding of 
dissociation between correct task sequence execution and correct usage of the interface.
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Overall chapter discussion
By adopting a similar paradigm to Byrne & Bovair (1997) using a procedural task with a 
fixed task sequence, the current series of experiments has successfully generated PCE 
rates that are high enough for investigations in a laboratory setting. The low PCE rate 
obtained in Experiment 6a led to a comparative analysis between the Doughnut task and 
the Phaser task used in Byrne & Bovair’s study. The analysis suggested several 
differences between the two tasks that might have contributed to the low error rate 
generated from the Doughnut task. In Experiment 6b, the Doughnut task was modified to 
include a competing signal upon task completion and a smaller task (Call Centre) was 
implemented so that one had to physically turn away from the main Doughnut task in 
order to attend to it. Furthermore, the button for the PC step was also modified to appear 
less prominent than originally designed. The inclusion of these modifications in 
Experiment 6b led to a generation of 16% of the overall PCE rate, which was high 
enough to examine the effect of interruption position statistically. In Experiment 6d, the 
task was further modified to make the PC step a less practised step relative to other steps 
in the task. The purpose of Experiment 6d was not only to replicate findings from the 
previous experiment but also to mimic one of the characteristics in Byrne and Bovair’s 
Phaser task.
Given the scant research on PCE, the task paradigm designed and used in this study has a 
significant contribution to the task repertoire in studying the error phenomenon. More 
importantly, the modifications identified and made in the current series of experiments 
reveal not only some important factors in relation to inducing the error in the laboratory, 
but also some properties inherent to PCE. One such property that differentiates PCEs 
from other omission errors is the occurrence of a false completion signal upon task 
completion, which could act as a competing signal against the PC step. Everyday PCE 
examples in procedural tasks, such as photocopying and withdrawing cash from the 
ATM, all involve occurrence of a competing signal when the task goal is fulfilled: having 
the copies or the cash in your hand. This task completion signal is “competing” with the 
PC step because it has a tendency to urge one to move on to the next task goal without 
remembering to perform the secondary PC step.
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The series of experiments investigated the effect of interruption, more specifically the 
effect of interruption position and duration, on the rate of PCE in a procedural task. 
Consistent results were produced in Experiments 6b, 6c and 6d, showing that the rate of 
PCE could be affected by manipulating where the interruption occurs in the primary task. 
The findings are consistent with the predictions made from Altmann and Trafton’s AGM 
model, that interruptions occurring just-before the PC step in a task were more likely to 
result in a PCE than earlier interruptions due to the disruption of associative priming from 
its previous task step. During the interrupting activity, rehearsal of the to-be-resumed goal 
is prevented and its level of activation undergoes a time-based decay process. When the 
interrupting activity is long enough for the to-be-resumed goal to decay, an incorrect goal 
is likely to be retrieved upon task resumption.
The time it took the participants to resume the primary task after an interruption was also 
found to be different depending on where the interruption occurred. A consistent pattern 
of results was found in all three experiments that resumption times were longer when one 
was to resume any of the major task steps before the task was completed, whereas 
resumption times were shorter for the PC step after an interruption. This is likely to be 
due to the relatively lower encoding demand of the PC step compared to the other major 
task steps resulting in faster resumption. The results are consistent with previous findings 
(Monk et al., 2002; 2004) suggesting that the encoding demand before completion of a 
subtask is higher than at the beginning of a subtask or in a repetitive operation. The 
higher encoding demand results in longer resumption time because more information 
needs to be rehearsed about the goal state and its associative links to the next task step.
The effect of interruption position on PCE has a commonality to Chung & Byrne’s (2004) 
finding, though they examined the role of dynamic visual cues in combating PCEs. It was 
found that an effective visual cue to combat PCE had to come into play just in time, i.e. 
just-before the PC step, and that cues occurring early on in the task did not aid the 
reduction of the error. Although the current study and Chung & Byrne investigated 
different manipulations on the error phenomenon, both studies grounded their theoretical 
predictions in the AGM model highlighting the importance of timing of the manipulations 
in relation to PCE.
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Although PCE was found to be sensitive to the effect of interruption position, analyses of 
other errors in Experiments 6b, 6c and 6d suggest that the effect is not unique to PCE. 
Finer grained analyses of other procedural errors suggest that it is more likely to result in 
an error of resuming the correct task step in a sequence (incorrect-sequence error) after an 
immediately preceding interruption than an earlier interruption. The analyses also reveal 
the presence of another kind of omission error: incorrect interface usage (skip-selector 
errors) but correct task sequence execution. These skip-selector errors, however, are 
found not to be sensitive to the disruptive effect of an immediately preceding interruption. 
The distinction between incorrect-sequence error and skip-selector error suggests very 
different manifestation in terms of error behaviour. When an incorrect-sequence error is 
committed, the participant is executing a wrong sequential step in the procedure but 
maintaining the usage of the interface correctly (not forgetting to “select” one of the 
chosen compartments in the Doughnut Machine). In contrast, the commission of a skip- 
selector error suggests that the participant is remembering the sequence of the task 
procedure correctly but using the interface incorrectly. Moreover, these two kinds of error 
respond to the disruptive effect of an immediately preceding interruption very differently: 
an incorrect-sequence error is more likely to occur immediately after an interruption but 
this is not the case for skip-selector error. The commonality between incorrect-sequence 
error and PCE is that their occurrences are increased when preceded by an interruption. 
This might imply that knowledge of a correct task sequence or a PC step during task 
execution has a dynamic nature, which is susceptible to disruption caused by an 
immediately preceding interruption. Whereas knowledge of correct interface usage might 
have a relatively stable nature during task execution and so is less vulnerable to the 
disruption caused by an immediately preceding interruption. This differentially disruptive 
effect of interruption on different error kinds provides support to the general notion that 
occurrence of PCE is not due to deficiency in one’s knowledge of how to use the 
interface but momentary memory lapses caused by factors such as interruption or high 
working memory demand (Byrne & Bovair, 1997).
Analyses of other errors also allow comparison between PCE and incorrect-sequence 
error in terms of the effect of interruption position. However, it is difficult to conclude 
from the current series of experiments whether one kind of error is more disrupted by an
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interruption than the other. This is because there is no interaction effect (error type x 
interruption position) obtained in Experiment 6b but there is in Experiment 6d. Although 
the significant interaction effect yielded in Experiment 6d is attributed to an overall 
increase in PCE rate, consistent across the current experiments is the finding that both 
PCE and incorrect-sequence error are sensitive to an immediately preceding interruption. 
However, the question regarding whether the extent of disruption differentiates between 
the two kinds of error would require further research to explore it fully.
Results from Experiment 6c show that PCEs are sensitive to the disruption effect of 
interruption as brief as 15 seconds. The manipulation used in the experiment does not 
show the predicted interaction effect between interruption position and duration. 
However, the trend of the data is consistent with the predicted direction: overall fewer 
PCEs occur in the 15-second condition than the 45-second condition.
Although the interruption duration manipulation does not yield the predicted effect on 
PCEs, the shorter interruption is found to have a less disruptive effect on another kind of 
error, namely, incorrect-sequence error; showing an interaction effect between 
interruption position and duration. The effect of interruption position on incorrect- 
sequence error persists in the 45-second condition but not in the 15-second condition; in 
other words, the error is increased when immediately preceded by a longer interruption 
but is less affected by a shorter interruption. As mentioned earlier, while consistent results 
from the current series of experiments suggest that both PCE and incorrect-sequence error 
are increased by an immediately preceding interruption, manipulation of interruption 
duration reveals different behaviour between the two kinds of error. Current results 
suggest that PCE is sensitive to interruption as short as 15 seconds but incorrect-sequence 
error is not. Early research on interruption duration (e.g. Gillie & Broadbent, 1989) 
suggests no differential effect on primary task performance; however, results from the 
current study suggests the contrary: different durations can have differential effect on 
different kinds of error. Using more local dependent measures, such as number of errors 
or resumptions times (Trafton et al., 2004), differential disruptive effect imposed by 
different interruption durations can be revealed.
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The overall PCE rate obtained in Experiment 6d is about 10% more than that obtained in 
Experiment 6b and this is attributed to the inclusion of a conditional PC step. The 
characteristic of a conditional PC step is that it only requires execution on some occasions 
within a task, and this is different to the PCEs observed in most everyday situations, such 
as retrieving your original document after photocopying, which requires the execution of 
the PC step every time the main goal is completed. On reflection, although the PC step in 
both Experiment 6d and Byrne and Boviar’s Phaser task is less frequently practised 
relative to other steps in the tasks, the nature of the conditional-PC step manipulation is 
different to the characteristic of a cyclic task structure in the Phaser task. This is because 
the appearance of the condition to carry out the PC step occurs at the very beginning of 
the task in Experiment 6d (notification pops up before the participant could begin the 
doughnut-making process), whereas the PC condition occurs at the very end of the Phaser 
task in Byrne and Bovair’s experiment: a participant is given feedback about whether an 
enemy ship is destroyed after various configuration processes of the Phaser machine are 
done.
In retrospect, the conditional-PC step manipulation in the current study contains an 
element of prospective memory because the participant is notified about the requirement 
of the PC step at the beginning of some trials, and he/she has to carry out that step when 
the appropriate time arrives: in this case, at the end of the task procedure. The prospective 
memory nature of the manipulation is suggested to have added memory load to 
performing the PC step, because the participant needs to remember whether he/she has 
received the notification in a given trial. It is possible that the omissions of the PC step in 
Experiment 6d might not necessarily reflect the occurrences of PCEs entirely. It is 
speculated that the failure to execute the conditional-PC step might be due to two reasons: 
first, the participants genuinely forgot to carry out the PC step, thinking one has reached 
the end of the task and this can be classified as a PCE. Secondly, the participants might 
have actually remembered about the execution of the PC step but did not carry out the 
required action because they misremembered whether the PC step had to be carried out or 
not. In this situation, the omission of the PC step is not necessarily a PCE. This suggests, 
in Experiment 6d, the overall increased error rate at the PC step might contain the error 
due to misremembering as well as occurrences of PCE.
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The extra memory imposed by the conditional-PC step is also reflected in the occurrences 
of a commission error —  xClean (execution of the PC step when it is not required) —  due 
to misremembering of information. Furthermore, the analysis of interruption position on 
the error suggests that it is not sensitive to an immediately preceding interruption. 
However, the occurrence of the commission error is not an intended outcome of the 
current study and the exact nature of the error would require further investigation.
Traditional research on prospective memory and PCE appear to be rather separate and 
this is primarily because of two reasons: first, experimental tasks used to study 
prospective memory are not usually procedural tasks defined by a set of fixed procedures 
as is the case for PCE. Second, a theoretical distinction made is that a prospective 
memory error is concerned with failure to carry a formed intention and prospective 
memory researchers view PCE not being under such distinction because the PC step 
constitutes only a small part of an overall intention (Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1996). 
Speculations made on the conditional-PC step manipulation in Experiment 6d suggest 
that the distinction between prospective memory and PCE might be less clear than one 
used to think. However, this suggestion remains speculative and further research is 
required in order to understand the relation between prospective memory and PCE, or 
better still, if it is possible to make novel experimental or theoretical predictions about 
PCE from the perspective of prospective memory research.
There was another highly systematic error found in the experiments, namely, skip- 
selector error at the very first major step of the task (“Selector DP”). Initial results from 
the current study suggest that the skip-selector error is not sensitive to the disruptive 
effect of interruption. Another intriguing aspect of the error is its highly systematic 
occurrences at the very first step of the main task process. The systematic omission at the 
beginning of a sub-task (forgetting to ‘select’ a compartment before operating on it) 
suggests its role in the task sequence being secondary rather than primary. In other words, 
the subgoal of having to ‘select’ a to-be-operated compartment does not occur as a natural 
step in the task sequence. The structure of the error bears similarity to a PCE in that it 
involves omitting a “secondary” step in a procedure; on the other hand, it is different to a 
PCE in that it occurs at the beginning of a task rather than at the end when the task is
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completed. At the same time, a skip-selector error is extremely similar to, if not the same 
as, the USW error which occurs when one forgets to select a window before interacting 
with it (Lee, 1992). Further research is necessary in order to investigate the nature and 
systematic occurrences of the error.
There are a number of methodological issues stemming from the series of experiments. 
First of all, in Experiment 6a, the between-subject interruption conditions (complex vs 
simple) utilised two interruptions of different nature and durations. The limitation of this 
is the variation of two attributes rather than a single one. However, the objective of 
Experiment 6a is to set up a methodological paradigm to ensure the 75-sec mental 
arithmetic interruption has a disruptive effect. The use of a simple perceptual-motor task 
as a short interruption is to serve as a comparative basis for the longer and more complex 
interruption on its disruptiveness. The use of a seemingly different interruption was not to 
investigate and draw conclusions about the effects of the nature and duration of 
interruptions as such.
Secondly, one might criticise the categorisation of the non-PCEs into the interruption 
position categories as not comparing like for like when compared to the PCEs in 
Experiment 6b and 6d. More specifically, the “no interruption” category containing errors 
from Nil trials as well as from errors before an interruption for non-PCEs. However, this 
particular grouping is argued to be equivalent, at least functionally, to the Nil category for 
PCEs in order to analyse the obtained data in an exhaustive manner.
All in all, the effect of interruption on PCE is clear and robust: an immediate preceding 
interruption is more likely to result in a PCE than an earlier interruption. However, 
further research is required to confirm the effect of the interruption duration on PCE, by 
including a shorter interruption duration than the current 15 seconds to examine the 
predicted interaction effect between interruption position and duration. The AGM model 
serves as a good theoretical framework allowing predictions to be made about the effect 
of interruption. Traditional studies in interruption research did not look at how an 
interruption might affect specific kinds of error. The current series of experiments has 
furthered the understanding of the occurrences of PCE in a procedural task by 
investigating the effect of interruption with an appropriate theoretical framework.
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The next section takes the current general findings of the disruptive effect of interruption 
on PCE and discusses how the various existing theoretical approaches to the error might 
or might not apply to the findings.
Theoretical discussion
The main findings from the series of experiments investigating the effect of interruption 
position on PCE show that the error is more likely to occur immediately after an 
interruption than later after or with no interruption at all. The effect, however, was found 
not to be unique to PCE but to affect other non-PCEs as well, more specifically incorrect- 
sequence errors (errors executing the incorrect task step). The incorrect resumption 
pattern of PCE also highlights that the incorrectly resumed step is, mostly, the next task 
goal in sequence and not just any random task step.
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the major shortcoming in the PCE account offered by 
the AGM framework is that it better explains how PCE is avoided rather than how the 
error occurs. Nevertheless, the framework provides low enough level of specificity to 
generate predictions about the effect of interruptions on the error. The AGM model 
explains the interruption position effect on PCE in terms of three basic notions: first, the 
mechanism of associative cueing in a procedural task; secondly, reliance of cues in the 
environment upon resuming the interrupted task; thirdly, the time-based decay of goal 
memory. An interruption disrupts the associative links in memory between the PC step 
and its preceding step, and during the interrupting activity the activation of the next 
correct subgoal undergoes a decay process. Upon task resumption one relies on cues in 
the environment to cue the next task step. In situations where interruption occurs just 
before the PC step, a false completion signal is the main cue prompting one to move on to 
the next task upon task resumption. As a result, the PC step is omitted. To put it simply, 
associative links in memory cue the PC step, whereas environmental cues (the false 
completion signal) prime the next task goal in sequence. The same explanation can also 
be applied to other errors (e.g. incorrect-sequence errors) during task execution in relation 
to the effect of interruptions. However, the AGM model is not able to explain the
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unanticipated finding that PCEs are more vulnerable to the effect of interruption than 
incorrect-sequence errors.
Chung & Byrne (2004) also adopted the AGM framework to generate predictions about 
the use of dynamic reminders in combating PCE. Although Chung & Byrne’s study had 
the opposite intention to our series of interruption experiments, which investigate factors 
provoking the error, empirical findings from both studies highlight the just-in-time factor 
of the variables manipulated. An effective dynamic reminder was found to be effective 
only if it occurred just-before the PC step. An interruption occurring just-before the PC 
step was found to be more detrimental to the error than interruptions occurring at other 
steps in a task. The AGM framework offers adequate theoretical guidance in explaining 
the two sets of empirical findings.
Byrne & Bovair’s CAPS account of PCE has a rather different decay process to the AGM 
accounts. Instead of a time-based decay process, the process is load-based in CAPS which 
accounts for PCE as a function of working memory demand. It is suggested that the 
occurrence of PCE is “ ...not simply as a result of delay between when the main goal is 
satisfied and when the post-completion step should be executed.” (p. 41). This 
fundamental difference seems problematic in explaining the effect of interruption on 
PCE, which depends on the decay of the PC subgoal during the length of the interrupting 
activity. Despite the difference there are other aspects in the CAPS model suggesting that 
it may be stretched to accommodate the effect of interruption on the error.
In CAPS, activation is spread and maintained from the main goal to its subgoals as long 
as it remains active in memory. When the main goal is completed it gets displaced from 
memory and its subgoals stop receiving activations from it. However, under low working 
memory load, the main goal will remain active in memory for some time upon 
completion and productions for maintaining active goals will fire. This is to propagate 
activation to the PC subgoal so that it gets executed. According to this view, the 
occurrence of an interruption can be seen as replacing the main goal of the primary task 
in memory with the interrupting activity. When an interruption occurs just before the PC 
step, the main goal of the primary task had already been completed. The interrupting 
activity prevents the firing of the goal maintenance productions. As a result, upon task
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resumption, the PC subgoal would not have received enough activation to be executed. 
On the other hand, interruptions occurring earlier or no interruptions at all should not be 
as likely to result in PCEs. This is because the main goal of the primary task is still not 
completed after the interruption and may still propagate activation to the PC subgoal.
So far the CAPS account seems compatible with the interruption position effect on PCE. 
However, there is one problem without a time-based decay process in the CAPS model 
because it has difficulty in explaining the occurrences of errors immediately after an 
interruption. Without a time-based decay mechanism, the CAPS account implies that 
when the system re-engages with the unaccomplished primary task goal, activation 
spreads to its subgoals without any diminishing effect. This results in correct resumption 
every time after an interruption, which is contrary to the results. Furthermore, the CAPS 
model does not take into account the role of environmental cues and this is mostly 
because the model was originally developed to investigate a different phenomenon related 
to PCE, namely working memory demand. The lack of the notion of environmental cues 
in the account makes it difficult to explain the resumption pattern of PCE, i.e., how one 
moves on to the next task.
Poison et al.’s supergoal killoff account has a similarity to the CAPS account in that 
subgoals receive activation and remain active as along as the top-level main goal is 
unaccomplished and active. The difference in the supergoal killoff account is that it takes 
into account feedback from the environment such that, “the goal generation process will 
be driven almost exclusively by prompts and other feedback received from the interface.” 
(p. 745). In this respect, the supergoal killoff account may be extended to explain the 
interruption position effect on PCE. Regarding interruptions occurring just before the PC 
step, the account explains the result of PCE immediately after the interruption in terms of 
the loss of activation supply to the PC subgoal due to the deactivation of the 
accomplished main goal. Moreover, the account explains the resumption pattern of 
moving on to the next task in terms of feedback from a false completion signal in the 
interface. However, the supergoal killoff approach has difficulty in explaining the 
relatively low likelihood in PCE occurrences after an earlier interruption or no 
interruption at all. The goal generation process is proposed as solely dependent on
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feedback from the interface; this predicts that when confronted with the false completion 
signal, one should only move on to the next task forgetting about the PC step.
There are two further issues with the supergoal killoff account. Firstly, without a memory 
decay process, it is not clear how the account could explain the generally high 
occurrences of errors immediately after an interruption. Secondly, the account proposed 
the occurrence of PCE due to similarity between the PC step and its preceding step. 
However, as Byrne & Bovair pointed out, the notion of similarity is difficult to 
operationalise. In terms of the current experimental paradigm, it is hard to argue what 
should be the criteria to determine similarity between the PC step and its preceding step. 
For example, should the criteria be on a physical action level (e.g. button click) or on a 
semantic level of the actions involved?
The Soar account has quite a different theoretical foundation to the other PCE accounts in 
that it has no notion of activation. The occurrence of PCE is due to the asymmetry 
between the initiation and the termination of a subgoal. The termination of a subgoal 
cannot be used to trigger further activities, and when terminated the subgoal and its 
associated structures disappear. When the main goal is completed and terminated, its 
associated PC subgoal just disappears, resulting in a PCE. However, the Soar account 
suggests the presence of compensatory mechanisms, such as self-rehearsal or external 
cueing in the environment, to explain how the error is mostly avoided.
The account may be stretched to explain that immediately after an interruption, it is more 
likely for a PCE to occur because the interrupting activity disrupts the compensatory 
strategies in overcoming the error. As a consequence, there is no rehearsal about the 
execution of the PC step and it is omitted. On the other hand, the account may explain 
fewer PCEs occurring with earlier interruptions or no interruptions at all due to the 
compensatory mechanisms being able to kick in again just before the PC step. However, 
the Soar account does not use the theoretical construct of activation, and hence no notion 
of a decay process. Like the other PCE accounts, without a decay process, the Soar 
approach has difficulties in explaining the generally higher error occurrences immediately 
after an interruption.
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The current discussion suggests that the effect of interruption position on PCE is better 
explained by the AGM model than the other three PCE accounts. This is hardly surprising 
as the CAPS account, the supergoal killoff account and the Soar account were not 
developed to address the effect of interruption on the error. Nevertheless, attempts were 
made to extend these accounts to see how they might provide insights into the current 
findings. On a superficial level, each of these accounts seems able to provide a 
descriptive explanation of the effect of interruption on PCE. However, any account that 
attempts to explain the effect adequately also needs to explain how an immediately 
preceding interruption is more likely to result in error than an earlier interruption or no 
interruption at all. This is because the empirical results suggest that the effect is not 
unique to PCE but also affects errors in executing the correct task sequence. At this level, 
the CAPS model, the supergoal killoff account and the Soar account all have problems in 
offering an adequate explanation. Furthermore, one of the current results suggest that 
PCE might be more vulnerable to interruption than errors due to remembering ones place 
in a task sequence. However, none of the existing accounts could explain this finding 
adequately.
The next chapter is a concluding chapter to summarise the findings and to discuss their 
implications. The concluding chapter ends with an outline of the contribution to 
knowledge of the current thesis and suggestions for further work.
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The first goal of the current thesis has been to identify empirically factors that would 
provoke or mitigate PCE. This goal has been achieved by two series of experiments 
studying PCE in problem-solving (Chapter 3) and the effects of interruption on PCE 
(Chapter 6).
Factors provoking PCE
The first series of experiments shows that PCE can be provoked in a novel experimental 
paradigm —  problem-solving —  obtaining an error rate above the 5% systematicity 
criterion. This finding extends the general finding that the occurrence of PCE is sensitive 
to working memory demands (Byrne & Bovair, 1997; Mortensen, 2003) by requiring 
participants to solve problem tasks “in the head” without aid from the external 
environment. The successful generation of PCE in problem-solving tasks shows that 
anecdotal evidence of PCE occurring in problem-solving activities such as programming 
(Poison et al., 1992) and simple arithmetic can be studied as empirical phenomena in an 
experimental setting. This extends our understanding of PCE in that it does not only occur 
in procedural tasks, which involve executing a set of learned and pre-defined procedures, 
but also in problem-solving tasks, where task execution involves consciously “working 
out” the solutions. Thus, it demonstrates the pervasiveness and robustness of PCE as a 
cognitive phenomenon.
The use of a problem-solving paradigm also constitutes a methodological contribution to 
the study of PCE. The problem-solving paradigm differs from the procedural task 
paradigm used in previous studies (e.g. Byrne & Bovair, 1997) in two ways. First, the 
demand on working memory is an integral component to the problem-solving task itself, 
and this does not require the use of a dual task paradigm, as in Byrne and Bovair’s study, 
where participants are required to carry out a concurrent secondary task. Secondly, the 
generation of PCE does not require extensive training on the participants’ part in doing 
the problem tasks. Future experiments based on this problem-solving paradigm can be 
designed to address questions that are not answered by the current experiments. One of 
the limits of the current experimental design is that it does not examine the effect of 
problem complexity on PCE. The problem tasks used in the current experiments are not 
isomorphic and, consequently, differ in their complexity. Future research can use 
isomorphic problems or determine problem complexities according to some objective
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metrics. A hypothesis to be tested is that problems with different complexities might 
impose different working memory demands, and this might generate different PCE rates.
The hypotheses concerning the effects of interruption position and duration on PCE were 
tested out in the second series of experiments using a procedural task paradigm. The 
AGM model (Altmann & Trafton, 2002) provides a theoretical tool to link two research 
areas together, namely interruption and PCE. The main finding of interruption position 
suggests that occurrence of PCE is sensitive to where an interruption occurs in the task: a 
PCE is more likely to occur immediately after an interruption than after an interruption 
occurring earlier in the task. This finding is consistent with the AGM model’s prediction 
that the increase of PCE immediately after an interruption is because of the disruption of 
associative cueing from the previous task step and decay of the suspended goal. However, 
it would be misleading to conclude that the effect of interruption position is unique to 
PCE. Findings of other errors suggest that errors in remembering the correct step in the 
task sequence (referred to as incorrect-sequence error) are also sensitive to an 
immediately preceding interruption.
The hypothesis about the effect of interruption duration on PCE was not supported by the 
current findings. It was found that PCE is sensitive to an interruption duration as brief as 
15 seconds. However, analysis on other errors suggests that incorrect-sequence error is 
less likely to occur with the 15-second interruption when compared to a 45-second 
interruption. This finding implies that while PCE and other errors, such as incorrect- 
sequence error, are sensitive to the disruptive effect of interruption, PCE seems relatively 
more vulnerable to the short interruption. Studies on interruption duration (e.g. Monk & 
Trafton, 2004) show that very short interruptions can impose cognitive overheads on 
primary task performance. Future research can adopt even shorter interruption duration to 
examine if the disruptive effect on PCE would disappear.
Factor mitigating PCE
The effect of static visual cue was investigated in the series of problem-solving 
experiments. It was found that a simple static cue implemented in pop-up menus can 
reliably reduce the number of PCE occurrences. Although the effect of static visual cues 
is limited in that they do not completely eliminate PCE, they are not completely
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ineffective in combating PCE as claimed by previous research (Chung & Byrne, 2004). A 
practical implication of this finding suggests that when it is impractical to implement a 
dynamic cue, which can occur just-before the PC step, because a system cannot determine 
the end of an interaction, for example in VCR programming, a static cue can still be a 
remedy to reduce PCE.
Interpretation of the findings suggests that the complexity of an interface should be taken 
into account in determining the effectiveness of a visual cue. While static visual cues 
might not be effective in mitigating PCE when used in interfaces with relatively complex 
interactions and controls, such as the Phaser task (Byrne & Bovair, 1997; Chung & 
Byrne, 2004), simple static cues can be effective in combating PCE in simple interfaces 
involving menu-style interactions. A limitation of this finding is that the notion of 
interface complexity is only loosely based on contrast between the menu-style interface, 
in Experiments 3b & 3c, and the interface of Byrne and Bovairs’ Phaser task. A future 
research direction to pursue is what constitutes a complex or visually distracting interface, 
and invoking psychological theories of attention or visual attention might be a possible 
starting place to generate more specific hypotheses to determine the complexity of an 
interface in more specific terms. A further direction to pursue the effectiveness of static 
visual cue is to investigate its benefit with extend time period. A speculation on this issue 
is that the mitigating effect of static visual cues on PCE might diminish in the long run. 
This is because participants might get habituated to the effect of static cues in a prolonged 
period as suggested by Lee’s study (1992).
Relations of PCE in problem-solving and procedural tasks
The empirical investigations of the current thesis suggest that PCE can occur in problem­
solving and procedural tasks and this raises the question of to what extent these tasks 
relate to each other in relation to PCE. There are two aspects to this question: first, it is 
reasonable to suggest that the cognitive processes involve in the two task types are quite 
different. In problem-solving activities, no pre-existing knowledge specifying how to 
solve the task is present and the problem-solver has to “work out” the solution within the 
constraints of the problem. On the other hand, pre-existing knowledge of how to execute 
various steps in a procedural task is present and task execution becomes a matter of 
retrieving the correct information from memory. Although the cognitive processes that
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underlie problem-solving and procedural task execution might be different, it does not 
necessarily mean there should be different mechanisms responsible for PCE occurrences 
in the two types of task. Secondly, the essence of the PC step in the two task types is that 
its execution is not knowledge-dependent; in other words, to carry out the PC step does 
not require one to “work it out” but to remember to retrieve such action from memory. 
Viewing PCE from this perspective, it might be a possible future research direction to 
invoke prospective memory research to see if it aids the understanding of PCE. Although 
traditional prospective memory research (e.g. Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1996) might not 
regard PCE as a prospective memory problem, the fact that a PC step constitutes a 
functionally isolated, or not logically inherent, step to the main task might indicate a 
requirement of prospective remembering in order to carry it out.
Theoretical insights into PCE
The second goal of the current thesis is to gain theoretical insights into PCE and this is 
achieved by the meta-theoretical analysis (Chapter 4), which critically examines the 
existing accounts of PCE. The main problem with the existing accounts of PCE is that 
they have quite different theoretical constructs and, as a result, are difficult to compare 
and contrast against each other. The critical analysis is able to bring the different extant 
theoretical accounts under a coherent structure by addressing three fundamental aspects 
of the error: (1) how the task in question is carried out, (2) how PCE arise from the task 
performance behaviour, and (3) how the infrequent but persistent nature of the error is 
manifested.
One of the outcomes of the meta-theoretical analysis is the identification of associative 
cueing as an important element in the execution of procedural tasks. Among the existing 
accounts, only the AGM model (Altmann & Trafton, 2002) incorporates associative 
cueing in proposing how a procedural task is carried out, as the meta-theoretical analysis 
argues that this is the foundational level, which an account of PCE in procedural tasks 
should be built upon. The notion of associative cueing between procedural task steps 
allows predictions to be made with respect to the effect of interruption position on PCE 
based on the AGM model. Moreover, extending the notion of associative cueing to 
problem-solving tasks, it is argued that such cueing is minimal and this might also 
contribute to the high PCE rate generated in the problem-solving paradigm (Experiment
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3b). Although the AGM model provides a verbal description of how a procedural task is 
carried out and motivates the study of interruption on PCE, it does not specify the 
mechanistic details of how associative cueing occurs. The notion of associative cueing 
provides a good starting point in composing a model of PCE, and there are outstanding 
questions regarding how sequential behaviour occurs in procedural tasks, such as how do 
different task steps link to each other? Is a task step only linked to its immediate 
neighbours or does it also link with task steps in proximity? If so, how strong are the 
links? These questions provide a basis for future research looking into sequential 
behaviour in procedural tasks, which itself is a substantial research area.
The meta-theoretical analysis suggests that any adequate account of PCE should be able 
to account for its infrequent but persistent nature. To address this, it is suggested that a 
model should specify how PCE is avoided by some compensatory strategies in order to 
exhibit the infrequent aspect. At the same time, the compensatory strategies should be 
fragile enough to allow the persistent aspect to occur under cognitively adverse 
conditions. The implication of this notion of infrequent but persistent nature might be 
more general than a characteristic unique to PCE, it might apply to many cases of human 
error that can be classified as slips. The analysis also identifies the occurrence of a false 
completion signal as an important characteristic of PCE, and, when examined closely, not 
all the existing accounts, apart from the CAPS model (Byrne & Bovair, 1997) and 
Reason’s (2002) analysis, include this characteristic in their description of PCE. Future 
research can examine whether it is possible to vary the strength of a false completion 
signal and investigate if this would have an effect on PCE.
Although it is beyond the scope of the current thesis to propose a complete unified 
theoretical account of PCE, the meta-theoretical analysis identifies some important 
characteristics contributing to the occurrence of PCE.
Relation of PCE to other errors
Analyses of the results from Experiments 6b, 6c and 6d also looked at the effects of 
interruption on other errors as well as PCE. This raises the issue of what is the relation of 
PCE to other errors; more specifically, is PCE special?
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In relation to the effects of interruption, it would be misleading to conclude that PCE is 
unique because consistent results from Experiments 6b, 6c and 6d suggest that other 
errors, such as errors involving remembering the correct task sequence (incorrect- 
sequence error), are also sensitive to the disruptive effect of interruption. The effect of 
interruption on PCE and incorrect-sequence error suggests that information held in 
working memory, which allows the correct task step to be executed at the right time, has 
a dynamic nature and is easily disrupted by interruptions. However, results from the 
effect of interruption duration suggest that while PCE is sensitive to interruption as brief 
as 15 seconds, incorrect-sequence error is less affected by the 15-second interruption. 
This finding suggests that although PCE might not be unique in response to the effect of 
interruption, PCE might be more vulnerable to the disruptiveness of interruption when 
compared to other errors. This might be related to a distinguishing feature of PCE, 
namely the presence of a false completion signal. Upon resumption to the primary task, 
the false completion signal might act as a miscue cueing one to move on to the next task 
and omit the PC step.
In contrast to PCE and incorrect-sequence error, it was also found that there are other 
errors, such as skip-selector error (which involves remembering the correct task sequence 
but forgetting the correct usage of the interface), that do not seem to be affected by 
interruptions. The occurrence of skip-selector error is particularly pronounced at the very 
first step (DP selector) of the doughnut-making task. This error is highly similar to the 
USW error (Lee, 1992) that it is the omission of a secondary step at the beginning of a 
procedure. A future experiment can examine the effect of prolonged practice on the error. 
According to Lee’s finding, if the DP skip-selector error is similar to USW error, then the 
error rate should decrease with initial practice and increase again with more practice. An 
interesting manifestation of the DP skip-selector error is that its occurrence is high at the 
first step of the doughnut-making task and that it is not due to misremembering the 
correct sequence of task itself. The occurrence of the DP skip-selector error suggests that 
the dynamic information, for place-keeping, held in working memory is intact but the 
knowledge of using the interface correctly is forgotten. This provides a contrast to PCE, 
whose occurrence is due to disruption to dynamic information in working memory rather 
than knowledge of using the interface correctly.
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Explaining two real-world PCE examples
The following is a description of two PCE cases and the purpose of this is to bring the 
general findings of the current thesis together by articulating how PCE is likely to arise in 
each case.
Case 1: The voice message system at a certain university requires the caller to press the # 
key after saying the message in order to save the message in the system.
In the above case, it is predicted that there will be a high proportion of people forgetting 
to press the # key after speaking the message, and consequently, the message is not 
recorded. The prediction is based on the following rationales: first, it is not unreasonable 
to say that most voice message systems do not require the extra step of pressing the # key 
at the end of a message, therefore, this extra step is probably not in most users’ 
procedural knowledge when leaving a voice message. In other words, the procedure of 
finishing speaking the message is unlikely to act as an associative cue to prime the 
execution of pressing the # key: associative cueing is minimal, if at all, between these two 
steps. Secondly, when leaving a voice message there is a considerable demand on the 
user’s working memory assuming that the user is not reading out loud from a script but 
has to construct what he/she has to say. Thirdly, when the user finishes speaking the 
message this gives a strong false completion signal indicating the end of the task. The 
combination of a lack of associative cueing, high working memory demand and 
appearance of a false completion signal is likely to give rise to PCE in the above case —  
forgetting to press the # key after leaving the message.
Case 2: A user o f a photocopier is making a copy o f a single-sided document. When the 
copy is made and collected, the user is interrupted by his/her boss with a 5- 
minute conversation just before he/she is going to collect the original document.
In this case of a photocopying task, it is predicted that the user is likely to make a PCE —  
forgetting to collect the original document —  due to the interruption. In contrast to the 
case 1, the procedure of the PC action —  collecting the original —  is in the user’s 
procedural knowledge assuming that the user is an experienced user of the photocopier.
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Therefore, under usual circumstances, the action of collecting the desired copy should act 
as an associative cue priming the action of collecting the original. However, the 
conversation with the user’s boss interrupts the associative cueing process, and the length 
of the interruption is likely to be long enough for the subgoal of collecting the original to 
decay below retrieval threshold. When the conversation is over, the user resumes to the 
photocopying task seeing the desired copy in his/her hands, and this acts as a false 
completion signal indicating the end of the task. Moreover, there is no visual cueing 
about the PC step because the original document is hidden under the lid of the 
photocopier. Since the subgoal of collecting the original has decayed during the length of 
the conversation, seeing the desired copy in his/her hand the user leaves and forgets about 
the original document.
The above two cases are used as examples to illustrate the general findings of PCE from 
the current thesis. Although it is possible that there are other factors that might have 
contributed to the occurrence of PCE in the above cases, such as the user’s motivation, 
importance of the original document, time pressure, etc., it is not to claim that the above 
cases are explained exhaustively by the current findings. The use of the PCE cases are 
examples to show that we can anticipate more reliably about the occurrences of PCE in 
certain situations than we previously know about the error phenomenon.
Contribution to knowledge
The current thesis contributes to the substantive knowledge of PCE through a series of 
empirical investigations and a critical theoretical analysis. The empirical findings show 
that, first, the occurrence of PCE extend beyond procedural tasks to problem-solving 
tasks; secondly, PCE is sensitive to where an interruption occurs in a primary task and 
that an interruption as brief as 15 seconds can increase the occurrence of PCE. A simple 
static visual cue is found to mitigate the occurrence of PCE reliably, although complete 
elimination of the error is not possible.
Critical examination of existing PCE accounts through the meta-theoretical analysis 
identifies some important criteria that any adequate model of PCE should take into 
account in future theoretical development. Although it is beyond the analysis to achieve a
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complete account of PCE, it is the first attempt to compare and contrast the different 
theoretical accounts within a coherent structure.
Finally, the use of a novel experimental paradigm in Chapter 3 —  problem-solving —  
and another procedural task in Chapter 6, in addition to the Phaser task (Byrne & Bovair, 
1997), also makes a methodological contribution to the study of PCE. The very first 
experiment in each of the two series of experiments (Chapter 3 and 6) has met difficulty 
in generating PCE, but various methodological shortcomings were identified and 
subsequently rectified. These tasks not only contribute to the limited task repertoire in 
studying PCE, but also meet one of the main difficulties in studying human error in 
laboratory settings: to generate a high enough error rate for subsequent examination.
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Appendix A (i)
Interface instruction manual
Thank you for participating in this Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) study.
In this study, you will be asked to solve a series of problems. Each problem will 
be described to you on a problem sheet which contains all the necessary 
information to solve the problem. Please inform the experimenter once you have 
finished reading the problem sheet and it will be taken away. You will then be 
asked to recall the locations and the objects that you think you will have to enter 
into a computer in solving the problem. For example, if one of the objects in a 
problem is a person named John you should recall the name “John” and not just 
“a person”.
Each problem involves a series of steps to be solved. You will be required to 
enter the answers into a computer. The following is how you would enter your 
answers through the specific interface:
© O  0 Please enter your answers
(  Start ) View History 1 step ; 1
Move □ □  to the □ □ side  of the river
C Finish! ) Enter 'S
After recalling the locations and the objects to be manipulated, please press the 
“Start” button immediately.
Type your answers into the text boxes through the keyboard. You can move 
between the text boxes by hitting the Tab key or via the mouse. Once you are 
happy with the answer you have typed in, you need to hit the “ Enter” button by 
simply pressing the Return key on the keyboard or by using the mouse to click 
the “Enter*' button on the screen.
You are allowed to enter more than one object into the long text box on the left. 
However, please separate the objects with a comma and a space when you do 
so. For example, if you want to enter Peter, Apple and Toy then you should type
in:
Peter, Apple, Toy
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When you think you have reached the solution click on the “Finish” button.
You can use the 1 View History’ drop-down menu to look back at what you did. 
You will see three options when you click on the menu. “ 1 Step” will display the 
previous answer you gave; “2 Steps” will display two previous answers you 
entered; and “Air will allow you to look at all the previous answers you gave. The 
most recent answer is always at the bottom of the window. When you have 
finished looking at what you did before, you can return to entering your answers 
by clicking the “Close" button:
HISTORY -  A ll
"1. Move O bjectl, 0bject2, 0bject3 to the Forrest side of the river
"2. Move Object2, 0bject3 to the Swamp side of the river
"3. Move Objectl to the Swamp side of the river
Close
The “View History” option might come in handy when you’ve forgotten what you 
did previously, however, please ONLY use this option when you feel it is 
absolutely necessary. Furthermore, you should also use the three options 
strategically, i.e. do not view all previous answers when you only need to look at 
the two previous steps.
You will have the opportunity to interact with the interface in a test trial before the 
main trial.
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Your performance will be timed and timing will begin from the point you start 
reading the problem sheet. It is very important that you should perform as 
accurately and quickly as possible.
You will be asked to do the same thing for all the problems. In between problems, 
you are allowed to take a 3-min break. Remember this is NOT a test of your IQ 
so please do not feel pressured.
Any information you provide in this study will be kept confidential. The study will 
last for approximately 30 minutes and you have the right to leave the session if 
you wish.
Any questions?
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Training problem sheet
In this problem you will need to get Object39, Object72 and Object58 from the 
Swamp side of a river to the Forest side. Since this is only a test trial, the 
sequence of steps to solve the problem are already provided and you just need to 
type in the information accordingly. This is to get you comfortable with the 
interface that you will be using.
Please memorise the objects and the sides of the river as you will be asked to 
write them down on a separate sheet of paper. You may begin this test trial by 
handing this sheet back to the experimenter.
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Recall sheet
Objects:
Sides of the river:
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Training problem instruction sheet
Step 1: Start trial by clicking on the “Start” button
Step 2: Send Object39, Object72, Object58 to the Forest side of
the river
Step 3: Send Object39, Object58 to the Swamp side o f the river
Step 4: View previous step made by selecting “1 step” from the
drop-down menu of “View History”
Step 5: Send Object58 to the Forest side of the river
Step 6: View 2 previous steps made by selecting “2 step” from the
drop-down menu of “View History”
Step 7: Send Object72, Object58 to the Swamp side of the river
Step 8: View all previous steps made by selecting “All” from the
drop-down menu of “View History”
Step 9: End the trial by clicking on the “Finish” button
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Reminder sheet
In the series of problems which you will be asked to solve, they all involve moving 
objects from one side of the river to the other. Anything that you move across the 
river are classified as objects. For example a nurse, Fred, a cat, a carrot and a 
canoe are all classified as objects.
There are different rules which you have to follow in order to solve each problem 
in a particular sequence of steps. Each step you make, you have to indicate all 
the necessary objects that will be moved across the river by entering them into 
the left-hand-side text box and the corresponding side of the river into the right- 
hand-side text box.
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The Father & Son (FS) problem
Bob and his two sons, Jim and Chris, want to go to the Christmas fair near their 
village. In order to get to the fair, which is on a small island next to the village, 
they have to go across a river. The only means of conveyance is a small boat 
which is moored on the river bank. The maximum capacity of the boat is 200 
pounds and any weight more than that will sink it. The boat does not have a auto­
pilot system and cannot get across the river without a passenger.
Jim and Chris both weigh 100 pounds each while Bob weighs 200 pounds. 
Assuming all three of them can operate the boat, how can they all get from the 
village side to the fair side of the river without getting anyone soaking wet?
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The Dog, Hen & Corn (DHC) Problem
Mrs. Jones, a farmer, is on her way to the market with her trusty dog, Shep. The 
market is on the other side of a river. Getting to market always used to involve a 
long detour round the river. However, Mr. Edison, the local inventor who lives at 
the bank of the river decided to rig up a rope-pulley contraption to allow them to 
get straight across. It consists of a rope slung between pulleys on either bank, 
with a seat just big enough for one person plus one thing to carry with. Whoever 
finishes using the seat always return it to the market side, where Mr. Edison lives, 
so that it is easy for him to take it in each evening. On arriving at the river when 
going to the market Mrs. Jones pulls the seat across from the far side using the 
rope. She gets in, hugging Shep then pulls herself across the river and continues 
into the market.
On the occasion in question Mrs. Jones buys a new hen and a sack of corn from 
the market. Returning home, from the market side, later in the day she arrives 
back at the river, and quickly realises she has a problem. She can only carry one 
thing across with her at a time and she has to be on the seat in order to offload 
whatever she is bringing with her when reaches the other side of the river. She 
will have to make more than one trip. This time it is worse than that however: if 
she leaves the hen and the corn alone on either side, the hen will eat the corn; 
similarly if she leaves Shep and the hen together on one side Shep will worry the 
hen, which may mean it stops laying eggs. Shep is not interested in eating corn 
so it will come to no harm with him.
How can Mrs. Jones get everything across, from the market to the home side of 
the river, uneaten and continue on her way?
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The simplified Missionaries & Cannibals (sMC) Problem
In the island —  Tau —  the missionaries have been attacked by the cannibals 
and both parties are now fighting for survival. After a few days of battle, there 
remains two missionaries and two cannibals. While the cannibals never say no to 
more dinner and the missionaries are fighting to save their lives, both parties spot 
a boat by the left side of a river in the island. The boat is connected to a rope- 
pulley system and the passenger has to send the boat back to where it was, in 
order for other passengers to get across, after it has reached the opposite side of 
the river. Of course there is no other way to get across the river apart from using 
the boat!
Intrigued by the discovery the two cannibals wanted to explore the other side of 
the island and the missionaries are hoping to be able to escape from the 
cannibals if they could get to the other side of the river. With the mutual objective 
of reaching the other side of the river, both parties agree to stop the battle and try 
crossing the river on the boat.
Although all four of them know how to operate the boat, it has a maximum 
capacity of only one person. This means that the passenger has to disembark 
before the next trip. To make things worse, if, at any time, there are more 
cannibals than missionaries on either side of the river, those missionaries will be 
eaten by the cannibals!
How can all four get from the left side to the right side of the river without any 
missionaries being eaten?
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Solutions for the FS problem:
Solution 1 Solution 2
Step Object(s) Side of the 
river
Object(s) Side of the 
river
1 Chris, Jim, boat fair Chris, Jim, boat fair
2 Chris, boat village Jim, boat village
3 Bob, boat fair Bob, boat fair
4 Jim, boat village Chris, boat village
5 Chris, Jim, boat fair Chris, Jim, boat fair
Solutions for the DHC problem:
Solution 1 Solution 2
Step Object(s) Side of the river Object(s) Side of the river
1 Mrs. Jones, 
hen, seat
home Mrs. Jones, 
hen, seat
home
2 Mrs. Jones, 
seat
market Mrs. Jones, 
seat
market
3 Mrs. Jones, 
Shep, seat
home Mrs. Jones, 
corn, seat
home
4 Mrs. Jones, 
hen, seat
market Mrs. Jones, 
hen, seat
market
5 Mrs. Jones, 
corn, seat
home Mrs. Jones, 
Shep, seat
home
6 Mrs. Jones, 
seat
market Mrs. Jones, 
seat
market
7 Mrs. Jones, 
hen, seat
home Mrs. Jones, 
hen, seat
home
8 seat market seat market
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Solution for the sMC problem:
Solution 1
Step Object(s) Side of the river
1 Cannibal, boat right
2 boat left
3 Missionary, boat right
4 boat left
5 Missionary, boat right
6 boat left
7 Cannibal, boat right
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Training problem sheet
Toby is an architect and he has a passion for assembling models of not just 
buildings but also toy cars, tanks, planes etc. He lives in a house, which is 
designed by himself, just outside London. His house is in a very quiet spot and is 
separated from the nearest town by a very charming river. Across the river is 
Toby’s favourite coffee shop, whenever he fancies a coffee (and maybe a piece 
of cake as well sometimes) he would have to make a detour and drive around the 
river to get to this coffee shop. One day Toby has this rather neat idea of building 
his own little remote-controlled toy boat to bring coffee across the river to his 
house so that he doesn’t have to drive! The little boat has two purposely-shaped 
containers to carry a coffee and a piece of cake. It cannot carry two coffees or 
two cakes at the same time. Now the ordering involves just a simple phone call to 
the coffee shop to place the order and the staff will then put the coffee (and cake 
sometimes) into the little boat for Toby to steer back to his house. After each 
order, the boat is always sent back to the coffee shop side of the river, as a 
convenience to the staff for the next order.
Today, Toby has a couple of friends around to his house for coffee and he 
decided to show off his new toy! The total order came to a Latte, a Cappuccino, a 
filter coffee, a muffin and a brownie. How can Toby get all of the order back to his 
house from the coffee shop with a minimum number of trips across the river? 
Please also send the boat back to the coffee shop when finished taking 
everything across.
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Check list
The following statements are related, one way or the other, to the story you just read, 
some of them are true while some are not. Please tick next to the statements which you 
think are true. If the statement were true, please indicate how important (Not at all, 
Moderate or Very) it would be to you in solving the problem.
| | Toby is an architect 
Not a t  a l l  Moderate Very
I I The total order includes a Cappuccino, a Latte, a filter coffee and a muffin 
Not a t  a l l  Moderate Very
I I The boat is built by Toby’s friends 
N ot a t  a l l  Moderate Very
□  The total order includes a Cappuccino, a Latte, a filter coffee, a brownie and a
muffin
N ot a t  a l l Moderate Very
I I The boat can carry two cakes
Not a t  a l l Moderate Very
EZI Toby lives opposite a coffee shop across a river
Not a t  a l l Moderate Very
I I The boat is always sent back to the house side of the river after use
Not a t  a l l Moderate Very
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I | Toby lives opposite a toy shop across a river 
Not a t  a l l  Moderate Very
□  The boat can carry two coffees
Not a t  a l l  Moderate Very
I I The boat can carry one coffee and one cake 
Not a t  a l l  Moderate Very
I I Toby is an interior designer 
Not a t  a l l  Moderate Very
I I The boat is always sent back to the coffee shop side of the river after use 
Not a t  a l l  Moderate Very
I I The boat is built by Toby 
Not a t  a l l  Moderate Very
□  The total order includes a Cappuccino, a filter coffee, a brownie and a muffin 
Not a t  a l l  Moderate Very
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The Lion, Monkey & Banana (LMB) Problem
Jerry is a circus trainer and one day he is going back to the circus after some 
shopping in town. This time Jerry is going back with his favourite pet, Rambo, a 
well-tamed lion, a monkey and a banana. The circus and the town are separated 
by a river and the only way to get across it is by using a boat, which is big enough 
for Jerry to carry two things with him.
Crossing the river is a little tricky for Jerry this time. If he leaves the monkey and 
the banana alone on either side of the river, the cheeky monkey will eat the 
banana before they get back to the circus; similarly if he leaves Rambo and the 
monkey alone on either side Rambo will harm the monkey. But Rambo is not 
interested in the banana so it will come to no harm with him. Jerry has to be in 
the boat in order to offload whatever he is bringing with him when getting across 
the river.
How should Jerry get everything across the river, from the town side to the circus 
side, uneaten and unharmed?
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The 3 Guests (3G) Problem
Mario and Luigi live in a small village where things are simple and quiet. The 
village is separated from the main town by a river. To get into town, Mario and 
Luigi would use a boat to get across the river.
One day, Mario and Luigi had three guests over for a dinner party. After the 
lovely dinner, Mario and Luigi had to escort their guests to the town side of the 
river. Getting across the river needs a bit of planning this time, since the boat is 
only big enough for Mario and Luigi together or one of their guests at a time. The 
boat is not even big enough for one guest with Mario or Luigi. So how can all the 
guests get across to the town side of the river?
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The Torch (Trch) Problem
Adam, Ben, Charles and David all go to the same secondary school and are very 
good friends with each other. The four of them always hang out together and 
sometimes they are a bit adventurous and spend a night in a forest nearby. This 
is considered a daring night out for them as they do this without their parents’ 
permission! And of course they will all be in trouble if found out as the forest is 
not a particularly safe place to be in at night. One night the four of them are out in 
the forest again for their adventurous exploration. This time they find a river which 
they had not noticed before. On the bank there is a boat attached to a pulley 
system which allows it to be sent across the river. Being all adventurous and 
daring, the boys decide to get across the river and find out what lies on the other 
side! When they reach the other side of the river, they have to send the boat back 
to the forest so that no one will notice it has been used.
However, getting across the river is not a straight forward task. It is totally dark 
and the boys are sharing one torch between them. The light torch only has 
batteries to last for 17 mins. Each person takes different times to get across the 
river; Adam 10 mins, Ben 5 mins, Charles 2 mins and David 1 min. None of them 
is brave enough to get across without the torch. The boat can only take a 
maximum of two people at a time and it will only go at the slower person’s speed. 
How can all four get from the forest to the other side of the river in 17 mins? The 
torch cannot be transported on its own using the boat.
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The Itchy & Scratchy (IS) Problem
Two mafia gangs, Itchy and Scratchy, in New York have planned a bank robbery 
operation in Lower Manhattan. The operation involved three members from each 
family. In this targeted bank, it is not just the cash they are interested in but also a 
suitcase of rare black diamonds. Both gangs got the money and also the suitcase 
of diamonds. As they went out of the bank, they were surrounded by the FBIs! 
However, both gangs did not just surrender but began a street war with the FBIs. 
After a series of gun shots and car chase, the two gangs managed to lose the 
FBIs and went outside the city. They reached the Hudson river and there they 
found a reasonably sized crate attached to a pulley system which the locals use 
for transporting goods across the river. Both parties decided to go to the other 
side of the river which they thought as a temporarily safe hiding place. They 
realise that they have to send the crate back to the initial side when they reach 
the other side so no one would suspect that it had been used.
Each gang wants the suitcase of diamonds for themselves and the dynamics of 
the two gangs have now changed... The Itchies have used up all their bullets and 
the Scratchies will shoot the Itchies whenever there are more Scratchies than 
Itchies on either side of the river. Neither gang trusts the other with the suitcase, 
this means that the suitcase cannot be left on either side of the river while 
crossing. The suitcase needs to be in the crate all the time with a gang member 
in case the crate tips and it falls into the river. It cannot be transported on its own 
to the other side. The crate is only big enough for two people max. How can all 
members of the two gangs go from the initial side to the other side of the river 
without anyone getting shot?
Note: If there is one Scratchy on one side already and you are moving one Itchy and 
another Scratchy to that same side, this will cause the Itchy to be shot even if one 
of the Scratchies immediately go to the other side. So such a move is an illegal 
move.
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Solution for the training problem:
Solution
Step Object(s) Side of the river
1 Muffin, Filter Coffee House
2 Boat Coffee Shop
3 Latte, Brownie House
4 Boat Coffee Shop
5 Cappucino House
6 Boat Coffee Shop
Note: The choice o f coffee and cake to be transported does not have to be those as 
indicated. The combination o f coffee and cake is not fixed as long as it conforms to 
the constraint o f the problem.
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Solution for the LMB problem:
Solution
Step Object(s) Side of the river
1 Jerry, Rambo, Banana Circus
2 Jerry Town
3 Jerry, Monkey Circus
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Solution for the 3G problem:
Solution 1 Solution 2
Step Object(s) Side of the river Object(s) Side of the river
1 Mario, Luigi Town Mario, Luigi Town
2 Luigi Village Mario Village
3 Guest Town Guest Town
4 Mario Village Luigi Village
5 Mario, Luigi Town Mario, Luigi Town
6 Luigi Village Mario Village
7 Guest Town Guest Town
8 Mario Village Luigi Village
9 Mario, Luigi Town Mario, Luigi Town
10 Luigi Village Mario Village
11 Guest Town Guest Town
12 Mario Village Luigi Village
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Solution for the Trch problem:
Solution 1 Solution 2
Step Object(s) Side of the river Object(s) Side of the river
1 Charles, David Other Charles, David Other
2 David Forest Charles Forest
3 Adam, Ben Other Adam, Ben Other
4 Charles Forest David Forest
5 Charles, David Other Charles, David Other
6 Boat Forest Boat Forest
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Solution for the IS problem:
Solution 1 Solution 2
Step Object(s) Side of the river Object(s) Side of 
the river
1 Itchy, Scratchy Other Scratchy, Scratchy Other
2 Itchy Initial Scratchy Initial
3 Scratchy, Scratchy Other Scratchy, Scratchy Other
4 Scratchy Initial Scratchy Initial
5 Itchy, Itchy Other Itchy, Itchy Other
6 Itchy, Scratchy Initial Itchy, Scratchy Initial
7 Itchy, Itchy Other Itchy, Itchy Other
8 Scratchy Initial Scratchy Initial
9 Scratchy, Scratchy Other Scratchy, Scratchy Other
10 Scratchy Initial Scratchy Initial
11 Scratchy, Scratchy Other Scratchy, Scratchy Other
12 Crate Initial Crate Initial
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DHC problem space graph
Note:
J stands for Mrs. Jones 
D stands for Dog 
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Trch problem space graph
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Thank you fo r taking part in this study of Human-Computer Interaction. In  
this session you will be playing a computer-based game called "The Wicket 
Doughnut Machine".
In  this game you are the baker and you have two tasks:
1) Make doughnuts using the Wicket Doughnut Machine. However, the 
doughnut machine is slightly faulty, and you, as the baker, has to try  your 
best to make the right amount of doughnuts ordered! I t 's  no good to your 
bakery to produce more than the order and it's defin ite ly not a good way to 
keep your customers to make less than the order!
2) Pack doughnuts into boxes via the Doughnut Packaging Express
There is a specific way to operate the machine and you will be walked 
through the instructions step-by-step.
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The Wicket Doughnut Machine
Below is th e  Wicket Doughnut Machine... it has five main 
compartments: Dough Port, Froster, Fryer, Puncher and Sprinkler.
T im e e la p s e d
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T
The five compartments need to be opera ted  in th e  following 
sequence:
Dough Port ® Puncher ® Froster ® Sprinkler ® Fryer
Otherwise, the  machine will not work!
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Doughnut Packaging Express
During some testing tria ls  you may see a screen, as below, while operating 
the doughnut machine. When such screen appears you need to pack the 
number of arrived doughnuts into two d iffe ren t sizes of boxes.
In  this example, 24 doughnuts have arrived so you can use either:
24 1-doughnut boxes or,
4 5-doughnut boxes and 4 1-doughnut boxes.
But you can't use 5 5-doughnut boxes to pack all 24 doughnuts. That will 
leave extra space fo r  the doughnuts so they are not tigh tly  packed and get 
squashed during delivery! This will count as a wrong answer and decrease 
your accuracy.
This Doughnut Packaging Express will appear fo r  a fixed amount of time. 
During this time you need to try  and complete as many tria ls as you can.
Accuracy
24 doughnuts have arrived!
B o x  ca p a c ity : 1 d o u g h n u ts 5  d o u g h n u ts
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You will need to  do a to ta l o f  10 tr ia ls  on th e  W icket 
Doughnut Machine. A fte r  th e  f ir s t  5 tr ia ls  you will be  
asked if you would like to  have a break and may do so as 
you wish.
This is not an assessm en t or a t e s t  o f  IQ . You are 
only required to  follow  th e  instructions ju st  presented  
and carry out th e  trials. However, you are encouraged to  
perform as quickly and accurately as you can in each task  
and in each trial.
Any questions?
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Fitts’ Law calculations for Experiment 6a
The purpose of these calculations is to provide an approximation of the physical 
movement times involved in resuming the PC step and the various “Selector” step. For 
both sets of calculation, the starting point of the resumption movement is assumed to be 
the location of the “Pack” button in the interrupting Doughnut Packing task. The 
calculations are only meant to be rough approximations, therefore, various estimations 
that have also been made are stated.
Fitts’ Law states that:
Movement time (in msec) = a + b log2(D / S + 1)
where a and b are parameters determined empirically. D is the distance of the movement 
measured and S is the size of the target (usually the width of a button). For the current 
purpose the values of a and b used are adopted from Raskin’s (2000) recommendation, 
which are 50 and 150 respectively.
Calculation for resumption movement time of the PC step:
S = 2.3 cm (width of the “Clean” button)
D = 16.5 cm (this is the distance measured from the centre of the “Pack” button, on the 
interrupting task screen, to the centre of the “Clean” button on the primary 
task screen, which is at the upper right corner of the screen layout)
Movement time (in msec) = 50+ 150 log2(/6.5 / 2.3 + 1)
= 505 msec
Calculation for resumption movement time of a “Selector” button:
S = 0.4cm (width of a “Selector” button)
D = 6.5 cm (rather than measuring distances of all 5 “Selector” buttons 
individually, the distance is measured from the centre of the “Pack” button, on the 
interrupting task screen, to the space in the middle of the 5 “Selector” buttons on the 
primary task screen. This measurement should serve as a “good enough” approximation 
as the 5 buttons are relatively close in proximity.)
Movement time (in msec) = 50 + 150 log2(6.5 / 0.4 + 1)
= 670 msec
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Fitts’ Law calculations for Experiment 6b, 6c and 6d
The approach of the calculations for Experiment 6b, 6c and 6d is the same as 6a.
Calculation for resumption movement time of the PC step:
S = 1.9cm (width of the “Clean” button)
D = 4.5 cm (this is the distance measured from the centre of the “Pack” button, on 
the interrupting task screen, to the centre of the “Clean” button on the primary task 
screen, which is at the lower right comer of the screen)
Movement time (in msec) = 50 + 150 log2(4.5 / 1.9 + 1)
= 310 msec
Calculation for resumption movement time of a “Selector” button:
This is the same calculation as Experiment 3.1 since there were no changes made to the 
position or size of the “Selector” buttons and the “Pack” button in Experiment 6b, 6c and 
6d.
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